China-Japan frictions moving to military field
(People's Daily)
Updated: 2005-01-23 15:59
The year 2005 has just begun and the differences between the two
neighboring countries - China and Japan, instead of shrinking, are
showing a dangerous sign of gradually moving frictions to the
military field.
According to inside information disclosed by the Japanese Kyodo
News Agency Japan Defense Agency has enacted specific action plan
to defend the southwest islands. The plan decided that when
something happened in the southwest islands apart from sending
fighter planes and destroyers the Japan Defense Agency would
dispatch as many as 55,000 soldiers of the Ground Self Defense
Forces and special forces there. The so-called southwest islands
mentioned in the guideline also include China's Diaoyu
Island.
Officials with the Japan Defense Agency said most of the southwest
islands have no troops stationed there and are blank areas in terms
of territory defense. The Chinese navy keeps expanding activity
scope. The SDF needs to pay attention to its future movement. The
target of what he said is quite obvious.
This provocation on the part of Japan directly incensed China.
Chinese FM spokesman Kong Quan said on January 18 that the Diaoyu
Island and its affiliated islands have been China's territory since
the ancient times. Japan has different opinions in this regard.
China always holds that China and Japan should solve relevant
disputes through negotiations and consultations rather than take
any unilateral actions.
By comparison China's attitude is more restrained.
Over the year Japan has on the one hand disseminated the "China
military threat theory" and on the other embodied this theory in
its official documents. In November, 2004 the Japan Defense Agency
put up the show of revealing "three possibilities of China's attack
on Japan". On December 7, 2004 Japanese PM Assistant Yoriko
Kawaguchi, who was attending the Meeting of European Security
Cooperation Organizations, tried to dissuade the EU from lifting
China arms embargo. The Japanese Defense White Paper 2004 and the
report of the Security Safeguard and Defense Strength Conference"
published in November, 2004 all preached the "China military threat
theory". On December 10, 2004 the Japanese cabinet passed a new
Defense Plan Outline, which apart from singing the old tune of
"DPRK threat theory" puts the "China military threat theory" into
this official government security policy document for the first
time.
In 2004 Japan sped up the pace toward a military power of "Japan-US
integration" and "overseas intervention" in such aspects as
security strategy, relevant systems and armament etc. International
public opinion believes that Japan resorts to the strategy of "a
thief crying 'stop thief'" and try to fan the "China military
threat theory" to clear public opinion obstacles both at home and
abroad.
In such an atmosphere the China-Japan security mutual trust fell
even lower. The "security dilemma" of being mutually guarded has
not been eased. PM Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine
again killed the mutual visits by fleets of the two countries.
Military exchange was in a stagnant state.
Jin Xide, a research fellow at the Japan Institute of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, said "enhancing mutual trust" would be
an import subject in China-Japan relations in 2005. In the new year
the possibility that China and Japan make breakthrough in the
security area is rather low.
In 2005 the competent departments of the Chinese and Japanese
governments would continue to carry out dialogues and negotiations
centered on mutual differences and cooperation. These questions
involve wide areas such as the demarcation of the East China Sea
and oil gas field exploitation as well as economics and trade,
technology, energy and environmental protection etc. The defense
departments of the two countries would continue to launch security
dialogues and military exchanges at various levels. Due to the high
sensitivity of these areas this kind of dialogues would be
influenced and limited by the China-Japan political relations. On
the other hand, the possibility whether a stable security dialogue
and military exchange system relatively independent of the
political frictions between the two countries can be established
has been listed into agenda as an important way of thinking.
In recent years the thought of mutual visits by Chinese and
Japanese fleets has long attracted attention as an important link
to expand military exchange and enhance security mutual trust. In
2005 if the question of PM Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine is solved appropriately, political atmosphere
surrounding the two countries thaws and warms up, public opinions
of China and Japan grows relaxed, this projection may resurface.
However, the Liberal Democratic Party - the governing party in
Japan adopted a new policy guideline on Jan. 18, which proclaimed
support of PM Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.
This made observers of the China-Japan relations even more
nervous.
The Japanese economy sank into a long depression after 1991 whilst
China entered an economic blast-off in the 1990s. Meanwhile the
intension of the Japanese decision-making body to break through the
"peace constitution" drawing on "pressure" from the US is growing
increasingly clear. Its will to become a political power and a
military power has grown stronger. Under the influence of these
factors competition between China and Japan and their watchful
mentality form a vicious circle.
On the question of history the Japanese right-wring conservative
forces keep instigating incidents to reverse the history of Japan's
invasion of China. China is forced to make restrained response
after long forbearance. All the facts prove that the one who is
"holding tight to the historical question" is Japan, not
China.
Military disputes repeat the routine of the historical question.
Japan keeps instigating incidents and China is forced to respond.
The military tone of Japan's China policy is becoming increasingly
thicker. Japan's China diplomacy is growing "aggressive".
Today's Japanese decision-making body is deviating from the
peaceful development course based on reflecting on defeated war
experience and is attempting to revive the "past power and
prestige" backed by might. For Japan a stable external environment
built by means of good neighborhood diplomacy and peace should be a
less costly and more efficient way. To choose a way of befriending
distant states while attacking those nearby would not necessarily
bring about Japan's increased security. Moreover, if even the
neighboring countries refuse support how is it possible for Japan
to fulfill its "political power dream"?
Recently some people in China, failing to truly understand Japan's
political intention and means, have claimed to want to "find
solution for the China-Japan relations". But the prescription they
wrote was so crude as to say that China should make a comprehensive
concession toward Japan! The Japanese have made complete study of
some Chinese's psychological weaknesses and have become tough even
on questions whose nature is so clear as visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine.
Jin Xide believes that we should have a clear understanding and
accept the reality that the China-Japan "chilly politics" cannot be
completely avoided, and make better mental preparation for the
fluctuation of the China-Japan political relations, give up the
illusion of making unilateral concession so as to exchange for a
"hot-politics" situation. This way will be more conducive to calmer
and rational handling of the China-Japan political frictions and
steady advance of the China-Japan relations.