A lesson for all you bastards.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2009/949/op1.htm
Toothless counsel
Opposition forces have been reduced by Arab regimes to servile
advice givers, neglecting the aspirations of the people whose
interests they exist to better defend, writes Azmi
Bishara
Some Arab opposition forces criticise this regime or that for
pursuing policies that run counter to its own interests. On what
grounds does the opposition presume it is more aware of the
regime's interests than the regime itself? The very charge is a
sign of weakness in the opposition force that levels it. It is not
the job of the opposition to offer advice on what is in a regime's
best interests. Its job is to criticise a regime's policies on the
basis of their assessment of what is in the country's and the
people's best interests.
Opposition in politics does not exist for its own sake. The
exception to this is the critical eye of a handful of intellectuals
who make a mission of constant critique and analysis. While such a
practice plays a part in politics it is generally not politicised.
Still, it remains an essential complement to political activity and
in order to perform its function its practitioners must avoid the
type of attitudes and behaviour that cheapen it, such as
superficiality, vanity, exhibitionism and egoism. By the latter I
mean indulging such personal whims or obsessions by playing the
role of victim; venting emotions such as love, hate, envy or
rancour; or avenging oneself on particular people. By
exhibitionism, I refer to the tendency of the critic to care less
about his subject and his function and more about projecting an
image of himself as an enfant terrible or a permanent and flippant
devil's advocate.
Apart from this there is no opposition in politics for opposition's
sake. Of course there are people who oppose out of personal
motives. A person might, for example, aspire to a government post
and attempt to fulfil this ambition by grandstanding in the hope of
forcing the government to award him an appointment merely to shut
him up. Another may be similarly opportunistic, but his ambitions
overlap with the aims of the opposition -- his hope for growing
status and influence is linked with the arrival of the opposition
to power. Such personal motives are considered legitimate in
politics, albeit within limits. In all events, they have little
bearing on our subject here, which is the political opposition
movement or party.
In pluralistic democracies that permit for the peaceful rotation of
power, the opposition advocates a platform of policies that
conflict with those of the government. It claims that in order for
these policies to be put into effect it must be voted into power or
invited into sharing power. Protest movements and pressure groups,
by contrast, try to influence the ruling government but do not
strive for power. They do not present themselves as alternatives to
the government. Rather, they oppose certain policies and try to
press the government into changing these policies and meeting their
demands. In democratic states there are numerous instances of
protest movements transforming themselves into political parties
after having accomplished their initial mission. There are also
cases of opposition parties or forces using protest movements for
their own ends. If the government is unable or unwilling to meet
the protesters' demands, they can be mobilised in favour of the
opposition. Conversely, the opposition may attempt to infiltrate
the protest movement and manoeuvre it in such a way as to forestall
the government's meeting its demands, for fear that if the
government did concede this would weaken the opposition and
undermine its prospects for the next elections. Protest movements
sometimes try to steer clear of the influence of opposition parties
and forces precisely because they fear the reaction of the ruling
authorities that are perfectly aware of the aforementioned
tactics.
The aim of the political opposition in democratic systems is to
attain and/or share power. This is the only reason for establishing
and organising a political party. Of course one occasionally finds
fringe parties in democratic countries that have other designs,
such as overthrowing the entire system of government, attaining
power by subverting the rules of the game, or merely to advocate an
idea different from the rivals in the mainstream. In the latter
case, such parties gradually evolve into something more akin to an
intellectual club or a cult in some cases.
Returning to our opening point, we stress again that an opposition
party does not see it as one of its functions to counsel the ruling
party or government on its best interests. Rather, it operates on
the premise that it knows better than the government what is best
for the country. It may go so far as to charge that the interests
of the current government are at odds with the interests of the
country. But his is not advice, but rather censure. To be thorough
and precise, we must exempt from this rule certain extreme
situations in which there is an overwhelming national consensus, as
occurs when a country is under attack or suffers a natural
catastrophe. In such cases, a wise government may actively solicit
the advice of the opposition and the opposition may sincerely
tender it on the overriding matters of national security on which
they are in full accord in order to safeguard the political order
in which they share a common interest and which embraces their
democratic rivalry.
But if the above applies to democratic countries, does it also
apply to non-democratic ones? Do not opposition forces in such
countries also aspire to power? They certainly do. In modern
non-democratic states, opposition forces organise themselves, per
force, in clandestine or semi-clandestine parties that aim to
leverage themselves into a position to put their political
programmes -- whether democratic or anti-democratic -- into effect.
