Wall Street Journal
June 21, 2007
By Garry Rodan
SINGAPORE'S state-owned investment companies - Temasek and the
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) - have long
been information black holes for outsiders. But that hasn't stopped
many governments, including those in China and Malaysia, from
copying the Singaporean model. As these funds expand in size and
scope, they may want to pay close attention to a lesson that
Singapore is learning: You can't export opacity even if you can
maintain it at home.
Take the experience of Temasek, which for over three decades has
acted as a holding company for Singapore's state-owned companies.
But as it expanded, Temasek started to invest heavily in
neighboring countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. This process
gathered momentum following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis when
there were bargains to be had in the region - often involving
politically sensitive sectors such as telecommunications and
finance, hitherto dominated by locals. However, until recently,
poorly developed governance regimes in such countries meant little
scrutiny of these investments.
No more. Last month, Indonesia's Business Competition Supervisory
Commission declared it had uncovered prima facie evidence of
monopoly practices by Temasek in the telecom industry. Temasek owns
56% of the SingTel Group, which in turn holds a 35% stake in
Telkomsel, an Indonesian cellular telecommunications company.
Singapore Technologies Telemedia, wholly owned by Temasek, also has
a 41% share in Indosat. Together, Telekomsel and Indosat account
for around 80% of the GSM cellular phone market in Indonesia.
Commission chairman Muhammad Iqbal says the watchdog has already
discovered "signs of a lack of competition between Telkomsel and
Indosat," including comparable prices for mobile phone products.
The University of Indonesia's Institute for Economic and Social
Research reported findings in late May suggesting price fixing
between Telkomsel and Indosat. Shortly afterward, the Post and
Telecommunications Directorate General announced its own
investigation. Responding to the announcement by Indonesian
authorities earlier this month that the probe into Temasek would
now enter an advanced stage - meaning a hearing and three months'
further investigation - Temasek's lawyer, Todung Mulya Lubis,
asserted that the "claims and complaint filed against Temasek are
totally without merit."
Temasek is not accustomed at home to critical attention by
university research centers, let alone such work being followed up
by regulatory authorities. Not only are Singapore universities less
inclined to probe the inner workings of state companies, but
regulation of anti-competitive practices is a work in progress in
the city-state. The Competition Act didn't come into effect until
2005, following the signing of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement and American persistence on competition and transparency
issues aimed squarely at monopolies and cartels.
Then there's Temasek's January 2006 deal with Shin Corp. - the
family company of Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra - which by most accounts has been a disaster. In
addition to a current investigation by Thai authorities into
alleged foreign investment law violations that Temasek rejects, the
deal precipitated widespread anti-Temasek and anti-Singapore street
protests in Thailand, soured relations between the two countries
and prompted the post-Thaksin junta to announce that it would seek
to regain control from Temasek of ShinSat's satellites, which it
regards as having national security implications. On top of that,
the deal represents a paper loss of around $2 billion in the wake
of the nosedive in Shin Corp. share prices following the coup. It
remains to be seen whether Temasek can ride through the political
and regulatory storms in Thailand to return a profit in the long
term.
These international episodes are starting to succeed, at least a
little, where domestic political pressures have failed in enhancing
transparency. In 2004, Temasek voluntarily produced its first
annual report since it was incorporated in 1974, and has continued
doing so since. The International Monetary Fund applauded this
improvement, but also called for the Singaporean government to
provide more information about the activities of Temasek and GIC,
whose assets and liabilities are audited but reported only to the
President and the Ministry of Finance. GIC Chairman Minister Mentor
Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly scotched ideas to detail publicly the
assets and financial returns of the GIC - established in 1981 to
invest Singapore's foreign exchange reserves abroad. Doing so, he's
said, is not in the national interest. The standard reply
prescribed for Temasek officials in response to questions about
government involvement in business is: "The Singapore government,
as a shareholder, is not involved in our investment decisions, much
less in the businesses of our portfolio companies."
Behind the highly selective concessions to greater transparency
reform lies a fundamental issue with wide implications, not least
for what we can expect of China's new investment fund, reported to
be many times larger than Temasek. While the Singapore government
can be pragmatic in providing information where it sees economic
benefits, it rejects the notion that Singaporeans have intrinsic
rights to detailed information about how public money is invested.
Transparency to improve the economy is one thing. Transparency
grounded in notions of Singaporeans' right to know and as a way of
holding political elites and those acting under their
administration to account is another.
Yet the value of information that does get released on economic
grounds will remain limited without other domestic institutional
changes rooted in respect for the public's right to know. In the
absence of strong and independent domestic media, well-resourced
civil society watchdog groups and opposition parties with a strong
presence in parliament, there is no capacity by the public to
scrutinize official information, let alone the chance of exerting
pressure to enforce the release of further information than
authorities originally intended.
Without mutually reinforcing institutions of economic and political
transparency at home, then, there is a serious limit to what
governance regimes abroad can achieve in opening up state-owned
investment funds. Therefore, while China's new fund will find that
global expansion comes with new information pressures, this might
only steel the resolve of Chinese authorities to keep domestic
transparency reforms within tight limits. Certainly that is the
Singapore experience thus far.
Mr Rodan is director of
the Asia Research Centre and professor of politics and
international studies at Murdoch University in Perth,
Australia.