US President
Donald Trump has focused on the need to "bring jobs back to
America", and some US multinationals (Carrier, Ford, Sprint) claim
they are doing just that. But are jobs really being created, and
are they jobs of the future, or of the past?
"Reshoring",
or returning offshore production to the intended final market, has
already been happening in response to market forces of
globalisation and technological change, and as more local
governments lure corporate investment with competitive tax breaks
and infrastructure subsidies (as the state of Indiana did to retain
Carrier).
But such
non-market "job creation" also causes job loss, as higher costs to
taxpayers and consumers, or reductions in other beneficial public
expenditures due to lost tax revenues, reduce real incomes and thus
demand and job creation in other sectors.
Higher costs
due to reshoring would also encourage technological upgrading,
chiefly automation substituting machinery for labour. As President
Barack Obama noted in his farewell speech in Chicago: "The next
wave of economic dislocations won't come from overseas. It will
come from the relentless pace of automation." Any new jobs are
likely to require scarce higher skills, necessitating an increase
in immigration, which Trump voters oppose - "jobs for whom" matters
more than just jobs per se.
Then there is
the very real risk that the jobs "brought back to America" are jobs
of the past, not of the future, and will not last long anyway.
The prime
example here is the car industry, which Mr Trump criticises for
manufacturing in Mexico to export to the US. As comparative
advantage dictates, car parts and models made in Mexico are more
labour-intensive and less profitable than those made in the US.
Taxing American consumers by imposing punitive tariffs on imports
from Mexico, or "returning" production to the higher-cost US, would
simply raise prices to US car buyers, disproportionately hurting
lower-income consumers who are more price-sensitive. Consumers will
have less income to spend on other domestically produced goods and
services - for example, haircuts, restaurant meals or gym
memberships - or will buy fewer cars. In either case, jobs will be
lost (or not created).
Besides
increasing automation to reduce costs, car companies would
accelerate investment in new technologies like self-driving cars,
just as they have invested in the ride-sharing companies Uber and
Lyft. Fewer cars would be produced, each with fewer workers, and
jobs would be lost not only in the factory, but also among
drivers.
RELEVANCE TO SINGAPORE
Why does this matter to Singapore?
Like the US,
we are a high-income, high-cost country facing competition from
lower-cost neighbouring countries in labour-intensive, lower-tech
tradable goods like manufactures. Unlike the US, we do not have a
large domestic market that would spur innovation and incentivise
domestic production. We also do not have local companies that are
large global players in particular market segments that could
locate the high-skill, high-wage parts of their global supply
chains in Singapore.
Rather, we
have prospered by shaping ourselves to fit particular occupational
niches in the ever-changing global supply chains and product
portfolios of foreign multinationals, as in manufacturing and
finance. To do this we have relied on selective tax incentives and
corporate subsidies that are increasingly imitated by others or
disallowed by international trade and tax rules, and on liberal
immigration policies enabling the hiring of foreigners with the
locally-scarce skills required by these investors.
Now, the
anti-globalisation threats of a Trump administration and others
across the Western world responding to populist anti-globalism may
limit our ability to continue with this follow-the-multinational
strategy. At the same time, the collapsing timelines of disruptive
technological change make it impossible for markets to predict, and
for governments to anticipate, the jobs of the future and the
skills they will require. It may well be, for example, that the job
of Uber driver, unpredicted and unheard of just five years ago,
lasts only for 10 years before being overtaken by self-driving
vehicles, while artificial intelligence first swells and then
depletes the ranks of computer programmers and software
developers.
But absolute
job creation is not the whole story. Record US job creation and
full employment under President Obama did not mollify Mr Trump or
his supporters, for whom jobs (and immigration) remain the biggest
concern. The reasons for their dissatisfaction are many: many of
the jobs created are part-time, temporary, low-wage or insecure,
and the unemployment rate is low partly because labour force
participation has dropped as "discouraged workers" stop looking for
work.
A recent study
by professors Lawrence Katz (Harvard) and Alan Krueger (Princeton)
found that 94 per cent of the 10 million net new jobs created from
2005 to 2015 were in the "alternative work" category, which jumped
from 10.7 per cent to 15.8 per cent of American workers. This
reflects the rise of independent contractors, freelancers, contract
company and temporary agency workers, who another study estimates
could reach 40 per cent of the US labour force by 2020. The number
of one-person businesses (the "self-employed" or "entrepreneurs")
has also soared, even in manufacturing.
At the same
time, conventional full-time salaried corporate jobs have
decreased. Today's tech giants like Google and Facebook employ only
a fraction of workers per dollar of revenue or market
capitalisation, compared with traditional industrial firms like
General Motors and Boeing, which themselves employ far fewer
workers per dollar of revenue than previously.
These labour
market shifts have been enabled by technology. The emergence of
online platforms enable individuals to raise capital, sell goods
and services, and share assets like homes and cars, online, while
3D printing has contributed to the rise of the "maker
revolution".
Deriving from
social and cultural as well as market and technological shifts,
these trends are likely to continue in the US and other developed
countries. The shift towards locally provided custom goods and
personal services rather than globally provided mass manufactures
suggests a limit to, if not a reversal of, global production
networks, even without newly protectionist policies. It also
contributes to the low productivity and GDP growth that developed
countries have experienced since the early 2000s.
THE REGION TO THE RESCUE
Fortunately, Singapore is located in a geographical region whose
economies will grow much faster in the next 50 years than the
Americas, Europe, Japan or China, for demographic and catch-up
reasons. Our location gives us an advantage over more distant
competitors in servicing the regional market, while our superior
infrastructure and education give us competitive advantages over
our neighbours. But leveraging these advantages to ensure good
incomes and occupations for Singaporeans will require nothing less
than a post-industrial transformation of many of the institutions
that served us well in the late industrial age, and the mindsets
and expectations that go with them.
First, we can
no longer rely on foreign multinationals, government-linked
companies and other large local enterprises to "create jobs" and
"raise wages" for us. Instead, we need to create jobs for
ourselves, through entrepreneurial ventures, self-employment and,
yes, "alternative work" arrangements (many of which can be
well-paid).
Second, we can
no longer rely on "job creation" through linkages with the
slow-growing final markets of distant developed countries. Instead
we need to expand our role in the faster growth of developing
countries, with which we have complementary comparative advantages,
particularly our neighbours. This may mean providing a different
portfolio of products at different price points than we have been
used to with rich customers and clients (for example, in medical
services and tourism).
Third, our
social safety net needs to be reconfigured to provide better
security for citizens in more flexible but also more volatile
"alternative work" arrangements (for example, provision for
self-employment contributions to a revamped Central Provident Fund,
perhaps a minimal basic income guarantee), and to avoid
discouraging inherently risky entrepreneurial efforts.
Fourth, our
education system needs to be more flexible and diverse, not only to
allow students of different abilities, interests and backgrounds to
maximise their individual potential, but also to encourage
curiosity, different thinking, self-learning, action-based
learning, and learning of other cultures and languages. Rather than
academic credentialling to fit into particular occupational slots
that are already disappearing in other people's enterprises, we
should encourage the creation of our own enterprises fulfilling
local and regional market needs.
At this
juncture of our national and world history, "more of the same"
development strategies that were effective in an earlier era will
not work. Given how developed we already are, there are diminishing
returns to yet more costly top-down state-directed investments in
infra- structure, education and corporate subsidies. It is time to
return to the bottom-up, market-driven, locally and regionally
focused, small-scale individual entrepreneurship that made us
successful in the past, and can do so again. This is where the jobs
of the future lie.