Executive
Summary
1.
The
Committee of Inquiry (“COI”) completed its inquiry into the escape
of
Mas
Selamat bin Kastari (“Mas Selamat”) from Whitley Road
Detention
Centre
(“WRDC”) on Wednesday,
27 Feb 2008. The
COI submitted its report
to the
Minister for Home Affairs on Thursday,
10 Apr 2008.
2.
In the
process of arriving at its findings and recommendations, the COI
was
given
unrestricted access to highly classified and security sensitive
information.
The COI
also received full cooperation from all relevant
agencies.
Mas
Selamat’s Escape
3.
The COI
finds that on Wednesday,
27 Feb 2008, Mas
Selamat escaped from
WRDC
between 3:54pm
and
4:05pm.
He was scheduled for his weekly family
visit
from 4:00pm
to
4:30pm.
The family visit was to take place in an assigned
Family
Visit Room, in a Family Visitation Block, at WRDC. As part of
the
family
visit routine, Mas Selamat was escorted by two Gurkha
Contingent
(“GC”)
guards and a WRDC Special Duty Operative (“SDO”) to a
changing
room for
him to change out of the WRDC-issued attire into his own
civilian
clothes.
Mas Selamat was then escorted to a toilet located next to the
Family
Visit
Room to shave and comb his hair as part of the family visit
routine. After
entering
the urinal cubicle inside the toilet, Mas Selamat closed the
urinal
cubicle
door. He flipped a pair of greenish-grey pants that he was wearing
over
the
concrete ledge above the urinal cubicle door, and turned on the
water tap
inside
this cubicle.
4.
The COI
believes that while inside the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat
climbed
onto the
ledge located just below the ventilation window, pushed open
the
ventilation
window and squeezed himself through it. To help his descent,
he
probably
held on to a water pipe running vertically down the external wall
of
the
toilet. The COI received forensic evidence from CID
that
smudges were
found on
the water pipe, although there were no conclusive fingerprints.
A
packet
of 7 rolls of toilet paper was found on the ground adjacent to
the
external
wall, which he could have used to break his fall when he
descended.
5.
Having
climbed down the water pipe, Mas Selamat was on the ground at
the
rear of
the Family Visitation Block. There is no conclusive evidence of
the
exact
route Mas Selamat took to escape. However, the COI’s view is that
Mas
Selamat
was likely to have used a route 20 metres to the right of the
ventilation
window
[as one faces the perimeter fences from the ventilation window].
This
is where
the inner and outer perimeter fences converged with the
enclosed
staircase
and walkway. Mas Selamat would have scaled the fence,
climbed
onto the
roof of the enclosed staircase and walkway, and jumped over
the
3
converged
perimeter fences. In a re-enactment requested by the COI, a
GC
guard
took 49 seconds to climb out of the ventilation window in the
urinal
cubicle,
scale the fence, climb onto the roof of the enclosed staircase
and
walkway,
and jump over the converged perimeter fences.
6.
The COI
did not make any findings as to the route Mas Selamat took
after
jumping
over the converged perimeter fences. Pinpointing a specific
route
would
have been speculative, given the many possibilities and the lack
of
evidence
on this issue. Nonetheless, the COI asked for a re-enactment of
the
shortest
and most direct route from outside the converged fences to the
Pan
Island
Expressway. This attempt was made by a young investigation
officer
and it
took him 2 minutes 44 seconds to do so.
7.
The COI
believes that the 11 minutes between 3:54pm
and
4:05pm
would
have
provided
Mas Selamat with ample time to make good his escape from the
time
he
entered the toilet. This is notwithstanding the fact that Mas
Selamat is older
and less
fit than the GC guard and the young investigation officer who
had
undertaken
the re-enactments.
Factors
Contributing to Mas Selamat’s Escape
8.
The COI
finds that Mas Selamat was able to escape because of the
confluence
of a
number of factors. These were:
_
The GC
guard escorting Mas Selamat did not stop Mas Selamat
from
closing
the urinal cubicle door in the Family Visitation Block
toilet;
_
The
ventilation window in the urinal cubicle had not been secured
by
grilles;
and
_
The
weakness in the perimeter fencing where the outer and inner
perimeter
fences
converged with an enclosed staircase and walkway leading to
the
Family
Visitation Block was not detected.
9.
In
addition, the COI finds that the following factors might have
contributed to
providing
Mas Selamat more time to make good his escape:
_
The two
GC guards and the SDO escorting Mas Selamat failed to
respond
immediately
and decisively when they noticed Mas Selamat was taking
too
long in
the urinal cubicle;
_
The SDO
escorting Mas Selamat failed to check if Mas Selamat had
changed
out of his WRDC-issued attire into his civilian clothes. The
COI
believes
that Mas Selamat must have been wearing at least two layers
of
clothing
when he emerged from the Locker Room; and
_
No one
was actively monitoring the two CCTV cameras covering the
outer
and
inner perimeter fences at the rear of the Family Visitation
Block.
4
10.
The COI
notes that no one individual had full control to bring about
such
confluence
of these factors at the material time. The COI finds no evidence
of
connivance
or collusion with or assistance given to Mas Selamat in his
escape
on the
part of any individual.
11.
The COI
is of the view that the routine use of the toilet in the Family
Visitation
Block
would have provided him with the opportunity to plan his escape.
