THE CHINESE OF MALAYSIA
July 15, 2000
(The following excerpts were taken from the book, THE CHINESE OF
SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Chin Ung Ho and published recently by Minority
Rights Group, London.)
MALAYSIA
The federation of Malaysia was created in 1963, comprising
peninsular Malaya, Singapore, and the states of Sabah and Sarawak.
Sabah and Sarawak are located on Borneo Island. In 1965, Singapore
was ejected from the federation after its leader, Lee Kuan Yew,
challenged the notion of Malay political supremacy.
Malaysia is where, proportionately, the ethnic Chinese constitute
the largest minority group in the whole of South-East Asia. Ethnic
Chinese constitute about 27 per cent of Malaysia's 20 million
population. The ethnic Malays and other bumiputera make up about 59
per cent, Indians 8 per cent and others 6 per cent.
The demography of Sabah and Sarawak are significantly different
from the peninsula. In the peninsula, the main local ethnic group
is the Malays while in Sabah it is the Kadazan-Dusun, and in
Sarawak it is the Iban Dayak.
SETTLEMENTS
A small number of Chinese traders probably first settled in Malaya
during the fifteenth century. Large-scale Chinese immigration,
however, only occurred during the British colonial administration
in the nineteenth century. The majority of the new settlers were
Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese.
The British policy of 'divide and rule' meant that the community
had little contact with the local Malay population. The Chinese
formed their own associations and built their own schools, temples
and even townships. More than 50 per cent of Chinese lived in urban
areas, a pattern that persists today.
In the 1950s, large numbers of Chinese were resettled by the
British into camps (called 'new villages') throughout the northern
part of the peninsula when an armed insurrection was launched by
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP was led mostly by
pro-Beijing Chinese.
The insurrection was put down by the British after more than a
decade of fighting but it left an impression among the Malay
community that some Chinese were loyal to communist China, creating
a barrier between the Malay and Chinese. The signing of a peace
agreement between the MCP and the Malaysian government in 1989 and
economic reforms in China in the past decade have erased this
perception.
The Chinese in Sabah and Sarawak have distinct histories. The
Chinese in Sarawak first arrived in large numbers in mid-eighteenth
century from what is now West Kalimantan, Indonesia. These were
mainly Hakka gold miners who settled in the gold-rich areas of
Bau.
There was no new migration until the early twentieth century, when
large-scale migration began directly from China. This was organized
by the Brooke family, the rulers of Sarawak, for the purpose of
economic expansion. The first large group from China was made up
mostly of Fuzhou Methodists led by a missionary.
Agents were later appointed in Singapore to recruit labourers
directly from southern China and Hong Kong. The biggest dialect
group in Sarawak today is the Fuzhous followed closely by the
Hakkas and Hokkiens. The Chinese make up about 29 per cent of
Sarawak's 2.1 million population.
Sabah was ceded to a private company, the British North Borneo
Company, in 1881. To develop the state, the company engaged agents
in China to recruit labourers. The first arrivals were mostly Hakka
Christians led by a missionary from Hong Kong. The Hakkas were
followed by Cantonese and Hokkiens. At present, the largest dialect
grouping in Sabah is still the Hakkas, followed by the Cantonese
and Hokkiens. The Sabah Chinese account for only 12 per cent of
Sabah's 1.8m population today.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
The most important political distinction in Malaysia is the
bumiputera/non-bumiputera dichotomy. 'Bumiputera' (literally 'son
of the soil') is a legal term meaning that the state recognizes the
indigenous status of the citzen. 'Non-bumiputera' signifies that
the citizen is not indigenous.
According to the Constitution, the bumiputera category consists of
ethnic Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups in the peninsula,
and the many indigenous ethnic groupings in Sabah and Sarawak. All
other ethnic groups are deemed 'immigrants' and classified as
non-bumiputera. Thus the Chinese, and the Indians, are
non-bumiputera.
The bumiputera/non-bumiputera dichotomy has important legal,
economic and political implications. Under the Constitution, a
bumiputera is entitled to 'special rights', meaning that the
government may make special provisions to protect the economic,
social and cultural interests of the bumiputera.
Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), which ran from 1971 to 1990,
and its successor, the New Development Policy (NDP), a 30 per cent
quota for bumiputera was imposed on all economic and social
spheres. The official discriminatory system was justified on the
grounds that the non-bumiputera (read Chinese) were more
commercially advanced than the bumiputera (read Malay). The
argument was that the wealth gap, between the Malay and the Chinese
would lead to political instability, especially in light of the
riots between Chinese and Malays in the capital Kuala Lumpur of 13
May 1969, after the mainly Chinese opposition made impressive gains
at the general elections.
Malaysia is a peaceful multi-ethnic society.
The discriminatory system is also justified on the grounds that the
Chinese had made a 'constitutional bargain' prior to independence.
The Chinese community allegedly accepted the notion of Malay
'special rights' in exchange for citizenship based on jus soli
(place of birth). This 'bargain', if it ever existed formally, was
negotiated by the Malay and Chinese political elite without any
consultation with their respective communities.
Some Chinese leaders claimed that their acceptance of Malay
'special rights' was conditional on the understanding that the
'special rights' would be removed once the Malay/bumiputera
community was on par economically with the Chinese community. The
Malay elite, on the other hand, claim that acceptance of 'special
rights' was forever.
The problem for the Chinese community is that they cannot re-visit
the issue of the 'constitutional bargain'. Under the Constitution,
matters of citizenship and Malay 'special rights' cannot be
questioned or discussed, even in parliament. Ethnic relations are
officially deemed 'sensitive issues' and cannot be discussed openly
without contravening the Sedition Act or the Internal Security Act
(ISA).
Chinese activists and opposition politicians have been jailed or
detained for questioning Malay special rights and discrimination
against the Chinese community.
ETHNIC POLITICS AND MALAY POLITICAL HEGEMONY
All the major political parties in Malaysia are mobilized along
ethnic lines. The Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition has
ruled since independence, turning the country into virtually a
one-party state. It claims to be a multi-ethnic coalition
government, but in reality is controlled by the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO).
UMNO's raison d'être is Malay nationalism, political supremacy and
Islam. UMNO's political strength lies in its ability to manipulate
the electoral system. More than two-thirds of the seats in Malaysia
are located in the rural areas, where ethnic Malays predominate.
This has ensured that UMNO (or Malays) always win the largest
number of seats in elections, often slightly more than half of the
seats in parliament.
Since independence, all Malaysian prime ministers, deputy prime
ministers and key cabinet posts have been held by UMNO. This means
that the Chinese-based parties in Malaysia cannot advance Chinese
interests. Even the Chinese parties in the ruling coalition, at
most, can only protest quietly to UMNO about anti-Chinese
policies.
UMNO cannot afford to soften its position on Malay 'special rights'
because its major political opponent is the Islamic fundamentalist,
Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), that has vowed to establish an Islamic
state with no political or cultural rights for non-Muslims when it
comes to power. UMNO fears that any concessions to the Chinese
community would mean a loss of support among its core constituents
to PAS.
EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
The Chinese suffer discrimination in relation to employment,
education and economic opportunities. The private sector is the
main source of employment for almost the whole Chinese population.
The public service is effectively closed to them due to the
bumiputera-first policy. Recruitment in the public service has
traditionally been set at one non-Malay (read Chinese or Indian)
for every four Malay recruits. This rule, however, has never been
strictly observed and anecdotal evidence suggests that the ratio is
closer to one non-Malay to every ten Malay. In the upper echelons
of the civil service, non-Malays definitely constitute less than 10
per cent of the elite administrative service.
The education problem centres on two issues: access to tertiary
education and vernacular education. A quota system has severely
restricted the entry of non-bumiputera into state-funded
universities. Officially the intake quota for universities was set
at 55 per cent bumiputera and 45 per cent non-bumiputera, but in
reality, bumiputera students constitute more than 70 per cent of
tertiary students.
Every year, thousands of Chinese students are thus denied a place
at university solely on the basis of their ethnicity, while many
Malay students who performed much worse than Chinese students in
public examinations are given a place. This has forced thousands of
Chinese students to go abroad for their tertiary education,
creating deep resentment due to the high costs involved.
From the 1970s to the 1990s, Chinese Malaysian students
consistently ranked in the top five among international students in
the US, Australia and the United Kingdom. Often the cost of an
overseas tertiary education has meant that a typical Chinese family
could only afford to send one of its children, usually the eldest,
overseas. Government scholarships are also openly biased towards
the Malay. More than 95 per cent of government scholarships for
overseas tertiary education are awarded to bumiputera
students.
