Why LTTE
failed
R. HARIHARAN
Its performance in Eelam War IV glaringly displayed
Prabakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional
warfare.
ANTON BALASINGHAM, THE LTTE's political adviser. A 2003
picture. (Right) Lakshman Kadirgamar, the Sri Lankan Foreign
Minister who was assassinated in 2005.
SRI LANKA’S security forces appear to have redeemed their
professional reputation with their resounding success in the fourth
edition of the Eelam War, which has been going on since 2006
against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly
known as the Tamil Tigers. They were not able to achieve decisive
results against the LTTE in their three earlier outings.
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had
rated the Tamil Tigers as “among the most dangerous and deadly
extremists in the world”. The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics
have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in
Iraq”. So, the security forces’ success against the LTTE should not
be underestimated, particularly when similar wars against
insurgents and terrorists in other countries, including
Afghanistan, have been dragging on.
The LTTE, over the past 25 years, has built a 15,000-strong
force that innovatively adapted its suicide war tactics to both
land and naval warfare with deadly results. It mastered the use of
terror tactics as a force multiplier. The LTTE’s charismatic and
ruthless leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, built a loyal network of
cadre – the Black Tigers – whose deadly suicide terror attacks
changed the course of political history in Sri Lanka and to a
certain extent in India also. Now the insurgents stand reduced to a
few hundreds and have lost their entire territory of over 15,000
square kilometres and their equipment, weapons, armament and
infrastructure so essential for survival as a viable entity.
The LTTE demonstrated its prowess with a daring suicide attack
on Colombo’s Katunayake international airport, destroying 26
military and civil aircraft, in July 2001, just four months before
Al Qaeda’s dramatic 9/11 attacks in New York. It sent a strong
message to Sri Lanka and the world at large that the LTTE was a
formidable force not be trifled with. But the consequences of the
9/11 attack on the global attitude to terrorism was far-reaching.
The U.S. marshalled forces for a global war on terror to destroy Al
Qaeda and its roots in Islamist terror. And the LTTE was already
listed in the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organisation.
The late Anton Balasingham, a close confidant of Prabakaran’s
and the political adviser to the LTTE, apparently understood the
need to modify the LTTE strategy in the face of the rising tide
against terrorism. He persuaded a reluctant Prabakaran to agree to
take part in a Norwegian-mediated peace process, deferring the idea
of an independent Eelam in favour of finding a solution to
accommodate Tamil aspirations within a federal structure. That was
how the 2002 peace process came into being.
The LTTE signed the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with Sri Lanka in
2002 as part of the peace process from a position of political and
military strength, having weathered four wars – three against Sri
Lankan security forces and one against Indian forces. It was at the
pinnacle of its power at that time. To a certain extent, this
enabled the Tamil Tigers to dictate the terms of the peace process,
which recognised it as the sole representative of the Tamil
minority, a status denied to it earlier. Thus, the peace process
accorded parity of status to the LTTE at the negotiating table in
its equation with the elected government of Sri Lanka.
By then, the repeated stories of LTTE successes, propagated by
its well-oiled propaganda machine that glossed over its significant
failures (for example, the retaking of control of Jaffna by the Sri
Lanka Army), reinforced the popular belief of Prabakaran’s
invincibility in war. It also generated great political
expectations among the Tamil population of his ability to satisfy
their long-standing aspirations through the peace process although
he had dropped the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. All that
has been proved wrong now.
Winston Churchill once remarked, “Those who can win a war well
can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace
would never have won the war.” This is very true in the case of
Prabakaran’s handling of events leading up to the war. His
monolithic and egocentric leadership style does not encourage the
free exchange of ideas except with his trusted childhood friends.
This has been the big roadblock in his strategic decision-making
process. Prabakaran failed to use fruitfully the political talent
at his disposal, among the seasoned members of the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA), in handling complex political issues during the
period of peace. Their advice was neither sought nor paid heed to
in taking decisions on key issues. The LTTE’s handling of the
presidential poll of 2005 is one such instance when their plea for
his support to elect Ranil Wickremesinghe, an architect of the
peace process, went unheeded.
Wickremesinghe’s rival, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had promised, in his
election manifesto, to eliminate LTTE terrorism. Prabakaran not
only ignored this but, on the basis of some convoluted reasoning,
enforced a boycott of the presidential poll in areas under LTTE
control. This action prevented a bulk of the Tamils from voting for
Wickremesinghe. This enabled Rajapaksa’s victory with a wafer-thin
majority through southern Sinhala votes. And the newly elected
President went about systematically dismantling the LTTE.
