http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/
The theory of the two truths has a twenty-five century long
history behind it. It has its origin in the sixth century
BCE[1] India with
the emergence of the Siddhārtha Gautama. It is said, according to
the Pitāpūtrasamāgama-sūtra, Siddhārtha became a buddha
“awakened one” because he fully understood the meaning of the two
truths—conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth
(paramārtha-satya)—and that the reality of all the objects of
knowledge, the text says, is exhaustively comprised of the two
truths (Sde Dge, dkon brtsegs nga, 60b). The theory of the
two truths, according to the Samādhirāja-sūtra, is a
unique contribution made by the Buddha towards Indian philosophy.
This text states: “the knower of the world, without hearing it from
others, taught that there are the two truths” (Sde dge, mdo-sde da
174b–210b). Nāgārjuna, in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,
(MMK) attributes the two truths to the Buddha as follows:
“the Dharma taught by the buddhas is precisely based on the two
truths: a truth of mundane conventions and a truth of the ultimate”
(MMK 24:8).
The theory of the two truths is the heart of the Buddha's
philosophy. It serves as the mirror reflecting the core message of
the Buddha's teachings and the massive philosophical literature it
inspired. At the heart of the theory of the two truths is the
Buddha's ever poignant existential and soteriological concerns
about the reality of things and of life. Nirvāṇa, ultimate freedom
from the suffering conditioned by desires, is only ever achieved,
according to the theory of the two truths, from a correct
understanding of two truths. Knowledge of the conventional truth
informs us how things are conventionally, and thus grounds our
epistemic practice in its proper linguistic and conceptual
framework. Knowledge of the ultimate truth informs us of how things
really are ultimately, and so takes our minds beyond the bounds of
conceptual and linguistic coventions.
In India the theory of the two truths the Buddha had explained,
of course without much elaboration, stimulated rich philosophical
exchanges amongst the Buddhist philosophers and practitioners, not
to mention the exchanges with traditional Hindu thinkers. The
exchange of different ideas and views of the two truths between the
early Buddhists, among other factors, gave birth to Buddhism as the
philosophy we know today. The transformation of the two truths
theory from a simple to a complex system of thought with highly
sophisticated concepts is perhaps the most significant contribution
resulting from the schisms the Buddhism experienced after the
Buddha passed away (ca. 380 BCE). Various schools with varying
interpretations of the Buddha's words soon appeared in Buddhism,
which resulted in rich and vibrant philosophical and hermeutic
atmosphere.
In later years, Sarvāstivādin (Vaibhāṣika) and Sautrāntika,
Madhyamaka (from the first century CE onwards) and Yogācāra (ca.
sixth century CE onwards) became the dominant schools. Our
investigation of the theory of the two truths will briefly focus on
how these schools have received, interpreted and understood it.
Although all these schools regard the theory of two truths as the
centrepiece of the Buddha's philosophy, all have nevertheless
adopted very different approaches to the theory. As we shall see
each understood and interpreted the two truths in different ways,
and are often fundamentaly and radically opposed to each other.
In the fourth century, Vasubandhu undertook a comprehensive
survey of the Sarvāstivāda School's thought, and wrote a
compendium, Treasury of Knowledge,
(Abhidharmakośakārikā AbhiDK; Mngon pa
ku 1b–25a) with his own Commentary on the Treasury of
Knowledge (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya AbhiDKB,
Mngon pa ku 26b–258a). This commentary not only offers an
excellent account of the Sarvāstivādin views, including the theory
of the two truths, but also offers a sharp critique of many views
held by the Sarvāstivādins. Vasubandhu based his commentary on the
Mahāvibhāṣā (The Great Commentary), as the
Sarvāstivādins held their philosophical positions according to the
teachings of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Consequently, Sarvāstivādins
are often known as Vaibhāṣikas.
The Sarvāstivādin's ontology[2] or the theory
of the two truths makes two fundamental claims.
To put the matter straightforwardly, for the Sarvāstivādins,
wholes and continua are only conventionally real, whereas the atoms
and point-instant consciousness are only ultimately real.
To see how the Sarvāstivādins defend these two claims, we shall
have a close look at their definitions of the two truths. We will
examine conventional truth first. This will provide the argument in
support of the second claim. In the Abhidharmakośa
Vasubandu defines conventional truth/reality as follows: “An
entity, the cognition of which does not arise when it is destroyed
and, mentally divided, is conventionally existent like a pot and
water. Ultimate existence is otherwise.” (AbhiDK 6.4,
Mngon pa khu 7ab) Whatever is, on this definition,
designated as “conventionally existent” is taken to be
“conventionally real” or conventional truth when the idea or
concept of which ceases to arise when it is physically destroyed,
by means of a hammer for instance. Or its properties such as shape
are stripped away from it by means of subjecting it under analysis,
thereby conceptually excluding them. A pot and water are designated
as conventionally existent therefore conventionally real for the
concept “pot” ceases to exist when it is destroyed physically, and
the concept “water” no longer arises when we conceptually exclude
from it its shape, colour etc.
On the Sarvāstivādin definition, for an entity to be real, it
does not need to be ultimate truth or ultimately real, exclusively.