Of course, non-democratic regimes may experience changes in rule or
power structure without the direct influence of opposition parties.
Political reforms or coups undertaken by the ruling party, the army
or other agencies are the two major avenues towards this end. The
new authorities may bring the opposition parties onboard or,
conversely, they may step up the repression of these parties. Both
trends are probably equally commonplace. Be that as it may, let us
not be detracted from our primary concern here, which is the state
of opposition parties themselves in non-democratic countries, Arab
countries included.
A regime consolidates and bolsters itself by expanding its support
base of beneficiaries and creating new sectors dependent upon it
and/or by effectively suppressing and fracturing the opposition by
means of clampdowns, detentions and exile. The longer a party
remains in opposition under such circumstances the greater the
chances that its remnants will also consolidate and perpetuate
themselves. Some may strike a bargain with the ruling regime
enabling them to function legitimately or semi-legitimately as an
opposition party with a margin of freedom to criticise from the
fringes of political life, resulting in a kind of permanent loyal
opposition that prohibits itself from so much as thinking about
attaining power. As we suggested above, a party that resigns itself
to eternal opposition and, for the sake of self- preservation, to
operate semi-legitimately in accordance with the conditions set by
the regime gradually forfeits its capacity as a political party and
loses its politicised character. It survives solely by power of
inertia, awaiting an opportunity that will never come because it
has effectively thrown in the towel in terms of its structure,
ideas, aims and aspirations for power.
One of the peculiar phenomena such a situation gives rise to is a
critical political discourse crafted and packaged as "advice" so as
not to upset the regime and call down upon itself the authorities'
wrath. It will say, for example, "it is in the interests of the
regime to change its policy and side with the resistance," or "the
regime would be well-advised to examine the concerns it has in
common with other Arab nations," or "it would do credit to the
regime to sever relations with Israel," and so on. I imagine the
authorities smile contentedly when they hear such "criticism". It
performs a service for them as it reveals that the opposition is
operating on the premise of the interests of the regime. Indeed, it
elevates this premise to a national axiom above discussion while
simultaneously putting paid to the political and social functions a
real opposition party should perform. Offering advice is a task
suited to an advisor not to an opposition party that hopes to
expose the futility or misguidedness of a government's policies or
the inability of this government to safeguard and promote the
welfare of society and the people.
Another curious phenomenon occurs when the opposition -- Arab
nationalist as a rule -- acts as though it has some claim to
authority and pretends to take the hand of the regime, the king or
president, as though it were a guardian figure imparting wisdom to
a minor. Now surely a regime that has remained in power for
decades, if not necessarily wise, is far from a doltish minor. The
perpetual opposition, meanwhile, has yet to prove that it could
govern if it ever came to power, let alone offer sound advice to
those in power. A real opposition, on the other hand, concerns
itself with establishing that the government is acting against the
interests of the people and the country or contrary to the
principles (or its understanding of the principles) that underpin
the national consensus. In addition, by means of its ability to
mobilise, lead and organise its followers and the people it also
establishes its credentials as a potential candidate for power. If
a regime made a strategic decision to place its country in the
American camp and believes that its relationship with Israel will
help strengthen its relationship with the US, what stance should
the opposition take? Should it say that this is not really in the
interests of the regime or should it say that this runs counter to
the interests of the country and the people? Should the Palestinian
opposition try to convince the Palestinian Authority (PA) president
that he would be doing himself a favour by cooperating with the
resistance? Surely he is more aware than the opposition that his
perpetuation in power is contingent upon his alliance with the US
and Israel and that to change this policy in a way consistent with
national unity is to change the security basis on which the PA is
founded and thus to change its leader. So, if it makes little sense
to offer such advice to the head of a Palestinian Authority that
has no sovereign capacity it makes even less sense to offer similar
advice to fully-fledged regimes with decades of experience in
perpetuating their rule.
If the interests of the regime are founded on notions and policies
that the opposition believes run counter to the welfare of the
country then it's the job of the opposition to expose this on the
basis of facts and logical arguments that proceed from these facts.
The opposition should make solid criticism its mission, even if the
prospect of attaining power is beyond it or not on its agenda. In
the pursuit of this mission it should take the interests of the
country -- as opposed to the interests of the ruling regime -- as
its springboard.
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