Ong Teng Cheong: “I had a job to do”
INTERVIEW OF SINGAPORE’S FIRST ELECTION PRESIDENT, ONG TENG CHEONG
BY ASIAWEEK
It’s now six months since you stepped down. How do you feel
about your time as president?
I am satisfied with what I did. I hope it was all for the best.
I was elected to do a job. And I had to do that job whether the
government — or anyone else — liked it or not.
It seems that often they did not like it, but let’s go back: How
did you first get into politics?
In the early 1970s, Lee Kuan Yew asked me for an interview to
get me involved to stand for election. I stood in 1972 and I won
and became a PAP backbencher. A year later,
Lee asked me to take up ministerial office but I turned it down
because my younger brother was dying of cancer. I had to assist him
and to settle his affairs after he died at the age of 25. Then Lee
Kuan Yew approached me again and this time I agreed to take up
office. Lee is very persuasive.
He must have been impressed to make you a minister so quickly —
you were a young architect with no experience of politics.
Yes, I was not trained to become a minister or a politician, but
you learn on the job. Whenever I went to a new ministry, I always
asked myself basic questions: What is this job all about? What am I
supposed to do? That’s what I did in 1980, for instance, when I
became minister of labor, in addition to being minister for
communications. I went through all the legislation and I decided
that the trade unions should not just be designed to organize and
finance strikes, but instead should help improve the workers’
social and economic wellbeing.
You became head of the NTUC and also
remained a cabinet minister — and Singapore remained strike
free.
Yes. But in January 1986 I did sanction a strike, the first for
about a decade. It was in the shipping industry where the
management was taking advantage of the workers. I did not even tell
the cabinet about santioning the strike. And some of them were
angry with me about that. The minister for trade and industry was
very angry, his officers were very upset. They had calls from
America, asking what happened to Singapore? — we are non-strike. I
said: if I were to inform the cabinet or the government they would
probably stop me from going ahead with the strike. It only lasted
two days. Then all the issues were settled. It showed that
management was just trying to pull a fast one. So I believe what I
did was right.
It marked a trend — that you have never been afraid of doing
something your ministerial colleagues might disagree with?
No. If they don’t like it, I can always come back here to my
architecture firm.
Around this time you were discussing the succession to PM
Lee?
Lee Kuan Yew had been discussing this since about 1983. At that
time, the second echelon was Tony Tan, S. Dhanabalan, Goh Chok Tong
and myself.
Were you a candidate for the top job?
I was considered as a member of the group. At that time, we did
not know who would be the successor to Lee. We finally made the
decision to pick Goh Chok Tong. He agreed on condition that I
agreed to be his number two. So I was the second DPM; he was the first DPM. In 1988,
Lee asked Goh to take over, but he was not ready. He said: two more
years. So two years later, he took the job.
Lee did not agree with your decision to pick Goh.
No, he did not disagree. He said he would leave it to us. His
own first choice was Tony Tan. Goh Chok Tong was his second choice.
I was his third choice because he said my English was not good
enough. He said Dhanabalan was not right because Singapore was not
ready for an Indian prime minister. That upset the Indian
community. There was quite a bit of adverse reaction to what he
said. But he speaks his mind. He is the only one who can get away
with it.
Personally, you felt Goh was the right man?
Well, among the four of us, he was the youngest. Tony Tan said
no. I said no. And he sort of accepted being pushed into the
position, on condition that we stay on to assist him.
Soon after taking over, Goh called a snap election in 1991 — but
the PAP’s vote slipped and there was talk he
would quit.
Well, we did discuss about that. But he didn’t indicate that he
wanted to step down.
At that time, you were no. 2 in the executive after PM Goh.
Yes. Well, no. 2, no. 3, doesn’t matter.
So why run for president?
The elected presidency was Lee Kuan Yew’s initiative. He came
out with the idea way back in ’82, ’83. After parliament passed the
measure in 1991, I considered it seriously. At that time, after 20
years in politics, I was thinking of a way to ease myself out, to
exit the political arena. I wrote to the prime minister twice to
say that I’m prepared to go.
You saw the presidency as a way to do that?
Yes, the unionists egged me on. They came to see me a couple of
times and they suggested that I take it on. I discussed it with the
prime minister, being old friends, and he gave me his support.
The well-known oppositionist J.B. Jeyaretnam wanted to run
against you?
Yes, but he was not allowed to because he did not qualify under
the stringent criteria. Maybe too stringent.
You were glad Jeyaretnam could not run?
No, it’s okay. I think it would have been more fun.
Some of your colleagues did not think it was much fun when your
only opponent, a former accountant-general, Chua Kim Yeoh, got so
much support?
Yes, all of them were quite worried. Some ministers even called
me to say: Oh, we are worried about the outcome. At first, we were
quite confident about getting over 70 percent of the vote. But
there was a swing of support over to my opponent’s side, especially
in the educated class — civil servants and the Shenton Way group.