For a thing to be ultimately real is for that thing to be
“foundationally existent” (dravya-sat / rdzas yod)[3] in contrast
with being “compositely existent” (avayavidravya / rdzas grub). By
“foundationally existent” the Sarvāstivādin refer to the entity
which is fundamentally real, the concept or the cognition of which
is not dependent on conceptual construction, hence not conceptually
existent (prajñaptisat) nor a composition of the aggregative
phenomena. In the case of foundational existent there always
remains something irreducible to which the concept of the thing
applies, hence it is ultimate truth. A simple entity is not
reducible to conceptual forms, or conventional designations, nor is
it compositely existent entity. We will have lot more to say on
this point shortly.
Pot and water are not the foundational entities. They are rather
composite entities (avayavi-dravya / rdzas grub). By composite
entity, we mean an entity or existent which is not fundamental,
primary or simple, but is rather a conceptually constructed
(prajñaptisat), composition of various properties, and is thus
reducible both physically and logically.
Hence for the Sarvāstivādin, conventional truth (samvṛtisatya),
composite-existence (avayavi-dravya / rdzas grub), and the lack of
intrinsic reality (niḥsvabhāva) are all equivalents. A conventional
truth is therefore characterised as a reducible conventional entity
on three grounds: (i) conventional truth is both physically and
logically reducible, as it disintegrates when it is subjected to
physical destruction and disappears from our minds when its parts
are separated from it by logical analysis; (ii) conventional truth
borrows its identity from other things including its parts,
concepts etc., it does not exist independently in virtue of its
intrinsic reality (niḥsvabhāva), the exclusion of its parts and
concepts thus affects and reduces its inherent nature; and (iii)
conventional truth is a product of mental constructions, like that
of conventionally real wholes, causation, continuum etc, and it
does not exists intrinsically.
The definition of the ultimate truth, as we shall see, offers
the Sarvāstivādin response to the claim that ultimate truth
consists of irreducible atoms and point-instant moments. In
glossing the AbhiDK 6.4 verse his commentary explains that
utimate truth is regarded as ultimately existent, one that is both
physically and logically irreducible. Vasubandhu supplies three
arguments to support this: (i) ultimate truth is both physically
and logically irreducible, as it does not disintegrate when it is
subjected to physical destruction and that its identity does not
disappear when its parts are separated from it under logical
analysis; and (ii) ultimate truth does not borrow its nature from
other things including its parts. Rather it exists independently in
virtue of its intrinsic reality (svabhāva), the exclusion
of its parts thus does not affect its inherent nature; and (iii) it
is not a product of mental constructions, like that of
conventionally real wholes, causation, continuum etc. It exists
intrinsically (AbhiDKB 6.4, Mngon pa khu 214a).
Ultimate truth is of two types: the compounded (saṁskṛta)
ultimate, and the uncompounded (asaṁskṛta) ultimate. The
uncompounded ultimate consists of (a) space (akāśa), and (b)
nirvāṇa—analytical cessation (pratisaṁkyā-nirodha) and
non-analytical cessation (apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha). These three
ultimates are uncompounded as each is seen as being causally
unconditioned. They are nonspatial concepts. These concepts do not
have any physical referent whatsoever. Space is a mere absence of
entity. Analytical and nonanalytical cessations are the two forms
of nirvāṇa, which is simply freedom from afflictive suffering, or
the elimination of afflictive suffering. These concepts are not
associated in positing any thing that can be described as remotely
physical. They are thus the concepts that are irreducible
physically and logically.
The compounded ultimate consists of the five aggregates—material
aggregate (rūpa), feeling aggregate (vedanā), perception-aggregate
(saṁjñā), dispositional aggregate (saṁskāra), and
consciousness-aggregate (vijñāna)—since they are causally produced,
and the ideas of each aggregate are conceived individually rather
than collectively. If the aggregates, the ideas of which are
conceived collectively as a whole(s) or a continuum/continua, they
could not be ultimately real. The collective concepts of the
aggregate as a “whole” or as a “continuum” subject to cessation as
they cease to appear to the mind, get excluded from the conceptual
framework of the reality of the five aggregates when they are
logically analysed.
The philosophers[4] who
championed this view are some of the best-known Indian logicians
and epistemologists. Other great names who propogated the tradition
include Devendrabuddhi (?), Śākhyabuddhi (?), Vinitadeva (630–700),
Dharmottara (750–810), Mokṣakaragupt (ca. 1100–1200). Dignāga
(480–540) and Dharmakīrti (600–660) are credited to have founded
this school. For the theory of the two truths in the Sautrāntika we
will need to rely on the following texts:
Broadly, all objects of knowledge are classified into two
realities based on the ways in which right-cognition (pramāṇa)
engages with its object. They are either directly accessible
(pratyakṣa), which constitutes the objects that are
obvious to the cognition, or they are directly inaccessible
(parokṣa), which constitutes the objects that are
occulted, or obscured from the cognition. A directly accessible
object is principally known by the direct perceptual
right-cognition (pratyaṣa-pramāṇa), whereas a directly inaccessible
object is principally known by the inferential right-cognition
(anumāna-pramāṇa).
