Out Of The Cage: It turned out to be a bridge too far
15 Apr 2006
Khairy Jamaluddin (Son in law of Msia PM) gave the reasons
why Sg din want the bridge. Since they knew the reasons, they shld
asked themselves why Sg will agree?
http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/nst/Saturday/Columns/20060415071252/Article/index_html
GOVERNMENTS the world over will only consider a volte-face in
policy as a last option. The one thing that political leaders want
to avoid is a U-turn, a track back, a change of mind. The public
consequently attaches great value to politicians who stubbornly
stick to their guns come what may.
Perhaps hardheadedness is an overrated political virtue. The
British economist John Maynard Keynes, who was famous for not
holding the same opinion for long, once remarked: "When the facts
change, I change my mind."
Similarly, a leader must be bold enough to change his mind if the
premise upon which his decision was made has changed.
This is evident in the decision made by the Government not to
proceed with a bridge of any kind to replace the Causeway with
Singapore after months of political signalling that we would go
ahead with a new structure on our territory.
Why the about-turn, especially after some very strong and
categorical statements from senior government leaders that work on
a curved half-bridge would commence shortly?
We knew the Singapore Government was not keen on a bridge replacing
the Causeway. The last thing they want is easier access across the
Johor Strait for Singaporeans to spend their money in
Malaysia.
They know that a new bridge combined with the new Customs,
Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) complex would considerably
alleviate traffic woes for the 70 million users of the Causeway
every year and make the trip up north all the more palatable.
A bridge would have also been a catalyst in promoting Johor
as a cargo, logistics and transshipment gateway.
They have also been aware for some months that the Prime Minister
has earmarked southern Johor as a new growth centre for services,
strategically positioning it as a competitor to Singapore which has
natural limits to growth and a richly valued property market.
With this in mind, they could not allow any project like the
bridge that would accelerate the development of southern
Johor. But obviously they couldnt afford to be so obvious
in showing their hand. Instead, they strung us along for the ride,
feigning interest and even talking about a "balance of benefits"
for both sides.
Of course, Singapores idea of a "balance of benefits" is the scale
tipping over on their side. In return for agreeing to co-operate on
a straight bridge, they literally asked for our bumi and
langit.
They knew their request for sand and airspace was a politically
loaded proposition which would be met with tremendous resistance by
the Malaysian public.
They knew that in the case of airspace, for instance, there was no
"balance of benefits" Malaysians would regard it as encroachment
into our sovereign territory while for Singapore it would be, in
the words of their media, merely a "good-to-have convenience...
like (a) sheltered walkway".
With Singapores hemming and hawing on the straight bridge, the
only conceivable way forward was to build the curved bridge in
order to replace the Causeway on our side, provide a sea lane
through the Johor Strait and link traffic with the new CIQ complex
on Bukit Chagar. And for a few months, that was our default
position that precipitated a war of words across the
Causeway.
All that, of course, changed with the announcement on Wednesday
that there would be no bridge. Many have attributed this to public
sentiment that Malaysians did not want to have to bargain with
their territory for the new bridge. Even the Prime Minister said
that he listened to the views of the people before making this
decision.
That is, of course, true. But public pressure does not fully
explain the strategic importance of the decision to abandon the
curved bridge. By definition, the curved bridge is a unilateral
decision. If there was a bilateral agreement the bridge would be
straight.
Any unilateral decision involving another country would have
exposed us to a reaction from the other side.
In this case, unilaterally building a bridge, even on our side,
would have most probably resulted in Singapore bringing this matter
to the Hamburg-based International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
arguing that it is a demolition of a common facility joining two
countries.
While the Foreign Minister is confident that we would have a strong
legal case, it would serve to delay construction, with the
possibility that the millions of ringgit spent on works would be
wasted if there were an unfavourable decision. The unilateral
option would have also eventually led to a bilateral face-off
because cutting and relocating the pipes that take water from Johor
to Singapore would require the latters consent.
Imagine building the bridge and not getting an agreement to
relocate the pipes. Another potential waste of money.
Finally, apart from the road and pipes that are built onto the
Causeway, there is the matter of our railway line. As with the
water pipes, a new railway connection requires Singapores
agreement.
If we fail to get an agreement with the Singaporeans on a new
railway connection, our trains will be forced to stop at Johor
Baru.
This could possibly lead to the closure of the Tanjung Pagar
railway station and the loss of other Malaysian railway land in
Singapore based on the Points of Agreement signed in 1990.
In other words, the unilateral option would have not just exposed
us to the possibility of international arbitration, but it would
have compromised our national interest and given Singapore leverage
over us.
If they can ask for our bumi and langit for a straight bridge,
imagine what their demands would have been had we begun spending
money on building a curved bridge only to find that their agreement
was needed for the water pipes and railway to be connected.
By then, we would not be able to simply walk away from the project
by merely compensating the contractor. By then the sunk cost would
be considerable, effectively strait-jacketing us in our
negotiations with Singapore.
So yes, it was a case of our leaders listening to us. But much more
significantly, it was a strategic decision based on careful
reconsideration.
It was an about-face because doing otherwise would have meant
negotiating from a position of weakness on other outstanding
issues.
When dealing with slippery opponents, hardheadedness is the worst
strategy. Call their bluff, change your mind, walk away, even float
like a butterfly. Now they know its game on.
The writer is an investment banker and deputy head of Barisan
Nasional Youth.