The issue was whether they wanted a PAP man
as president to check on a PAP government, or
whether it would be better to have a neutral independent like Chua.
That’s why they voted against me because I had the PAP government support. I would have been happier without
the PAP’s open support. I think I would have
been better off with just the unionists’ support and the
Chinese-educated heartlanders. Without them I would not have been
elected.
But you did win and you had to figure out how to do this new job
as Singapore’s first elected president.
Yes. At the first opening of parliament after I was elected, I
was given a speech prepared by the government. I read the speech
carefully. Besides ceremonial functions, it said that I’m supposed
to safeguard the reserves and to help society become more
compassionate and gracious. So I decided that, well, if that is
what is said in the speech, then that’s going to be my job. And I
am going to do it. That’s what I tried to do. In fact, during the
six years I was president, I was very busy.
Doing what?
Well, I got involved in a lot of things. The Istana presidential
palace and other places had to be renovated. All this had to be
planned and these places got ready one by one, so that ceremonial
functions and other business could go on as usual. I had to press
the government to finalize the procedures for the protection of the
reserves. A lot of the teething problems and misunderstandings were
because there was a lack of clearcut procedures ofwhat to do.
Towards the end of my term, I pressed the prime minister for a
White Paper to be tabled in parliament that would set out all the
principles and procedures for the elected president. Then I will
announce my decision to step down. I want to get the job done.
Initially, he did not want to do that?
It’s not that he did not want to do that, but it had been
dragging for a long time. They produced a White Paper eventually,
tabled it in parliament last July, and that made the future
president’s job easier. We have already tested out many of the
procedures during my term, except for asking the president to
approve a draw on the past reserves during a deep economic crisis.
That was never done. It’s that part of procedure that was not
tested. How to do it?
It was this issue that caused the dispute between you and the
government?
Yes. But I don’t want to go into details and upset everybody.
The thing is that the elected president is supposed to protect the
reserves, but he was not told what these are until five years
later. From the day the Constitution was amended in 1991 to provide
for an elected president, he was supposed to fulfil that role. My
predecessor, Wee Kim Wee, although he was not elected, was supposed
to play that role during the last two years of his term. But he did
not actively check. So, when I came in in 1993, I asked for all
this information about the reserves. It took them three years to
give it to me.
The holdup was for administrative reasons?
Either that or they did not think there was any urgency. You
see, if you ask me to protect the reserves, then you’ve got to tell
me what I’m supposed to protect. So I had to ask.
Why did they not want to tell you?
I do not know. Don’t ask me, because I don’t have the answer.
I’ve been asking them. In fact, in 1996, exactly halfway through my
term, I wrote prime minister Goh a letter. At that time, everybody
was expecting a general election in December or January. After the
election, a new government would be sworn in. When that happens,
all the reserves, whether past or current, become past reserves and
are locked up on the changeover date. As president, I have to
safeguard them and they can only be drawn upon with my permission.
So I said to Mr Goh: It’s already halfway through my term, but
until today I still don’t know all these figures about the
reserves.
So the government had been stonewalling you, the president, for
three years?
Yes. What happened actually was, as you know, in accounting,
when you talk about reserves, it’s either cash reserves or assets
reserves. The cash side is straightforward: investment, how many
million dollars here and there, how much comes from the investment
boards and so on. That was straightforward — but still we had to
ask for it. For the assets, like properties and so on, normally you
say it’s worth $30 million or $100 million or whatever. But they
said it would take 56-man years to produce a dollar-and-cents value
of the immovable assets. So I discussed this with the
accountant-general and the auditor-general and we came to a
compromise. The government would not need to give me the
dollar-and-cents value, just give me a listing of all the
properties that the government owns.
They agreed?
Well, yes, they agreed, but they said there’s not the time for
it. It took them a few months to produce the list. But even when
they gave me the list, it was not complete.
It seems the Singapore government does not know its own
assets?
Yes. It’s complicated. It’s never been done before. And for the
assets of land, I can understand why. Every piece of land, even a
stretch of road, is probablysubdivided into many lots. There are
50,000 to 60,000 lots and every one has a number. If you want to
value them all, it would take a long time. In the past, they have
just locked everything up and assumed it is all there. But if I am
to protect it, at least I want to know the list.
When they eventually gave you the list — the incomplete list,
did you have enough staff to do the checking and other work?
No, I did not. I only had one administrative staffer and two
part-timers from the auditor-general’s office. For things like
approving the budget of statutory boards, the auditor-general’s
office would normally go through that for me. They are very good.
They check on everything. And they query and ask for
information.
For government financial policy matters that you had a veto
over, did you get all the details?
They finally came with an executive summary to say that they had
checked through all this, and that this is what they have, this is
how much they are going to spend, and that it won’t need any draw
from the reserves — or that there’s likely to be a draw. There
never was a draw during my time, but there were instances where it
was a bit dicey whether the budgets of one or two statutory boards
would require a draw. But finally we resolved that.