Of the two types of objects, some are ultimately real while
others are only conventional real, and some are not even
conventionally real, they are just false, or fictions. In defining
the ultimate truth in the Sautrāntika tradition, we read in
Dharmakīrti's PVK: “That which is ultimately causally efficient is
here the ultimately existent (paramārthasat). Conventionally
existent (saṁvṛtisat) is otherwise. They are declared as the
definitions of the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal
(sāmāṅyalakṣaṇa)” (Dharmakīrti PVK Tshad ma ce 118b).
Ultimate truth is, on this definition, a phenomenon (dharma)
that is ultimately existent, and ultimately existent are ultimately
causally efficient. Phenomenon that is ultimately causally
efficient is intrinsically or objectively real, existing in and of
itself as a “unique particular” (svalakṣaṇa).[5] By “unique
particular” Dharmakīrti means ultimately real phenomenon—dharma
that is self-defined, uniquely individual, objectively real,
existing independent of any conceptual fabrication, ultimately
causally efficient (artha), dharma that serves as the objects of
direct perception, dharma that presents itself to the cognitions as
distinctive/unique individuals.
In the PVT Dharmakīrti characterises (Tshad ma ce
274b–279b) all ultimately real unique particulars exist as distinct
individuals with their own intrinsic natures. And they satisfy
three criteria:
So the “determinate intrinsic natures of the unique
particulars,” Dharmakīrti argues in PVT “are not accidental or
fortuitous since what is not determinate cannot be spatially,
temporally and ontologically determinate” (Tshad ma ce
179a).
The unique particulars are, Sautrāntika claims, ultimately real,
and they supply us four arguments to support the claim:
(1) Unique particulars are causally efficient phenomena
(arthakriyāsamartha) (PVT Tshad ma ce 179a) because: (a)
they have the ability to serve the pragmatic purpose of life—fulfil
the objectives in our life, and (b) ability to produce a variety of
cognitive images due to their remoteness or proximity.
(Dharmottara's Nyābinduṭīkā Tshad ma we 36b–92a) Both of
these abilities must be associated exclusively with the objects of
direct perception (Tshad ma we 45a).
(2) Unique particulars present themselves only to direct
perceptual cognition as distinct and uniquely defined individuals
because the unique particulars are, as Dharmakīrti's
Nyāyabindu points out “the objects whose nearness or
remoteness presents the difference of cognitive image” (Tshad
ma ce 231a) and that object alone which produces the
impression of vividness according to its remoteness or proximity,
exists ultimately (DharmottaraTshad ma we 44b–45a).
(3) Unique particulars are not denotable by language since they
are beyond the full grasp of any conceptual mind (śabdasyāviśaya).
Although unique particulars are the objective references of
language and thought, and we may have firm beliefs about them,
conceptual mind does not fully grasp their real nature. They are
ultimately real, directly cognisable by the means of certain
perception without the reliance on other factors (nimitta) such as
language and thought. Therefore they must exist. They are the sorts
of phenomenon whose cognition would not occur if they are not
objectively real.
In the Sautrāntika ontology ultimately real/existent
(synonymous) unique particulars are classified into three
kinds:
The Sautrāntika's theory of ultimate truth mirrors its ontology
of flux in which the unique particulars are viewed as the spatially
infinitesimal atoms constituting temporally momentary events
(kṣaṇika) or as successive flashes of consciousnesses, cognitive
events, all devoid of any real continuity as substratum. Unique
particulars are ultimately real, although they are not enduring
substances (dravyas) inhering in it's qualities (guṇas) and actions
(karmas) as the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika claims. They are rather bundles
of events arising and disappearing instantly. Even the continuity
of things and motion are only successive events closely resembling
each other. On this theory ultimate realities are momentary point
instants, and Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti both argue that no
conditioned phenomenon, therefore, no ultimately real unique
particulars, endure more than a single moment—hence they are
momentary instants (kṣaṇika).
Four closely interrelated arguments provide the defence of the
Sautrāntika's claim that ultimately real unique particulars are
momentary instants. Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti both employ the
first two arguments. The third argument is one Dharmakīrti
specialises in his works.
(1) Ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants
because their perishing or destruction is spontaneous to their
becoming. This follows because (i) unique particulars are
inherently self-destructive (Vasubandhu, AbhiDKB, Mngon pa
khu 166b–167a), and (ii) their perishing or cessation is
intrinsic and does not depend on any other
extrinsic causal factors (Dharmakīrti, PVK Tshad
ma ce 102a; PVT, Tshad ma ce 178ab).
(2) The ultimately real unique particulars are momentary
instants because they are motionless, and do not move from one
temporal or spatial location to another. They perish just where
they were born since nothing exists later than its acquisition of
existence (Vasubandhu, AbhiDKB Mngon pa khu 166b).
(3) The third argument proves the momentary instants of the
unique particulars from the inference of existence (sattvānumāna).
This is a case of the argument from identity of existence and
production (svabhāvahetu). All unique particulars which are
ultimately existent, are necessarily produced, since only those
that are ultimately existent, insofar as Dharmakīriti is concerned,
are able to a perform causal function—i.e., to produce effects. And
causally efficient unique particulars imply constant change for the
renewal and the perishing of their antecedent identities,
therefore, they are momentary.
