Hard truths from
Pyongyang's prodigal son
By Andrei Lankov
May 31, 2012
SEOUL - It seems that every royal family is bound to have a
maverick prince - and Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il,
fills the role for North Korea's ruling family.
Kim Jong-nam was born in 1970. Soon afterwards, his mother Song Hye
Rim, a beautiful actress, broke up with his father. Nonetheless,
the boy spent his childhood in the palaces of the Kim family and
then in expensive overseas schools. For a brief time, he was even
considered the most likely successor to his father.
For various reasons, things went awry and for the past 15 years or
so, Kim Jong-nam has lived in China and the Chinese territory of
Macau, visiting North Korea only occasionally.
From 2002 or 2003, Kim Jong-nam began to behave strangely (at least
in one important regard) - he became the only member of
the Kim family who was not completely and
unconditionally media shy. If intercepted by foreign journalists,
he usually was happy to engage in
conversation.
In most cases, what transpired was merely a little
small talk, but it showed in and of itself the fact that North
Korea's black prince was nonetheless witty and charismatic. With
the passage of time, his occasional interviews have become more
substantive in content and more politically frank. In 2010, he even
went so far as to openly voice his disapproval of the hereditary
power transfer at that point developing in Pyongyang, with Kim
Jong-eun being prepared to take over from his father, which
happened after Kim Jong-il died in December last
year.
However, the real bombshell was dropped earlier this
year when Yoji Gomi, a journalist for Japan's Tokyo Shimbun,
published a book that described his interactions with Kim Jong-nam.
In most cases, these were limited to the exchange of e-mails, but
there were a few meetings as well and at one point, Yoji Gomi was
granted a long interview with Kim Jong-nam.
This interview was published in the Tokyo Shimbunin
early 2011, but the book itself adds much to what was initially
published.
Interestingly, it was Kim Jong-nam that sought out
Yoji Gomi. In 2004, at Beijing Airport, Kim Jong-nam ran into a
group of foreign journalists, most of whom handed to the North
Korean prince - then still widely seen as the most likely successor
- their business cards. Somewhat surprisingly, Kim Jong-nam sent
e-mails to some of them, but as far as we know now, Yoji Gomi was
the only journalist to successfully establish a long-term
connection with Kim Jong-nam.
For the subsequent years, they exchanged e-mails and
occasionally met in person as well.
In these exchanges, Kim Jong-nam was seemingly quite
careful. He did not divulge information related to the personal
lives or factional struggles of the leadership in Pyongyang. He
also made it clear that he has no political power in the North (he
is a half brother to current leader Kim Jong-eun). He has
studiously avoided explaining how he was able to enjoy the highly
agreeable lifestyle he does in Macau and refused to talk about the
origins of his considerable personal wealth.
In other words, it is clear that Kim Jong-nam said
only a fraction of what he knows. Nonetheless, the book is the most
frank testimony to have emerged from the ruling elite in Pyongyang,
of whom Kim Jong-nam was once a very important
part.
The single-most important topic in the
Japanese-language book, titled My Father,
Kim Jong-il, and Me, is the (im)possibility of
Chinese-style reforms in North Korea (the book is also published in
Korean). Indeed, for nearly two decades, many outside observers
have expected that North Korea would eventually emulate the
stunning success of China and embark on similar market-orientated
reforms which are apparently all but certain to revive the
country's moribund economy.
Some other observers, including the present author,
have been less optimistic; they have indicated that in the peculiar
case of North Korea, which faces a "dirty rich" and free South,
attempts at reform and relaxation are highly dangerous politically.
In the unique case of North Korea, attempts at reform are likely to
produce a collapse followed by absorption by the South, rather than
a Chinese-style boom.
It seems that Kim Jong-nam's statements have
confirmed that the pessimists were correct in their assessments of
North Korea's reasoning on the issue (being one of the pessimists
himself, the ego of present author feelings well massaged by Kim
Jong-nam's remarks).
In a number of his letters and interviews, Kim
Jong-nam has clearly stated his belief that market-orientated
reforms would probably revive the North Korean economy. In one
case, addressing his half-brother Kim Jong-eun (by that time
already the successor to Kim Jong-il), he implored him to have pity
on the common people and follow the Chinese
example.
However, in many other cases, Kim Jong-nam is far
less certain about the potential positive impact of reforms. In his
interview in January 2011, he said, "I personally believe that
economic reforms and openness are the best ways to make life better
for the North Korean people. However, taking North Korea's unique
position into account, there is a fear that economic reforms and
openness will lead to the collapse of the present
system."