Eventually then, with the list of properties and the executive
summaries, you were kept informed?
I wouldn’t be able to say that. Even in my last year as
president, I was still not being informed about some ministerial
procedures. For example, in April last year, the government said it
would allow the sale of the Post Office Savings Bank POSB to DBS Bank. In the past, when
there was no elected president, they could just proceed with this
kind of thing. But when there is an elected president you cannot,
because the POSB is a statutory board whose
reserves are to be protected by the president. You cannot just
announce this without informing him. But I came to know of it from
the newspaper. That is not quite right. Not only that, but they
were even going to submit a bill to parliament for this sale and to
dissolve the POSB without first informing
me.
What did you do?
My office went to tell them that this was the wrong procedure.
You’ve got to do this first, do that first, before you can do this.
It was question of principle and procedure. We had to bring all
this to their attention. That they cannot forget us. It’s not that
we are busybodies, but under the Constitution we have a role to
play and a responsibility. Sometimes in the newspaper I came to
know of things that I am responsible for, but if it had not been
reported in the newspaper I would not know about it.
You must have been pretty angry that this was still happening in
your last year as president?
Yes, I was a bit grumpy. And maybe not to the liking of the
civil service. They did not like what I said. But I have to be a
watchdog all the time, you see. So this is where they are supposed
to help me to protect the reserves. And not for me to go and watch
out when they do right or wrong.
Under the Constitution, you have the right to all the
information available to the cabinet.
Yes. That’s right. And I sourced much information from the
cabinet papers. But they are not used to it. So I said: I
understand, it’s something new, and I know you don’t like my
interference and busybody checking up and so on. But under the
Constitution it is my job to do that.
Despite all this, it was widely believed that you wanted to run
again for a second six-year term as president?
No, I’d been telling my friends since late 1998 that my
inclination was not to stand for re-election. But of course, life
is unpredictable. In March last year, I went to Stanford and my
American doctor confirmed that my cancer was in complete remission.
He is very experienced, a world authority on my sickness. So I was
fine after my treatment. I gave a complete report to the prime
minister and we discussed it. I told him that my inclination was
not to stand, but that I’d make the announcement later on. Then the
cabinet met and they decided that if I were to stand again, they
would not support me.
You had been given a clean bill of health, yet your former
colleagues would not support you. Did that annoy you?
I told the prime minister over lunch: Well, I don’t need your
cabinet support. If I want to stand, whether I do or not, it will
be my personal decision. And I’ll make that decision nearer the
date of the presidential election — because I have another checkup
in June, July, and I want to know my latest position. Also my wife
was sick with cancer and we knew that if she died, it would be
difficult for me to stand without a first lady. She felt very
apologetic and that was another reason why my inclination was not
to stand. I hoped that if I stepped down I would have more time to
be with my wife, because her prognosis was not very good.
By waiting until July to announce your decision, were you
ruffling the government for the way they had treated you?
Maybe so. Maybe it was my miscalculation that my stated
inclination not to stand again had not been good enough for them.
But I had been telling that to all my friends. And I did not want
to tell people my wife was dying, either.
But the government worried that you might suddenly decide to run
again.
No, I made it very clear and I called a press conference in July
to tell everybody. But I believe some people were still afraid that
I might turn up on nomination day. Even friends asked me if I might
do that. How could they? I had given my word that I would not
stand.
A straw poll apparently indicated you would beat the
government’s candidate, S.R. Nathan, if you had stood.
Yes. But I gave my word that I would not run. And I don’t think
it’s right. I’m a very old-fashioned man. Also, my wife passed away
in September. And I became more sceptical about all these medical
reports. Well, not sceptical, but certainly I find life more
unpredictable than I thought. Full of uncertainties.
In the end you were happy to stand down?
Yes, I’d been preparing for that psychologically since late
1998. I was quite happy when the decision was made, happy to return
to private life to do the work that I enjoy.
How are your relations with PM Goh these days?
They are okay. I just had lunch with him last week. I can’t
invite him now, so he invited me. When I was president, we took
turns to invite each other for lunch in the Istana.
Did Senior Minister Lee join you?
No, we did that separately.
Lee spoke out against you last year. How are your relations with
him now?
We’ve never quarrelled.
It’s said that your recalcitrance upset him and your former
colleagues, leaving you estranged and bitter?
I would not call it recalcitrant. I mentioned some of the
problems — or many of the problems — that I faced. If they regard
that as an attack on the government and on the civil service, then
that is for them to interpret. The prime minister and I spoke at my
farewell reception. We agreed that we would say what we have to
say. I think it came out well. He said that my statements, and his
rebuttal in parliament, were probably a good thing. They showed the
transparency of the system. I stand by what I said.
- Published in Asiaweek 2000
http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2014/02/ong-ten…