Finally (4), unique particulars are ultimately real not only on
the ground that they constitute the final ontological status, but
also because it forms the basis of the Sautrāntika soteriology. The
attainment of nirvāṇa — the ultimate freedom from the afflictions
of life—for the Sautrāntika, according to Dharmakīrti's
Vādanyāya, has an immediate perception of the unique
particulars as its necessary condition (Tshad ma che
108b–109a).
Dharmakīrti defines conventional truth, in his PVK, as
dharma which is “conventionally existent” and he identifies
conventional truth with the “universal”
(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)[7] just as he
identifies ultimate truth with the unique particular (Tshad
ma ce 118b). When a Sautrāntika philosopher describes a
certain entity as a universal, he means a conceptual entity not
apprehended by virtue of its own being. He means a general property
that is conceptually constructed, appearing to be something common
amongst all the items in a certain class of objects. Unlike
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view where the universals are regarded as
objectively real and eternal entities inhering in the substances,
qualities and particulars, universals, for the Sautrāntika are pure
conceptual constructs. Sautrāntika holds the view known as
nominalism or conceptualism—the view that denies universals any
independent extramental objective reality existing on their own
apart from being mentally constructed.
While unique particulars exist independently of the linguistic
convention, universals have no reality in isolation from the
linguistic and conceptual conventions. Thus, universals and
ultimate reality are mutually exclusive. Universals are therefore
only conventionally real, lacking any intrinsic nature, whereas
unique particulars are the ultimately real, and exist
intrinsically.
The Sautrāntika defends the claim that the universals
(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) are only conventional truths for the following
reasons (tshad ma ce 118b):
According to the Sautrāntika philosophy, language does not
describe reality or the unique particulars positively through the
real universals as suggested by the Naiyāyikas. Sautrāntika
developed an alternative nominalist theory of universal called the
apoha-theory in which language is seen to engage with the reality
negatively by means of elimination or the exclusion of the other
(anyāpoha / gzhan sel). On this theory, the function of language,
specifically naming, is to eliminate the object from the
class of those objects to which language does not apply.
In brief the Sautrāntika's theory of the two truths rests on
dichotomising objects between the unique particulars, which are
understood as ultimately reals, dynamic, momentary, causally
effective, the objective domain of the direct perception; and the
universals, which are understood as only conventionally reals,
conceptually constructed, static, causally ineffective and the
objective domain of the inferential cognition.
The Vaibhāṣika's realistic theory of the two truths and the
Sautrāntika's representationalist theory of the two truths both
affirm the ultimate reality of the physical objects constituted by
the atoms. Yogācāra rejects the physical realism of both Vaibhāṣika
and Sautrāntika, although it agrees with the Sautrāntika's
representationalist theory as far as they both affirm
representation as the intentional object in perception and deny in
perception a direct access to the external object. Where they part
their company is in their response to the questions: what causes
the representations? Is the contact of senses with physical objects
necessary to give rise to the representations in perception? The
Sautrāntika's reply is that the external objects cause
representations, given that these representations are the
intentional objects there is indeed a contact between the senses
and the external objects. This affirmative response allows the
Sautrāntika to affirm the reality of external objects. The
Yogācārin however replies that the “subliminal impressions”
(vāsanās) from the foundational consciousness (ālayavijñāna) are
the causes of the mental representations, and given that these
impressions are only internal phenomena acting as the intentional
objects, the contact between the senses and the external objects is
therefore rejected even conventionally. This allows the Yogācārin
to deny even the conventional reality of all physical objects, and
argue that only conventional reals are our mental representations,
mental creations, cognitions etc.
The central thesis in the Yogācāra philosophy, the theory of the
two truths echoes this, is the assertion that all that is
conventionally real is only ideas, representations, images,
creations of the mind, and that there is no conventionally real
object that exists outside the mind to which it corresponds. These
ideas are the only objects of any cognition. The whole universe is
a mental universe. All physical objects are only fiction, they are
unreal even by the conventional standard, similar to a dream, a
mirage, a magical illusion, where what we perceive are only
products of our mind, without a real external existence.
Inspired by the idealistic tendencies of various sūtras
consisting of important elements of the idealistic doctrines, in
the third and the fourth centuries many Indian philosophers
developed and systematised a coherent Idealist School. In the
beginning of the Viṃśatikā Vasubandhu treats
citta, manas, vijñāna, vijñāpti as
synonymous and uses these terms as the names of the idealistic
school. The chief founders were Maitreyanāth (ca. 300) and
Asaṅga (315–390), propagated by Vasubandhu (320–380), Dignāga
(480–540) Sthiramati (ca. 500), Dharmapāla (530–561),
Hiuan-tsang (602–664), Dharmakīrti (600–660), Śāntarakṣita
(ca.725–788) and Kamalaśīla (ca.740–795). The last two are
Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas in contrast with the earlier figures who are
identified as Yogācārins.