On top of the quota restrictions, the government established MARA
(Majlis Amanah Rakyat/Council of Indigenous Trust) institutes and
colleges throughout the country. These colleges offer
employment-related courses such as accountancy and only admit
bumiputera students. In other words, Malay students who failed to
get a place in the public university will still get a
post-secondary education through the MARA institutes. The costs of
tuition and lodgings are met by the government.
In the mid-1990s the government decided to let foreign universities
set up branches in Malaysia to give more non-bumiputera students
access to tertiary education inside the country. This policy was
not driven by the need to accommodate non-bumiputera needs in
higher education but rather was an attempt to stop the massive
outflow of funds from Chinese parents for their children's foreign
education. The 50 per cent devaluation of the Malaysian currency,
the ringgit, caused by the 1997 Asian currency crisis, helped to
force the government's hand. Despite the government's motives, the
setting up of private universities and other tertiary institutions
has given the Chinese community more opportunities for education at
the post-secondary level.
Since the arrival of Chinese migrants on a large scale during the
colonial era, the community have established Chinese schools to
serve the needs of their children. There is a strong belief that in
order for Chinese culture to survive and flourish in Malaysia,
Chinese schools are essential. Over the years, an extensive network
of vernacular schools throughout the country was established.
After independence, for political reasons, the Malay language,
renamed Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language), was made the official
language and became the medium of teaching in all government
schools. This meant that certificates from the independent Chinese
and other vernacular schools were not recognized by the government.
It also meant that Chinese school leavers could not apply to
universities or any government-funded institutions, and they could
not apply for employment in the public service, statutory bodies
and state-owned enterprises.
The vernacular schools are not eligible for any form of government
funding and their existence depends totally on community support.
The government sees them as a hindrance to national unity and
assimilation. Currently, many independent Chinese schools teach a
dual curriculum to prepare their students to sit for both the
government public examinations and those sanctioned by the Dong
Jiao Dong, an umbrella group representing all Chinese schools in
Malaysia. Although the government has refused to recognize any
certificates issued by the Chinese schools, many universities
around the world accept them as meeting matriculation
requirements.
Another area of concern to the Chinese community relates to its
share of the economy and opportunities for expansion. Under the
NEP, the target for the Malay share of the economy was set at 30
per cent by 1990. In 1971 when the NEP was promulgated, the Malay
share was estimated to be only around 2 per cent. To fast-track the
Malay share, the government, first, aggressively promoted selected
Malay businessmen. They were given multi-million government
infrastructure contracts without going through a tender
process.
Second, the government discriminated in favour of bumiputera
businessmen across the whole spectrum of the economy. Bumiputera
businessmen were given first preference for all government
projects, supply tenders and trade licences. Certain government
contracts could only be awarded to bumiputera companies. All
financial institutions had to set aside a set percentage of their
loans for bumiputera businesses.
Public listed companies and large companies were legally obliged to
set aside 30 per cent of their shares for bumiputera investors.
These shares often had to be sold at below market value simply to
conform to the shareholding rule. The government's aim was to
create a 'Bumiputera Industrial and Commercial Community' that was
on a par with that of the Chinese. While the aims were noble, the
outcome so far has been the creation of a rentier bumiputera
business class more interested in using the government's
discriminatory policies for quick gains than in becoming genuine
entrepreneurs.
While the larger Chinese business concerns can withstand the
government's discriminatory policies, and in some cases thrive by
using Malay fronts for their business activities, small to medium
Chinese traders have been seriously hurt by the NEP and the NDP.
Many believe that Chinese business would have expanded much faster
if the policies had not been in place. Overall, Chinese business
has suffered because of the government's bias towards Malay
businesses.
Despite the restrictions, the Chinese share of the economy was
estimated at 40-50 per cent at the end of the NEP in 1990.
Presently, the Malay share of the economy is estimated to be in the
region of 20-30 per cent. The rest is owned by foreign
interests.
One area where the Chinese community was seriously hurt was
employment. Large companies were required to have a minimum of 30
per cent of their staff from the bumiputera community. This rule
was not applied in reverse. Malay companies could have a 100 per
cent bumiputera staff. Many government-owned companies and
statutory bodies have bumiputera-first hiring policies resulting in
more than 90 per cent of their staff being bumiputera.