Similarly, Prabakaran’s handling of the international community
lacked coherence. Apparently, he misunderstood the international
involvement in the 2002 peace process and thought it was a
vindication of the LTTE’s methods. Perhaps this made him complacent
when it came to observing the ceasefire in spirit. The LTTE’s
conduct, which was in utter disregard of international norms on
human rights and humanitarian laws during the entire period of the
ceasefire, came under severe criticism from international watchdog
bodies and the United Nations. These related to a large number of
issues, including the recruitment of child soldiers, illegal
arrests and kidnapping apart from the assassinations and suicide
bombings. This made the LTTE’s rhetoric on human rights hollow.
While the co-chairs were sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for
equity, they were wary of the LTTE’s tactics and covert operations
in their own countries. And the LTTE’s indifference to their
counsel during the peace process eroded its credibility. Things
came to a boil with the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005. This wanton act
compelled the European Union and Canada to ban the LTTE. Thus, the
LTTE shot itself in the foot as it was banned in 32 countries. The
ban also coincided with the introduction of strong international
protocols in shipping and against money laundering to prevent the
international operations of terrorists.
Prabakaran probably failed to appreciate the implications of
these developments when he gave the government a legitimate excuse
to abandon the peace process after the LTTE made an abortive
suicide attack in April 2006 on Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka,
the Army chief. It also enabled Rajapaksa to persuade the
international community to crack down on the LTTE’s support network
and front organisations in their midst. International cooperation
was further enlarged in scope to intelligence sharing and economic
aid, which indirectly underwrote Sri Lanka’s mounting burden of
war.
Similarly, Prabakaran never made any effort before the war to
redeem the LTTE’s relations with India. He failed to tap the fund
of sympathy for the Tamil cause that exists in India even among
large sections of the non-Tamil population. Presumably, his dubious
role in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination prevented him from
dispassionately examining the positive contribution India could
have made in pushing the Tamil cause at the negotiating table.
Apparently, he put his faith in the international community rather
than in India to bail him out when the Sri Lankan government
decided to go to war. This showed a lack of understanding of the
complexities of international relations. On the other hand,
successive Sri Lankan Presidents went out of their way to keep
India in good humour and that helped the country politically and
militarily in its war with the LTTE. In Eelam War III (1995-2002),
the performance of the Sri Lankan security forces was far from
satisfactory. By then, the LTTE had developed the Sea Tiger wing –
a daring guerilla navy that played havoc with the Sri Lanka Navy.
The Sri Lanka Army had suffered heavy casualties in defending
Mullaithivu and suffered a huge setback in Elephant Pass despite
its superior strength and firepower. In that operation, the LTTE
acquired its modern artillery, armour and high-tech communication
systems apart from capturing equipment.
At the start of the peace process, the security forces were a
demoralised lot. The terms of the peace process further added to
their misery as it prevented them from retaliating when the LTTE’s
pistol groups systematically eliminated the forces’ intelligence
operatives and killed even military commanders during the first
three years of peace. In this backdrop, no one was sure of the
ability of Sri Lanka’s forces to sustain an offensive against the
LTTE when Eelam War IV started in 2006.
Even after the LTTE defeat in Mavil Aru in the Eastern Province
in July 2006, the security forces were cautious in their optimism.
However, the LTTE belied the defence analysts’ expectations when it
floundered in the Eastern Province, offering stiff resistance only
in patches. Perhaps, it was at this time that Rajapaksa and Fonseka
made up their minds to go the whole hog against the LTTE in the
north.
Although Prabakaran has demonstrated strategic military
capability in the past, he appears to have failed to draw two
obvious strategic deductions in the developing war scenario, which
put the LTTE at a disadvantage. The first was not factoring the
impact of the defection of Karuna, his able military commander from
Batticaloa, on the LTTE’s overall military capability. The second
was in underestimating the determination of Sri Lanka’s political
and military leadership to turn Rajapaksa’s promise to eliminate
the LTTE into a reality.Prabakaran never made any effort to patch
up with Karuna, who had grievances with respect to the poor
representation of easterners in the leadership although they
provided the bulk of the LTTE cadre. Instead, he dispatched killers
to eliminate Karuna. The rebel leader commanded wide support among
cadre in the east, particularly around LTTE strongholds in
Batticaloa. A direct consequence of his defection was the
disbanding of a bulk of LTTE cadre, other than Karuna’s core
supporters. It also drove Karuna into the arms of the Sri Lanka
Army for protection. So when the war started in the east, the
LTTE’s strength as well as its manoeuvring space was reduced.
