By SAUL LANDAU and PHILIP BRENNER
President Barack
Obama could swiftly improve U.S. relations with Latin America by
announcing the death of the Monroe Doctrine and then presiding over
its funeral. Such a statement would cost him little domestically,
and win him praise and appreciation throughout Latin America and
much of the world.
Most Americans
don't know the details of this 185-year-old policy and could care
less about it. Latin Americans, in contrast, not only can describe
the Monroe Doctrine, but they revile it. In effect, it has become
nothing more than hollow rhetoric that offends the very people it
purports to defend.
In 1823,
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wrote, and President James
Monroe proclaimed, a doctrine that asserted U.S. political
character is different from Europe's. The United States, President
Monroe declared, would consider the extension of Europe's
monarchical political influence into the New World "as dangerous to
our peace and safety." European powers should leave the Americas
for the Americans, he warned, and he strongly implied that there
existed a U.S. sphere of influence south of the border.
At the time,
Europe shrugged. After all, the United States possessed neither a
formidable army nor navy. But three serious problems fundamentally
vitiated this apparently noble gesture to protect newly independent
republics in South America from European
re-colonization.
First,
Washington proclaimed it unilaterally. Latin Americans didn't ask
us for protection. U.S. diplomats didn't even consult their
counterparts. That was ironic, since the Doctrine's "protection"
involved placing the United States between Latin American countries
and supposedly malevolent European states.
Second, its
paternalism — the claim that "our southern brethren" lack the
ability to defend themselves — raises hackles in Latin America.
Even if the implication had some validity at one time, it no longer
corresponds to the region's reality.
The third and
most problematic issue Obama faces from the outmoded doctrine
relates to its legacy. For more than a century, the United States
has periodically intervened in the domestic affairs of Latin
American countries. Typically the United States invoked the Monroe
Doctrine — without threats from Europe — to justify self-serving
intrusions that have inflicted heavy damage on Latin American
dignity and sovereignty.
Roosevelt Corollary
Under President
Theodore Roosevelt, the doctrine stood for the informal
colonization of most "independent" Caribbean Basin countries. The
so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine claimed
Washington's right to preemptively intervene and occupy a Latin
American nation, even if no European power had yet threatened to
impose its power there. Roosevelt asserted that by virtue of going
into debt to a European bank, a Latin American country weakened
itself sufficiently to be vulnerable to re-colonization. Ergo,
anticipatory military intervention became a necessity from 1900 to
1933.
U.S. troops
invaded Colombia in 1901 and 1902; Honduras in 1903, 1907, and
1911; and the Dominican Republic in 1903, 1904, 1914, and 1916,
occupying the island nation until 1924. U.S. troops landed in
Nicaragua on multiple occasions, occupying it for some 20 years,
and occupied Cuba for three years (1906-1909) and Haiti for 20
years. U.S. forces also made incursions into Mexico, Panama,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica.
President Dwight
D. Eisenhower used the doctrine in 1954 to justify the overthrow of
a democratically elected government in Guatemala. President John F.
Kennedy embraced it from 1961 to 1963 in attacking Cuba, and
President Lyndon B. Johnson raised its banner in 1965 when he sent
23,000 Marines into the Dominican Republic in support of generals
who tyrannically governed the country over the next 13 years.
President Ronald Reagan said it was the basis for the CIA wars he
pursued in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala during which more
than 200,000 Central Americans died, as well as the U.S. attack on
Grenada.
For these
historic reasons, "Monroeism" carries a deeply negative meaning in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Throughout the region, the mere
mention of the Monroe Doctrine hints at impending U.S.
aggression.
Nearly two
decades after the Cold War's demise, U.S. policy elites still cling
to this doctrine as an axiom of U.S. policy. In recent years they
added as the latest corollary a demand that Latin American
governments adopt neoliberal economics. No wonder Latin Americans
have elected leaders — in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, and
Venezuela — who repudiated not only the doctrine's implied
hegemony, but the economic rules that accompany it today. Notably,
not one Western hemispheric country supported the United States in
October, when the UN General Assembly voted 185-3 to end the U.S.
embargo against Cuba.
The
Ballots Did It
Over the last
decade, citizens in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, and other Central American nations have declared their
opposition to U.S.-backed neoliberal economic policies and voted
for candidates who eschew the notion of perpetual U.S. hegemony.
Ballots, ultimately, killed the doctrine. This new wave of leaders
is challenging U.S. supremacy. Last year, Bolivian President Evo
Morales did what would have been unthinkable two decades ago: He
evicted the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. Ecuador has kicked out a
U.S. military base.
Most Latin
American nations now defy the United States on some major policy.
Chile and Mexico, both Security Council Members, voted against
Washington when the key UN resolution arose that would have
sanctioned Bush's invasion of Iraq. And U.S. influence has been
further eroded by the stronger diplomatic, economic, and military
ties with China, Russia, and Iran that several countries in the
region are developing.
Given the facts,
President Obama should announce as soon as possible — and no later
than the mid-April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad that he's
slated to attend — that the Monroe Doctrine is dead and buried.
This move could serve as a rhetorical catalyst for developing real
partnerships that acknowledge Latin America's new status. Only the
funeral of this 19th-century canon will enable the United States to
birth a healthy policy.
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