Originally posted by Icemoon:
[b]Reformed Epistemology
One of the central tasks of the philosophy of religion is to
provide an answer to the question Is belief in God
justified? In recent decades, there has been a radical
change in the way that many Christian philosophers approach this
question.
Most discussion of this question presupposes an
evidentialism, according to which belief in God is justified only
if the balance of evidence suggests that such belief is
true. The task of philosophers of religion is then seen as
weighing the arguments for Gods existence against the arguments
against Gods existence and determining which are the
stronger.
Reformed epistemologists reject this evidentialist assumption,
affirming that belief in God can be rational even in the
absence of evidence for Gods existence. Reformed
epistemology is thus a reaction against both evidentialism and
classical foundationalism.
Foundationalism is a theory about how our beliefs are justified
(epistemic justification). Foundationalists hold that there
are two types of epistemic justification: inferential and
non-inferential.
A belief is inferentially justified if it is inferred from
other justified beliefs. If I believe with justification
that my watch is accurate, and that my watch reads noon, then I can
believe with justification that it is noon. I can infer that it is
noon from other justified beliefs that I possess.
It cant be that all beliefs are justified inferentially. My belief
that it is noon may be justified because it can be inferred from
other justified beliefs, but what is it that makes those other
beliefs justified? If it is that they can be inferred from still
further justified beliefs, then the question returns again: what
makes those beliefs justified?
The only way of halting this regress is to admit that there
are some beliefs that are non-inferentially justified,
i.e. that are epistemically justified but not because they can be
inferred from other justified beliefs. Such beliefs are
called properly basic or foundational beliefs, because, if the
foundationalist is correct, all of our justification is ultimately
derived from such beliefs; such beliefs are the foundation of all
of our belief systems.
According to classical foundationalism, in order to be
properly basic a belief must be either incorrigible or
self-evident. A belief is incorrigible if it cannot
possibly be found to be in error; belief in ones own existence is
thus an incorrigible belief. Self-evident beliefs include simple
truths of mathematics and logic, such as 1+1=2 and the principle of
non-contradiction.
Reformed epistemologists have criticised classical foundationalism
as holding too narrow a view concerning which beliefs can be
properly basic. Beliefs can be cited, such as belief in the
existence of the past, or of the external world, that are clearly
justified but cannot be either inferentially or non-inferentially
justified on classical foundationalism. The existence of the past
and the external world, are neither incorrigible nor self-evident,
and cannot be inferred from beliefs that are incorrigible or
self-evident. On classical foundationalism, then, belief in them
cannot be justified.
Reformed epistemologists call for a more liberal view of proper
basicality, and assert that belief in God can be properly
basic. They therefore insist that it is improper to assume
that belief in God is irrational unless evidence for Gods
existence can be presented.
http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/reformedepistemology.html[/b]
I agree. Belief in God is absolutely rational. There are plenty
of rational evidences to believe in God. Even science can "prove"
God indirectly. Even without so called rational evidences, one can
still come to a knowledge of God based on belief.