Like other Buddhist schools, the theory of the two truths
captures the central Yogācāra doctrines. Maitreyanāth asserts in
his Verses on the Distinction Between Phenomena and
Reality (Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga-kārikā, DharDVK;
Sems tsam phi 50b–53b)—“All this is understood to be condensed
in two categories: phenomena (dharma) and reality (dharmatā)
because they encompass all.” (DharDVK 2, Sems
tsam phi) By “All” Yogācārin means every possible object of
knowledge, and they are said to be contained in the two truths
since objects are either the conventional truth or the ultimate
truth. Things are either objects of conventional knowledge or
objects of ultimate knowledge, and a third category is not
admitted.
Etymologically the term conventional truth covers the sense of
what we ordinarily take as commonsensical truths. However, in
contrast with the naïve realism associated with the common sense
notions of truths, for Yogācāra the term “conventional truth” has
somewhat a negative connotation. It exclusively refers to the
objects of knowledge like forms, sound etc., the mode of existence
or mode of being which radically contradicts with the mode of its
appearance, and thus they are false, unreal, and deceptive. Forms,
sounds, etc., are defined as conventional truths in that they are
realities/truths from the perspective of, or by the force of, three
forms of convention:
A conventional truth is therefore a truth by virtue of being
fabricated by the conceptual mind; or it is truth erroneously
apprehended by means of the dualistic consciousness; or it is true
concept, meaning, signified and designated by a convenient
designator/signifier.
Because the Yogācārins admit three conventions, it also admits
three categories of conventional truths:
The first and the last are categories of the imaginary phenomena
(parikalpita) and the second is the dependent phenomena
(paratantra).
Yogācāra's claim that external objects are not even
conventionally real, what is conventionally real are only our
impressions, and mental representations is one Vasubandhu closely
defends by means of the Yogācāra's theory of the three natures
(trisvabhāva). In his Discernment of the Three
Natures (Trisvabhāvakārikā, or
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, TSN; Sems tsam shi 10a–11b),
Vasubandhu explains that the Yogācāra ontology and phenomenology as
consisting of the unity of three natures (svabhāva):
The first two account for conventional truth and the latter
ultimate truth. We shall consider the import of the three in
turn.
First, Vasubandhu defines the dependent nature as: (a) one that
exists due to being causally conditioned (pratyayādhīnavṛttitvāt),
and (b) it is the basis of “what appears” (yat khyāti) mistakenly
in our cognition as conventionally real, it is the basis for the
“unreal conceptual fabrication” (asatkalpa) which is the
phenomenological basis of the appearance of reified subjects and
objects (TSN 2 Sems tsam shi 10a). The
implications of the Yogācārin expression “what appears” to describe
the dependent nature are therefore twofold: (a) that the things
that appear in our cognitions are exclusively the representations,
which are the manifest forms of the subliminal impressions, and (b)
that the entire web of conventional reality, which presents itself
to our cognitions phenomenologically in various ways, is
exclusively the appearance of those representations. Apart from
those representations, consciousnesses, which appear to be external
objects, there is no conventionally real external content which
corresponds to what appears.
Second, in contrast with the dependent nature which is the basis
of “what appears” (yat khyāti), the imaginary nature
(parikalpita), as Vasubandu defines it, is the mode of
appearance “as it appears” (sau yathā khyāti) on the ground that
its existence is only an “unreal conceptual fabrication”
(asatakalpo) (TriSN 2, Sems tsam chi 10a). The
imaginary nature is only an “unreal conceptual construction”
because of two reasons: (i) it is the dependent
nature—representations—merely dually reified by the mind as an
ultimately real subject, or self, or eg, and (ii) the imaginary
nature is dualistic reification of beings and objects as existing
really and externally, there is no such reality.
Third, given the fact that the dependent nature is devoid, or
free from this duality, the imaginary nature is a mere
superimposition on it. Hence nonduality, the perfect nature
(pariniṣpanna) is the ultimate reality of the dependent nature.
In the Commentary on the Sūtra of Intent
(Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Mdo sde ca 1b–55b)
it is stated that “Reality as it is, which is the intentional
object of a pure consciousness, is the definition of the perfect
nature. This must be so because it is with respect to this that the
Victorious Buddha attributed all phenomena as natureless,
ultimately.” (Mdo sde ca 35b) Vasubandhu's TSN
defines “the perfect nature (pariniṣpanna) as the eternal
nonexistence of ‘as it appears’ of ‘what appears’ because it is
unalterable.” (TSN 3, Sems tsam chi 10a) “What
appears” is the dependent nature—a series of cognitive events, the
representations. “As it appears” is the imaginary nature—the unreal
conceptual fabrication of the subject-object duality. The
representations, (i.e., the dependent nature) appear in the
cognition as if they have in them the subject-object duality, even
though the dependent nature is wholly devoid of such subject-object
duality. The perfect nature is therefore this eternal nonexistence
of the imaginary nature—the duality—in the dependent nature.
