The journey from Bill Shankly to Billy Beane took half a
century. One of football's most famous socialists was the founding
father of Liverpool Football Club in its preferred incarnation as
England's dominant force. Now that a second set of American
capitalists have purchased the club, Oakland Athletics, the
overachieving baseball team, appear to have replaced Glenbuck
Cherrypickers, Shankly's exotically-named first club, as a
reference point at Anfield.
Bills, along with cheques, cash and other forms of payment, are
at the heart of the issue. A path can be drawn from
Moneyball, the vogue book tracing Beane's progress as
general manager of Oakland, where a low budget yielded high
returns, to the appointment of Damien Comolli as the
snappily-titled director of football strategy at Anfield. But it is
just as pertinent to interpret it as an expression of John W
Henry's admiration of Arsene Wenger.
It is understandable. Henry is a businessman, Wenger the best
business mind in football management. He has accomplished what
successive regimes at Anfield could not and financed a lucrative
new ground while producing competitive teams. Comolli's former
employer - he was Arsenal's European scout - is both economist and
pioneer.
From a financial perspective, his greatest find was one of his
first, Nicolas Anelka, bought for £500,000 and sold for £23
million. Or, to put it another way, a return of 4,600% on the
original investment. It prompted the current global search for
emerging talent. Without Wenger, would Manchester United have
brought Federico Macheda, the Da Silva twins and Bebe to Old
Trafford at such a young age?
But, as Liverpool know better than most, identifying potential
is a perilous process. Some of Anthony Le Tallec, Florent
Sinama-Pongolle, Antonio Barragan, Sebastian Leto, Krisztian Nemeth
and Mikel San Jose have produced a profit, but none made a major
impact in the first team.
Hence Comolli's arrival and the importing of ideas from the
Boston Red Sox who, in turn, sought to emulate Beane. Sabermetrics
is basing decisions on statistical analysis - perhaps an irony at
Anfield given Rafa Benitez's infamous fondness for "facts" - and an
attempt to find undervalued players. It emphasises that perception
isn't reality, as can be illustrated with a glance at some of
English football's traditional big spenders who judged players by
the size of their reputation, salary or transfer fee.
But there are problems with implementing the numbers game.
Baseball lends itself more obviously to such a model than football,
where besides the intangibles - team spirit, communication - the
importance of a unit means players have to be assessed by their
performance as part of a group. In a back four, a defender who wins
all his headers and tackles might pass a factual test, but one who
kept on playing opponents onside would be deemed a liability. Then
there is the difference open play, an alien concept in baseball,
makes as statistics require context and interpretation. Assuming
that the players with the highest pass completion rates are the
finest distributors might merely result in an accumulation of
unadventurous defensive midfielders.
Here, once again, Wenger assumes a significance. In every
outfield position, an example can be found of his ability to
unearth a bargain. Comolli is credited with some, including Gael
Clichy and Kolo Toure (despite recent revisionism, he merits rather
less praise for signing Gareth Bale for Tottenham, whose ability
was apparent to all the many Premier League managers who scouted
him). Reflected glory has played a part in bringing him to
Anfield.
Clichy is a prime case of Moneyball. Signed for
£250,000, he is approaching 250 games for Arsenal and worth
anything from £5 million to £15 million (while some discuss
players' values in fixed terms, it is worth remembering that they
fluctuate and, more to the point, a footballer is only worth what
someone is prepared to pay for him). Liverpool's left back, in
comparison, is Paul Konchesky, four years his senior, costing £4
million and arguably an inferior player.
Arsenal's, in short, is a far more cost-effective model. Where
Liverpool spent £5 million on Christian Poulsen, Wenger has the
more powerful, accomplished, Alex Song, seven years his junior, and
priced at only £1 million when he arrived.
Song ranks among the Premier League's best performers in his
position. His recruitment represents an excellent judgment call. So
does that of Clichy who - while Bale operates in midfield and
Aleksandar Kolarov finds his feet at Manchester City - could be
called the third best left back in the division.
And that hints at the limits of 'Wengernomics'. Clichy offers
outstanding value for money, but the two stand-out left backs are
Ashley Cole and Patrice Evra, both costlier - though certainly
still qualifying as excellent buys - and probably better paid.
Arsenal invariably lose to Chelsea and normally to Manchester
United, Cole and Evra's employers. Take Clichy as a microcosm of
the team and it explains why Arsenal are consistently competitive
without winning anything since 2005.
As £500,000 purchased Cesc Fabregas, one of the world's great
central midfielders, that is a simplification but it taps into a
common complaint among Arsenal fans: that Wenger's way has resulted
in fine players arriving, but not enough of the calibre to capture
silverware. It means that while Arsenal's model has obvious appeal
to an owner, such as Henry, supporters of Liverpool, after two
decades without a league title, may still have reservations.
A parallel with another who applied more scientific methods is
that Oakland's results tailed off as others copied them. While
Arsenal remain ever-presents in the top four, their rivals have
expanded scouting teams in Europe, Africa and South America; the
inspiration for United's last three titles was Cristiano Ronaldo,
signed at 18 for just over £12 million.
While the surfeit of mediocrity among the squad players is a
regular complaint at Anfield, Wenger's brand of alchemy would be
welcome. But amid the many newer and more complex theories floating
around sport, one basic truism often applies: the team with the
best players wins.
And long before Moneyball entered the sporting
vocabulary, Shankly appointed Geoff Twentyman chief scout at
Anfield. He recommended an unknown Ian Rush, signed by Bob Paisley,
for £300,000 and an untried Alan Hansen, who cost £110,000,
possibly Liverpool's greatest goalscorer and centre back
respectively. Whether the inspiration comes from across the
Atlantic or deep into the club's past, from statistics or
intuition, those are the sort of signings Comolli requires.