ISLAMIZATION AND CULTURAL POLICIES
Almost all Malaysian Chinese are non-Muslims while the official
religion of the country is Islam. The majority of Chinese are
Taoists, Confucians, Buddhists and Christians. Although religious
freedom is guaranteed in the Malaysian Constitution, serious
restrictions are placed on non-Islamic faiths. These include a
legal ban on proselytizing to Muslims, restrictions on the building
of new temples and churches and the use of certain terms deemed
'Islamic'.
Government policy is to promote 'Islamic values' in all areas of
public life. This policy started in the 1970s but was only
implemented aggressively from the 1980s onwards. An International
Islamic University was established, Islamic banking and finance was
introduced and the rapid expansion of Islamic schools and a
mosque-building programme were generously funded by the state. A
course dealing with the basics of the Islamic religion, history and
culture was made a compulsory for all tertiary students, regardless
of their religious affiliation, in government-funded
universities.
There are state-sanctioned Dakwah (missionary) groups who target
the Chinese for conversion to Islam. In recent years, there have
been several high-profile cases of teenage Chinese girls converting
to Islam without the knowledge or consent of their parents. There
are credible reports of peer pressure to convert being applied to
non-Muslim students studying in local universities and government
boarding schools.
Controversy also surfaced in the mid-1990s when a Chinese Muslim
preacher attacked the Christian religion and traditional Chinese
faiths on a weekly Mandarin-language Islamic programme on state
television. In Sabah and Sarawak, there were reports of indigenous
peoples such as the Kadazan-Dusuns and Ibans being converted to
Islam with promises of material aid or money.
Conversion to Islam is controversial in Malaysia because it implies
a switch in ethnic identity. Under the Constitution, a Malay is
defined as a Muslim, and therefore converting to Islam in Malaysia
is often referred to as 'masuk Melayu' (becoming a Malay). Chinese
converts are not only expected to adopt a Malay name, but are also
expected to cut all cultural and linguistic links with their
Chinese backgrounds and there are many cases of Chinese converts
who do this. Conversion to Islam is non-reversible under the
law.
In 1971, the government announced a National Cultural Policy (NCP).
The Chinese and the non-Malay community were unaware that a NCP was
being drafted, and the policy totally ignored the fact that almost
half of the Malaysian population were non-Malay and non-Muslim. The
NCP declared that the core of the NCP must 'reflect indigenous
society' and thus only Malay and Islamic culture. This policy means
that the official mass media ignore non-Malay and non-Islamic
cultures. Movies that promote Christianity or any other non-Islamic
faiths are banned.
PROSPECTS
In summary, the Malaysian Chinese suffer significant discrimination
in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres. This is
due to a deliberate government policy of discrimination in favour
of the Malay and bumiputera community, and Islam. Despite the gains
made by the bumiputera in the economy, the Malay-led government is
unlikely to change the system.
The Malay population is so used to privilege that a subsidy
mentality has developed. Many younger Malays believe that the
benefits accorded to them are their birthright. The political
system is also unlikely to be liberalized. The Malays know that
their privileged position is tied directly to their dominance of
the political system. While the Chinese share of the economy will
probably remain stable in the coming years, the Malay and
government share of the economy will increase. This takes away any
leverage, political or economic, the Chinese community might have
in trying to extract concessions from the government.
The positive side of this is that with significant Malay holdings
in the economy, the Indonesian scenario, where the local people can
easily blame the Chinese for any economic ills, is unlikely in
Malaysia.
Another problem facing the Chinese is that their share of the
population is expected to fall to between 22-5 per cent in the
coming two decades. This is because the largely urban Chinese are
having fewer children as society industrializes, and because of
immigration from Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Politics
plays a role here as most Indonesians and Filipinos accepted for
residency are ethnic Malays and Muslims.
The likely outcome is a political, social and cultural system that
is dominated by the Malays and Islam. The prospects for minority
rights for the Chinese in Malaysia in the long term are therefore
not promising.
Chin Ung Ho, PhD, is a Malaysian-born academic currently teaching
overseas. He has published extensively on Malaysian politics. He
can be contacted at [email protected] The above article
reflects the personal views of the writer.