Vasubandhu defines the perfect nature as the ultimate truth and
identifies it with mere-consciousness. “This is the ultimate
(paramārtha) of the dharmas, and so it is the reality (tathatā)
too. Because its reality is like this all the time, it is mere
consciousness.” (Triṃ 25, Sems tsam shi 3b)
Accordingly Sthiramati's Commentary on the Thirty Verses
(Triṃśikābhāṣya, TriṃB; Sems tsam shi 146b–171b),
explains “ultimate” (paramārtha) here as refering to “’the the
world-transcending knowledge’ (lokottara-nirvikalpa-jñāna)
in that there is nothing that surpasses it. Since it is the object
of [the transcendent knowledge], it is the ultimate. It is even
like the space in having the same taste everywhere. It is the
perfect nature, which is stainless and unchangable. Therefore, it
is known as the ‘ultimate.’” (TriṃB, Sems tsam shi
169ab)
So, as we can see the dependent and the imaginary natures
together explain the Yogācāra's position on conventional reality
and the perfect nature explains its conception of the ultimate
reality. The first two natures provide an argument for Yogācāra's
empirical and practical standpoint (vyavahāra), conventional truth
and the third nature an argument for its ultimate truth. Even then
the dependent nature alone is conventionally real and the perfect
nature alone is ultimately real. By contrast, the imaginary nature
is unreal and false even by the empirical and practical standards.
This is true in spite of the fact the imaginary nature is
constitutive of the conventional truth.
So, the perfect nature—nondual mind, i.e., emptiness (śūnyatā)
of the subject-object duality—is the ultimate reality of the
Yogācāra conception. Ultimate truth takes various forms as it is
understood within the Yogācārin tradition. As Maitreyanātha states,
ultimate truth takes three primary forms—as emptiness it is the
ultimate object, as nirvāṇa it is the ultimate attainment, and as
nonconceptual knowledge it is the ultimate realization
(MadhVK, Sems tsam phi 42B).
Yogācāra Arguments
The core argument in support of the only mind thesis is the
impossibility of the existence of external objects. Vasubandhu
develops this argument in his Viṃ 1–27 as does Dignāga in
his Examination of the Intentional Object
(Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, ĀlamPV 1–8, Tshad
ma ce 86a–87b) against the atomists (Naiyāyikas-Vaiśeṣika and
Ābhidharmikas[8]). Against the
Yogācāra idealist thesis the realist opponents, as Vasubandhu
observes, raise three objections:—“If consciousness (does) not
(arise) out from an object (i) neither the determination or
certainty (niyama) in regard to place (deśa) and time (kāla), (ii)
nor the indetermination or unexclusiveness (aniyama) in regard to
the series of (consciousness) (iii) nor the performance of the
(specific) function (kṛtyakriya) are logically possible (yuktā)”
(Viṁ 2, Sems tsam shi 3a).
Vasubandhu offers his Yogācāra reply in the Viṃ to
these realist objections and insists that the idealist position
does not face these three problems. The first problem is not an
issue for the Yogācāra since dreams (svapna) account for the
spatio-temporal determination. In dreams, in the absence of an
external object, one still has the cognition of a woman, or a man
in only determinate / specific time and place, and not arbitrarily
and not everywhere and not in any moment. Neither is the second
problem of the lack of an intersubjective agreement an issue for
the Yogācāra. The case of the pretas (hungry-ghosts) account for
intersubjective agreement as they look at water they alone, not
other beings, see rivers of pus, urine, excrement, and collectively
hallucinates demons as the hell guardians. Although pus, urine,
excrement and hell guardians are nonexistent externally, due to the
maturation of their collective karma, pretas exclusively experience
the series of cognitions (vijñapti), other beings do not encounter
such experience (Viṃ 3, Sems tsam shi). Nor is
the lack of causal efficacy of the impressions or representations
in the consciousness a problem for the Yogācāra. As in the case of
wet dreams, even without a union of the couple, the emission of
semen can occur, and so the representations in the consciousness
are causally efficient even without the externally real object.
Yogācāra's defensive arguments against the realist challenges
are quite strong. However unless Yogācāra is able to undermine the
core realist thesis—i.e., reality of the external objects—and its
key supporting argument—the existence of atoms—then the debate
could go either way. Therefore Yogācāra shows the nonexistence, or
unreality of the atoms as the basis of the external object to
reject the realist position.
Yogācāra's impressions-only theory and the Sautrāntika's
representationalist theory both explain our sensory experience (the
spatio-temporal determinacy, intersubjective agreement, and causal
efficacy). They agree on what the observables are: mental entities,
including mental images but also emotions such as desires. They
also agree that karma plays vital role in explaining our
experience. The realist theory, though, according to Dignāga's
Investigation About the Support of the Cognition
(Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛ tti, ĀlamPV) has to posit the reality
of additional physical objects, things that are in principle
unobservable, given that all we experience in the cognition are our
impressions (ĀlamPV, Tshad ma ce 86a).
If the realist thesis were correct, then there would be three
alternatives for the atoms to act as the intentional objects of
cognition.
Of the three alternatives: (1) points to the unity of a
thing conceived as a whole; and (2) and (3) point to the
multiplicity looking at the things as loose atoms, i.e.,
composite atoms. Not one of the three possibilities is, on
Yogācāra's account, admissible as the object of cognition however.
The first is inadmissible because nowhere an external object is
grasped as a unity, whole, one apart
from its parts (ĀlamPV Tshad ma ce 86b). The second is
inadmissible because when we see things we find that the atoms are
not perceived individually as one by one (Viṃ13, Sems
tsam shi 3b). The third alternative is also rejected because
the atoms in this case cannot be proved to exist as an indivisible
(Viṃ 14, Sems tsam shi 3b).