At other points, Kim Jong-nam repeated the same
point: "The North Korean leadership is stuck in a bind. Without
reforms the country's economy will go bankrupt, but reforms are
fraught with the danger of systemic
collapse."
In one of his letters discussing with Yoji Gomi the
then-recent Fukushima nuclear disaster and resultant electricity
shortages in Japan, Kim Jong-nam emphasized that apparent
similarities with North Korea were superficial. He said, "North
Korea's electricity problems result from North Korea's systemic
economic problems."
One cannot be more certain on this issue. Kim
Jong-nam confirms that North Korea's leaders are aware of the
potential economic benefits of reforms. They are, however,
concurrently aware of the huge associated political risks and hence
they remain indecisive.
Kim Jong-nam mentions that around 2006, the
North Korean leadership created a special group whose task was to
study the Chinese experience and suggest ways in which North Korea
could emulate China's success.
The head of the group was Chang Song Taek, the
brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il, and at present seemingly regent
(either as advisor or maybe as actual ruler) to Kim Jong-eun.
According to Kim Jong-nam, the "Chang Song Taek committee" could
not come up with any recommendations. Thus North Korea has
continued its politically safe and economically disastrous
course.
Kim Jong-nam touched on another sensitive
issue - the hereditary succession. He is known to have voiced his
disapproval of hereditary transfer of power in other interviews,
but in his exchanges with Yoji Gomi he sounded more
ambivalent.
On one hand, Kim Jong-nam admits that the idea of
hereditary succession is clearly anachronistic. He said, "[The
world] having left behind the era of feudal monarchies, so we are
an unusual laughing stock."
Kim Jong-nam has even claimed that his father was
initially unsupportive of further hereditary succession. On the
other hand, Kim Jong-nam is less critical, he emphasizes the fact
that the hereditary power transfer makes a lot of sense
domestically since the people of North Korea have grown used to the
idea of being run by members of the "Paektusan
family".
Kim Jong-nam does not explicitly use the word
"legitimacy", but this is clearly what he means. He goes on to
claim that hereditary succession might not be such a bad idea after
all, since it will lead to continued stability in the North, which
he claims is in everyone's interests.
Another important issue that is raised in the book
is the growing level of North Korea's economic dependency on China.
These remarks are important because Kim Jong-nam is often seen as a
"Beijing man", a person who lives under Chinese control and might
be even become a head of a pro-Chinese regime if such a regime was
ever to emerge in Pyongyang.
Actually, Kim Jong-nam admitted that the Chinese had
much interest in him, so he lived under a mixture of protection and
surveillance by the Chinese authorities.
Kim Jong-nam is not particularly hostile to China,
but he is hardly sycophantic when it comes to describing Chinese
policies. On the one hand, Kim Jong-nam admits that China's major
goal is to maintain the status quo in the region. At the same time,
however, he also states that China hopes to establish control over
the North Korean economy - a development that "cannot be welcomed
from North Korea's point of view".
Therefore, we have an interesting piece of important
evidence coming from a source very close to Pyongyang's
decision-makers. Kim Jong-nam's revelations confirm that
these people are smart, rational and know perfectly well what they
are doing. Unfortunately, their overriding goal is regime survival
and this goal is not necessarily compatible with the interests of
their own people, let alone outside
players.
But this leaves us with an important question: why
did Kim Jong-nam reveal all of this? After all, Kim Jong-nam
initiated contacts with Yoji Gomi and did not mind discussing many
sensitive issues (and he also talked to a number of other foreign
journalists with comparable level of
openness).
Does this mean that he has decided to partake in the
high politics, so he wants to position himself as the voice of
moderate opposition and win some domestic (or foreign) political
support? Or does it mean the opposite - that Kim Jong-nam wants to
distance himself from North Korean politics, whose moral
shortcomings he obviously knows only too
well?
Or is it a non-political gesture, an attempt to
voice some opinions and concerns that Kim Jong-nam believes should
be voiced?
We do not know the answers to these
questions. Nonetheless, the surprisingly frank comments of this
charming, smiling and overweight North Korean princeling provide us
with a rare insider's view into Pyongyang's way of
thinking.
Unfortunately, these insights do not create much
ground for optimism about North Korea's
future.
Andrei Lankov is an associate
professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, and adjunct research
fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with
emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and
North Asia.
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