In the course of time, recruitment from the east to augment LTTE
strength petered out. Ultimately, when the security forces launched
their offensive in the north with huge numerical superiority, the
LTTE did not have the essential strength to face the onslaught. It
was clear that the LTTE would not be able halt the security forces
by conventional warfare.
However, somehow Prabakaran failed to use his superior
insurgency tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional
warfare. Instead, the LTTE adopted a passive defensive strategy
with a line of bunds that reduced the natural advantage of guerilla
mobility enjoyed by the cadre. The bunds imposed a limited delay as
they required heavy firepower to break up the offensive. This was a
luxury that the LTTE did not enjoy.
The second aspect was the LTTE leader’s failure to read the mind
of Rajapaksa. In his first two years in office, the President had
oriented his entire policy framework towards the goal of
eliminating the LTTE. His strong support to the operations of the
security forces, regardless of national and international
compulsions, enabled the Army chief to plan and execute his
offensive.
SENA
VIDANAGAMA/AFP
Karuna (right) speaking to women LTTE fighters in
Batticaloa district on Women’s Day in March 2004. Prabakaran failed
to take into account the impact of Karuna’s defection from the LTTE
on its overall military capability.
His strategic direction of war, operational planning and neat
execution undoubtedly paved the way for success. In the words of
Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, the distinguished Indian Army
officer, Fonseka “displayed the qualities of a great military
leader nations are blessed with from time to time”. In short, under
Fonseka’s leadership, the demoralised armed forces reinvented
themselves to become a well-knit and highly motivated force.
As a result, when the security forces went to war in 2006, they
were well-trained and enjoyed superiority in firepower and
mobility. Learning from the past, they built up force levels on
land, in the air and at sea to ensure success against the Tamil
Tigers. The Sri Lanka Army went on a recruiting spree. For
instance, in the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added, to raise
47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, four task force contingents
and two divisions. The Army now has 13 divisions, three task forces
and one armoured brigade. Evidently, Prabakaran failed to read the
sea change taking place in the capabilities of the security forces
and adapt his tactics. Instead, he stuck to a conventional warfare
mode that was doomed to fail although it inflicted casualties on
the advancing troops.
Fonseka adopted a multi-pronged strategy to split the defending
Tamil Tiger ranks and keep them guessing. It aimed at pinning down
the LTTE at the forward-defended localities astride the
Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road in the north from Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil
and in the south along the Palamoddai-Omanthai line. This prevented
the LTTE from thinning out the troops to reinforce its defences
along other axes.
Offensives along two broad axes were launched: along the
Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A-32 road on the west coast to block LTTE
access to Tamil Nadu through the Mannar Sea and along the
Welioya-Mullaithivu-Puthukudiyiruppu line on the east coast.
Operations on these axes progressively cut off the external supply
of military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea. In
tandem with ground operations, the Sri Lanka Navy progressively
curtailed the freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevented
LTTE shipments from reaching the Sri Lanka coast. In well-planned
raids in international waters, the Navy destroyed eight ships of
the LTTE’s tramp supply shipping fleet in 2006-07.
Despite faltering steps at times, the security forces maintained
the momentum of their offensive in the north from the second half
of 2007, which culminated in the dramatic capture in January 2009
of Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the LTTE.
This capture contributed largely to the rapid advance of the
security forces in areas east of the A-9 axis, which never gave the
withdrawing LTTE a respite or permitted it to deliver a strong
counterstroke.
In the present Eelam war, except for a short-lived surprise
offensive in the Jaffna peninsula in the early stages of the
confrontation in the north, the LTTE was never able to launch
proactively a major offensive or a sizable counteroffensive against
the security forces that would have turned the course of the
war.
The LTTE strategy of carting off all the civilians from captured
areas to areas under its control after the fall of Kilinochchi is
questionable. This reactive defence strategy affected the mobility
of cadre, pinning them down to static defences rather than allowing
them to adopt a resilient mobile withdrawal strategy. This strategy
neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy
weapons or air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as
human shields. It only generated adverse publicity, and that the
security forces were also blamed for the same callousness in
dealing with ordinary people is no consolation as they have emerged
as victors.
The performance of the LTTE in Eelam War IV glaringly displayed
Prabakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional
warfare. As he is an astute military leader, if he survives the
current ordeal, he will put on his thinking cap to reinvent the
LTTE, just as Fonseka reinvented the security forces when he took
on the monumental task of reviving them and leading them to
war.•
Colonel R. Hariharan is a retired Military Intelligence
specialist on South Asia and served as the head of intelligence of
the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.
E-mail: [email protected]
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