Further, if there were a simultaneous conjunction of an atom
with other six atoms coming from the six directions, the atom would
have six parts because that which is the locus of one atom cannot
be the locus of another atom. If the locus of one atom were the
locus of the six atoms, which were in conjunction with it, then
since all the seven atoms would have the same common locus, the
whole mass constituted by the seven atoms would be of the size of a
single atom, because of the mutual exclusion of the occupants of a
locus. Consequently, there would be no visible mass
(Viṃ12, Sems tsam shi 3b).
Since unity is an essential characteristic of being the whole,
or composite whereas indivisibility an essential characteristic of
being an atom when both the unity and individuality of the atoms
are rejected, then the whole and indivisible atoms are no longer
admissible. Therefore, Vasubandhu sums up the Yogācāra objections
against the reality of the external sense-objects (āyatanas) as:
“An external sense-object is unreal because it cannot be the
intentional object of cognition either as (1) a single thing or (2)
as a multiple in [isolated] atoms; or (3) as a aggregate because
the atom is not proven to exist” (Viṃ11, Sems
tsam shi 3b).
The realist insists that the external sense objects are real and
that their reality is ascertained by the various means of knowledge
(pramāṇas) of which perception (pratyakṣa) is the most important.
If the external sense objects are nonexistents, there can be no
intentional objects, then cognition would not arise. Since
cognitions do arise, there must be external objects as their
intentional objects.
To this objection, Yogācāra employs two arguments to refute the
realist claim and to establish the mechanism of cognition, which
takes place without the atoms of an external object. The first
argument shows that atoms do not satisfy the criterian of being the
intentional object, therefore they do not cause the perception.
“Perceptual cognition [takes place] just like in dreams and the
like [even without an external object]; moreover, when that
[cognition] occurs, the external object is not seen; how can it be
thought that this is a case of perception?” (Viṃ16,
Sems tsam shi 3b).
The second is the time-lag argument, according to which, there
is a time-gap between the perceptual judgement we make and the
actual perceptual process. When we make a perceptual judgement, at
that time we do not perceive the external object as it is in our
mental consciousness (manovijñāna) that carries out the judgement
and since the visual consciousness that perceives the object has
already ceased. Hence at the time when the mental consciousness
delivers it judgment, the perceptual cognition no longer exists
since all things are momentary. Therefore the atoms of an external
object is not the intentional object of perceptual cognition, since
it has already ceased and does not now exist therefore it is not
responsible for the cognition's having the content it has, like the
unseen events occurring on the other side of the wall (Vasubandhu's
Viṃśatikā-kārikāvṛtti, ViṃKV 16–17).
Yogācāra therefore concludes that we cannot postulate the
reality of an external object through direct perception. However
since in perceptual cognition we are directly aware of something,
there must be an intentional object of the perceptual cognition.
That intentional object of the perceptual cognition is, according
to Yogācāra, none other than the subliminal impressions (vāsanās)
passing from their latent state contained in the storehouse
consciousness (ālayavijñāna) to their conscious level. Therefore
the impressions are the only things that are conventionally
real.
Vasubandhu's TSN 35–36 inspired by the Buddhist
traditional religious beliefs also offers others arguments to
defend the idealism of Yogācāra:
All these arguments based on the facts of experience show that
the objects do not exist really outside the mind, that they are the
products of mental creation and that their appearance is entirely
mind dependent. Therefore Yogācāra's theory of the two truths
concludes that the whole world is a product of mind—it is the
collective mental action (karma) of all beings. All living beings
see the same world because of the identical maturation of their
karmic consequences. Since the karmic histories of beings are same,
there is homogeneity in the way in which the world is experienced
and perceived. This is the reason there is an orderly world instead
of chaotic and arbitrariness. This is also the reason behind the
impressions of the objectivity of the world.
After the Buddha the philosopher who broke new ground on the
theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka system is a South Indian
monk, Nāgārjuna (ca. 100 BCE–100 CE). Amongst his seminal
philosophical works delineating the theory are Nāgārjuna's
Āryadeva's work Catuḥśatakaṣāstrakārikā (Four
Hundred Verses) is also considered as one of the foundational
texts delineating Madhyamaka's theory of the two truths.
Nāgārjuna saw himself as propagating the dharma taught by the
Buddha, which he says is precisely based on the theory of the two
truths: a truth of mundane conventions and a truth of the ultimate.
(MMK 24.8, Dbu ma tsa 14b–15a) He saw the theory
of the two truths as constituting the Buddha's core teaching and
his philosophy. Nāgārjuna maitains therefore that those who do not
understand the distinction between these two truths would fail to
understand the Buddha's teaching (MMK 24.9, Dbu
ma tsa 15a). This is so, for Nāgārjuna, because (1) without
relying on the conventional truth, the meaning of the ultimate
cannot be explained, and (2) without understanding the meaning of
the ultimate, nirvāṇa is not achieved (MKK 24.10, Dbu
ma tsa 15a).
