The problem of natural evil is a specific form of the
problem of evil, the problem of
reconciling the existence of evil with the existence of God. If God
is all-knowing, benevolent, and all-powerful, then why does he
allow evil to occur?
There are two kinds of evil in the world: moral and natural;
both appear to exist in abundance. Moral evils are those evils that
are freely inflicted upon humankind by humankind: deceit, murder,
theft, etc.; they result from the choices of free agents. Natural
evils are those evils that occur as the result of natural
processes: earthquakes, forest fires, tsunamis, etc. The problem of
natural evil is thus the problem of explaining why God allows this
latter kind of evil to occur.
The most common response to the problem of evil—the free-will
defence—holds that God rightly chose to create humankind free, and
that evil is the result of our abuse of that freedom. Evil is not
God’s fault; it is ours. This defence applies only to moral evil;
natural evil does not result from the choices of free agents, and
so cannot be justified in this way. Natural evil therefore poses a
greater threat to belief in God than moral evil.
Two generic responses to the problem of evil question its
fundamental assumptions. The first denies that God is morally good,
casting doubt on whether he would prevent evil if he were able to;
the second denies that evil exists, casting doubt on whether there
is a problem to solve at all.
There is, however, an alternative response to the problem of
natural evil, associated with St Augustine, that grants that evil
exists but denies that any of it is natural. If this position can
be maintained, then it will be possible to extend the free-will
defence to cover not only those evils usually categorised as moral
evils, but also those usually categorised as natural.
The defence works by suggesting that so-called natural
evils—earthquakes, epidemics, etc.—are the work of demonic forces,
fallen angels. They are, it is suggested, no less the result of
free will than evils normally classified as moral. This defence
thus effectively denies the existence of natural evils, holding
that all evils result from the choices of free agents, and so that
all evils are moral.
Another attempt to solve the problem of natural evil sees such
evil as a just punishment for sin inflicted upon us by God. We
cannot complain about natural evils, on this view, because we
deserve all that we get. Natural evil, unpleasant though it may be,
belongs in the world; it makes the world more just.
The chief difficulty with this view is that nature is a crude
instrument of retribution; it often smites hardest those that have
sinned least. The argument may succeed in casting some doubt on the
supposition that a good God would eliminate all suffering; God’s
benevolence and his justice may exist in tension, and a benevolent
God may sometimes will just punishment. It does not, however,
explain the unequal distribution of natural evil that we
observe.
Perhaps a more robust approach to resolving the problem of
natural evil is that which holds that it is necessary for the
universe to contain some evil in order for it to contain some good.
Good and evil, according to this position, are relative terms, like
up and down or past and future; one cannot have one unless one has
both. If this is correct, if it is impossible for one to exist
without the other, then perhaps God was justified in creating a
world containing evil because it was only by doing so that he could
create a world containing good.
Even if the previous suggestion is resisted, a similar argument
might be proposed, holding that evil is necessary in order for
certain types of good to exist. Specifically, the existence of evil
allows for goods that oppose evil, opening up possibilities for
bravery, for compassion, and for mutual dependence, for example.
These higher-order goods could not exist otherwise. A world without
suffering would lack such goods as these, and would therefore be
inferior.
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