The
Rise of Political Buddhism in Myanmar
Marte Nilsen
July 06, 2015
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Burman-Buddhist nationalism remains the country's biggest barrier
to sustainable political reform.
The Organization for the Protection of Race and
Religion, known by the Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha, is
gaining ground in Myanmar. It has also been receiving increased
international attention—last month for its proposal to
ban Muslim headscarves in public
schools.
The organization was founded in 2014, when
central figures from the more widely known 969 movement
started campaigning for four
laws to ban polygamy,
restrict interfaith marriages and religious conversions, and
enforce birth control measures among groups with high rates of
population growth. All four laws, which are aimed at Myanmar’s
Muslim population, passed
parliament earlier this year. The new initiative to legally ban
Muslim headscarves in public schools is the group’s
latest.
Buddhism in Myanmar has become increasingly
politicized with the rise of the Ma Ba Tha, which has its roots in
2012, when the loosely organized 969 movement of monks and
laypeople called for a boycott of Muslim businesses. The
numerological symbol 969, which represents the triple gems
of Buddhism—the noble qualities of the Buddha [9], the dhamma [6],
and the sangha [9]—is meant to counter that of Islam, 786
(Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim). 969 campaigns have
coincided with a number of serious violent attacks on Muslim
neighborhoods by Buddhist nationalist mobs in Rakhine State
and several urban areas across
Myanmar.
Ma Ba Tha seeks to protect
the “Burman race” and Buddhism against the perceived threat of
Islam, a religion that has deep roots in the histories and cultures
of Theravada Buddhist countries across South and Southeast Asia.
Muslim populations in these countries remains small—officially 9.7
percent in Sri Lanka, 6 percent in Thailand, 4 percent in Myanmar,
and 1.6 percent in Cambodia. Nevertheless, Buddhist monks and
laypeople have expressed grave concerns about the future of
Buddhism amid fears of Muslim expansion.
Buddhists in South and
Southeast Asia recognize that few Buddhist states remain. Areas
once belonging to the ancient Brahman-Buddhist kingdoms exist today
as Muslim states—Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan—with marginal, if any, remaining Buddhist populations.
Many Buddhists fear that the tendency of Buddhists to convert in
interfaith marriages, combined with a generally higher birthrate
among Muslims (mainly in impoverished families), presents an
imminent threat to the future of Buddhism. Fear and skepticism
toward Muslim neighbors make Buddhist populations increasingly
receptive to anti-Muslim agitation from Buddhist
nationalists.
In Myanmar, as in other
Theravada Buddhist countries, Buddhism and nationalism are
inextricably linked. This phenomenon can be traced back to the
close, reciprocal relationships between the ancient Buddhist kings
and the sangha, modeled on Ashoka’s empire in which the king
reigned with a moral legitimacy as a righteous chakravarti
or
dhammaraja. In the struggle for
independence from the colonial powers across South and South East
Asia, from the late 19th century through much of the first half of
the 20th, a modern Buddhist nationalism that invoked and reinvented
this ideal Buddhist kingdom emerged.
In Myanmar, the British Raj
banned political organizing but permitted religious institutions
and organizations, which were quickly politicized. Later, in the
formative years of post-independence Burmese nation building,
Buddhism would play a prominent role, along with the culture of the
ethnic Burman majority, in constructing a national identity. The
alienation of Myanmar’s many ethnic and religious minorities
continues to this day. Today the Myanmar government juggles peace
negotiations with some 17 ethnic armed groups, after about 60 years
of armed conflicts and civil wars.
Following 50 years of
military dictatorship, Myanmar’s current struggle to develop
sustainable political reform remains hampered by narrow
Burman-Buddhist nationalist ideology.
The Ma Ba Tha, a new political expression of
this ideology, has been known to threaten and intimidate Burmese
who advocate for tolerance of diversity and to use its religious power to
exercise political pressure. As November’s general elections quickly
approach, existing Buddhist anxieties and skepticism toward Muslims
could be exploited by political interests, which could lead to a
resurgence of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. By framing the
widely popular Aung San Suu Kyi, and her National League for
Democracy, as “soft on Muslims,” her opponents may succeed in
challenging her political and moral authority.
In the long term, Myanmar
will need to reassess its national ideology in order to give space
for the emergence of new national identities that respect ethnic
and religious minority rights without compromising the country’s
Burman and Buddhist heritage.