(continuation of article)
In a parliamentary session last August to discuss the differences
between Ong and the government, Lee stressed that while the
president would have "a certain blocking power," he would have no
executive authority.
Opposition MP J.B. Jeyaretnam growled: "Isn't his decision
to say 'no' to the government's proposal to use the reserves not an
exercise of executive power?"
Actually, that was the one thing Ong never got to do during his
six-year term, so it was never tested.
What the PAP's leaders were united over was that candidates must
meet stringent conditions. Besides being "a person of integrity,
good character and reputation," a candidate has to have occupied
high public office or headed a company with paid-up capital of at
least S$100 million (about US$58.5 million).
The criteria are stringent enough that Ong's successor, S.R. Nathan
(a former ambassador and head of the secret service), had a
walkover last September when no suitably qualified opponent came
forward.
This irked Jeyaretnam: "There is a feeling among a great many
Singaporeans that they have been completely left out, cheated, of
their chance to choose the president."
In choosing Ong as its first candidate back in 1993, the government
appeared to have forgotten his independent streak and his activist
past. As one of them, they thought there was no need to
worry.
That was a mistake.
As president, Ong promptly set about actively doing the job as it
was laid down in the Constitution. Almost immediately there
were problems over how much power he should have and how much
information he should get. In rapid
succession, there were four constitutional amendments to try to
plug these holes.
Mostly, they entailed grabbing back some of the powers that
had been vested in the elected president, like his right to veto
both defense spending and laws that curtailed his own
authority.
Only regarding the reserves did he continue to hold sole
discretionary power; he could decide whether to approve or reject
requests to draw on the funds. In order to make such decisions, Ong
wanted to know how much the reserves were worth. He hit a
roadblock.
Those who had the information stalled over okaying its
release.
There was no urgency since none of the budgets presented to him for
approval included a request to draw on the reserves.
Still, three years into his presidency, Ong wrote to the government
complaining that he had not got the figures. With a general
election looming later that year, he felt it was procedurally
important that he should know the dollar-and-cents details.
Finance Minister Richard Hu says Ong got a response on Aug. 14 -
"less than two months later." Ong says it was "a few months."
The rancor was undisguised and it continued unabated.
The government said it would take "56 man-years" to provide the
information Ong wanted. The president said tersely: "Never mind. Go
ahead."
Later, he agreed to accept just a list of the government's
immovable assets rather than a dollar-and-cents valuation. When he
finally got it, he says it was incomplete. He complained that he
still learned of vital information from the newspapers, instead of
being informed first. And he chafed under the minimal staff he was
allotted.
Many of these problems may just have been - as the government has
argued - teething pains associated with the civil service dealing
with a new, untested institution. But they added up to the unusual
image of top officials publicly squabbling, a sight not seen since
the 1980s when Lee lambasted the former president and PAP stalwart,
Devan Nair.
Later, personal problems intervened for Ong. His wife had colon
cancer and died in July, and his own lymphoma had flared into a
high-grade form in 1998.
Given all this, he says he told Goh he was disinclined to stand for
re-election. But the PM recalls it differently, telling Parliament
that Ong told him last February that he was thinking of standing
again. Ong insists: "I have not told anybody that I wanted to stand
again."
Whatever, Goh says he advised Ong to get a medical report first. In
March, Ong went to the US to see the world authority on lymphoma,
Stanford University's Dr. Saul Rosenberg.
Ong recalls: "He checked that I was in complete remission. So I was
fine after my treatment." His Singapore physician, Dr. John Wong,
concurred with Rosenberg, but apparently harbored enough
reservations that when the cabinet considered this matter, they
decided not to support Ong if he decided to run again. Said Goh:
"The cabinet concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the
president's health would affect the discharge of his official
duties in the next few years."
Goh said Ong was ruled out solely on health grounds. Not everyone
bought that. Says Jeyaretnam: "Because he was being a bit of a
difficult boy they decided they wouldn't have him for a second
term." Ong was hurt.
When he next met the PM, he told Goh that if he wanted to run for
president again it would be his own decision. The response caught
Goh's men by surprise.
They knew that if Ong ran, he
would almost certainly trounce Nathan, which would be hugely
embarrassing. A month before the polls Ong finally
told Goh that he would not stand.
But he had one last bite: when he made the announcement, he also
revealed all the problems he had endured over the past six
years.
Many Singaporeans feel the ex-president's experiences
confirm their perception of a bureaucracy that is more often curt
than not. "Civil servants aren't supposed to talk to you," says
nominated MP and constitutional lawyer Simon Tay, "and that really
has to change."
The Ong episode also suggests
that the precise role of the elected president remains
unclear. Even PAP men defend the new institution
with less than wholehearted conviction.
Admits Lee: "It is an open secret that some of my colleagues think
I am attempting something which is futile." As to the disputes at
the top, there are those who see these in a positive light.
"The issue here is not a lack of debate, but the robustness of the
debate," says Industry & Trade Minister George Yeo. "When Ong
Teng Cheong took the job he knew he was testing new ground. The PM
knew it, [Ong] knew it, there would have to be tension.
[Otherwise], the problems would not surface. It was a necessary
tension for it to work." But did it?
Published in the ASIAWEEK March 10, 2000.