There
was
evidence that Mas Selamat was testing the reaction of the GC guards
by
closing
the urinal cubicle door on previous occasions. This would also
have
given
him the opportunity to climb onto the ledge in the urinal cubicle
to
survey
the rear of the Family Visitation Block. The COI is also of the
view that
by the
time Mas Selamat was brought out of his cell on 27 Feb
2008, he
had
intended
to escape that day because he wore his WRDC-issued attire under
his
civilian
clothes when he emerged from the Locker Room. However, had
the
confluence
of factors not occurred on 27 Feb
2008, Mas
Selamat would
probably
have deferred putting his escape plan into action. Hence the
COI
believes
that Mas Selamat had pre-planned his escape over a period of time
and
seized
the opportunity provided him by the confluence of a number of
factors
at the
material time.
Post-Escape
Response
12.
The COI
finds that the GC guards’ response following the discovery of
Mas
Selamat’s
escape at 4:05pm
was
sufficiently prompt and in accordance with
procedures.
The GC Stand-to plan was immediately activated. The
cordon
along
Onraet
Road was set
up by 4:10pm,
5 minutes after Mas Selamat’s
escape
was discovered.
13.
The COI
also finds that GC HQ’s response was sufficiently prompt. The
GC
Wing
Commander arrived by 4:30pm,
within 20 minutes of GC HQ being
informed.
The GC Trackers, who had been activated, arrived at
4.35pm.
14.
After
the alarm was raised, Whitley Road Complex (“WRC”) was
locked
down.
The inner and outer gates of WRC were closed and thorough
checks
were
conducted on all vehicles leaving WRC. ISD also sought
Police’s
assistance
to activate resources for search and to establish cordons and
road
blocks
around WRC at 4:20pm.
WRDC’s
Operations, Systems and Processes
15.
The COI
examined WRDC’s operations, systems and processes in the
following
areas: command and control, communications and
coordination,
system
of audits, training of GC Guards, joint planning and exercises,
risk
5
assessment
of detainees, and policy on handcuffs. The COI also examined
the
actions
of various individuals vis-à-vis their responsibilities to assess
whether
and how
these had contributed to the operational lapses.
Recommendations
16.
The
COI’s view is that the custodial protocols and procedures of
WRDC
detainees
are generally sound. Detainees are secured in individual cells
to
prevent
them from communicating with one another. Different blocks
are
linked
via enclosed walkways to prevent detainees from
familiarising
themselves
with the layout of WRDC. Access within and across blocks
is
tightly
controlled to prevent detainees from escaping. When a detainee
moves
within
the WRDC compound, he is escorted by at least two GC guards, and
his
movements
are logged. The overall guard to detainee ratio in WRDC is
much
higher
than that in a Prisons facility to ensure tight security. GC guards
are also
rotated
regularly. This also prevents familiarity with
detainees.
17.
However,
the COI finds some weaknesses in operationalising WRDC’s
systems
and processes. To rectify these weaknesses, the COI recommends
the
following:
_
Recommendation
1: ISD to assume overall command and control of
WRDC,
including security.
_
Recommendation
2: ISD to establish a formal framework of
communications
among the three functional groups (WRDC
Administration,
GC guards and Operations Group) in WRDC that
supplements
direct communications between officers from different
functional
groups on the ground. Where instructions are given or
changes
occur
that have an impact on another functional group, they should
be
communicated
to the latter’s higher management formally, so that
appropriate
Orders or Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”) can be
updated
and training programmes reviewed accordingly.
_
Recommendation
3: As WRDC is an ISD facility, ISD HQ must clarify the
responsibilities
of officers in all three functional groups in relation to
one
another.
The Superintendent must ultimately take command and
control
over
WRDC’s day-to-day operations, and have oversight of the
procedures
and
practices of all ISD officers and GC guards deployed at
WRDC.
_
Recommendation
4: ISD HQ, WRDC Administration and GC HQ to
establish
a more structured feedback mechanism.
_
Recommendation
5: WRDC Administration and GC HQ to develop a
comprehensive
training programme for WRDC staff and GC guards
deployed
at WRDC.
_
Recommendation
6: WRDC Administration to develop a more structured
framework
to communicate risks posed by certain detainees to GC
guards.
6
_
Recommendation
7: WRDC Administration to consider instituting a system
of
regular audits to ensure that instructions are carried out and
procedures
are
adhered to.
_
Recommendation
8: ISD HQ to institute a system of checks and balances
through
(1) Regular review of WRDC security by Protective
Security
(“PS”)
Command; (2) Process by which WRDC Administration must
seek
proper
security assessment from PS Command in writing before any
change
in
escort procedures or use of facilities by detainees is approved;
and (3) the
Superintendent
must obtain approval from Director, ISD before he
overrules
any recommendation by PS Command.
_
Recommendation
9: WRDC Administration and GC HQ to jointly develop
a robust
response plan for major incidents. Joint ground exercises
should
also be
conducted regularly to validate and improve these plans.
_
Recommendation
10: ISD HQ to consider having WRDC purpose-built
from
design on a new site and to revisit its previous plans to
co-locate
within
the Changi Prison Complex.
Conclusion
18.
The
COI’s recommendations are made with the primary aim of addressing
the
operational
lapses that resulted in Mas Selamat’s escape, and improving
the
overall
system of security at WRDC, to minimise, if not eliminate, the risk
of
future
escapes. If accepted, there is a need to ensure the proper
implementation
of these
recommendations and periodic reviews of their continued
effectiveness.