Nāgārjuna's theory of the two truths is fundamentally different
from all theories of truth in other Indian philosophies. Hindu
philosophers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkya-Yoga, and
Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta—all advocate a foundationalism of some kind
according to which ultimate reality is taken to be the “substantive
reality” (drayva) or foundation upon which stands the entire
edifice of the conventional ontological structures where the
ultimate reality is posited as immutable, fixed, irreducible and
independent of any interpretative conventions. That is so, even
though the conventional structure that stands upon it constantly
changes and transforms.
As we saw the Buddhist realism of the Vaibhāṣika and the
representationalism of the Sautrāntika both advocate ultimate truth
as ultimately real, logically irreducible. The idealism of Yogācāra
holds the nondual mind as the only ultimate reality and the
external world as merely conventional truths. On Nāgārjuna's
Madhyamaka all things including ultimate truth are ultimately
unreal, empty (śūnya) of any intrinsic nature (svabhāva) including
the emptiness (śūnyatā) itself, therefore all are groundless. In
this sense a Mādhyamika (a proponent of the Madhyamaka thought) is
a an advocate of the emptiness (śūnyavādin), advocate of the
intrinsic unreality (niḥsvabhāvavādin), groundless, essenceless, or
coreless. Nevertheless to assert that all things are empty of any
intrinsic reality, for Nāgārjuna, is not to undermine the
existential status of things as simply nothing. On the
contrary, Nāgārjuna argues, to assert that the things are empty of
any intrinsic reality is to explain the way things really are as
causally conditioned phenomena (pratītyasamputpaṅhā).
Nāgārjuna's central argument to support his radical
non-foundationalist theory of the two truths draws upon an
understanding of conventional truth as tied to dependently arisen
phenomena, and ultimate truth as tied to emptiness of the intrinsic
nature. Since the former and the latter are coconstitutive of each
other, in that each entials the other, ultimate reality is tied to
being conventionally real. Nāgārjuna advances important arguments
justifying the correlation between the conventional truth vis-à-vis
dependent arising, and emptiness vis-à-vis ultimate truth. These
arguments bring home their epistemological and ontological
correlations (MMK 24.14; Dbu ma tsa 15a). He
argues that wherever applies emptiness as the ultimate truth, there
applies the causal efficacy of the conventional truth and wherever
emptiness does not apply as the ultimate truth, there does not
apply the causal efficacy of the conventional truth
(Vig.71) (Dbu ma tsa 29a). According to
Nāgārjuna, ultimate truth's being empty of any intrinsic reality
affords conventional truth its causal efficacy since being
ultimately empty is identical to being causally produced,
conventionally. This must be so since, for Nāgārjuna, “there is no
thing that is not dependently arisen; therefore, there is no such
thing that is not empty” (MMK 24.19, Dbu ma tsa
15a).
Svātantrika / Prāsaṅgika and the two truths
The theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka in India took a
great resurgence from the fifth century onwards soon after
Buddhapālita (ca. 470–540) wrote A Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's]
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way
(Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti,[10]Dbu
ma tsa 158b–281a). Set forth in this text is a thoroughgoing
non-foundationalist philosophic reasoning and
method—prāsaṅga arguments or reductio ad absurdum
style without relying upon the svatantra, independent
syllogistic argument—to elucidate the Madhyamaka metaphysics and
epistemology ingrained in theory of the two truths. For this
reason, Buddhapālita is often described as the founder of the
Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, although elucidation of the theory itself is
set out in the works of Candrakīrti. Three decades later
Bhāvaviveka[11] (ca.
500–570) challenged Buddhapālita's interpretation of the two
truths, and developed a Madhyamaka account of the two truths that
reflects a significant ontological and epistemological shift from
Buddhapalitā's position, which was later championed by Candrakīrti
to whom we shall return shortly.
Many later commentators ignore the philosophical content of the
debate between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika and claim that
their controversy is confined only to pedagogical or methodological
issues. There is another view according to which the content of the
debate between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika—Buddhapālita
versus Bhāvavevika followed by Bhāvavevika versus Candrakīrti—is
essentially philosophic in nature. Underpinning the dialectical or
methodological controversy between the two Madhyamaka camps lies a
deeper ontological and epistemological divide implied within their
theories of the two truths, and this in turn is reflected in the
different methodological considerations they each deploy. So on
this second view, the variation in the methods used by the two
schools of the Madhyamaka are not simple differences in their
rhetorical devices or pedagogical tools, they are underlain by more
serious philosophical disagreements between the two.
According to this view the philosophical differentiations
between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is best contained within
the discourse of the two truths. Prāsaṅgika's theory of the two
truths we leave aside for the time being. First we shall take up
the Svātantrika's account.
Bhāvaviveka wrote some of the major Madhyamaka treatises
including
In these texts Bhāvavevika rejects the Brahmanical systems of
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta on both metaphysical
and epistemological grounds. All the theories of truth and
knowledge advanced in these systems from his Madhyamaka point of
view are too rigid to be of any significant use. Bhāvavevika's
critiques of Ābhidharmikas—Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika—and Yogācāra
predominantly target the ontological foundationalism which
underpins their theories of the ultimate truth. He rejects them on
the ground that from an analytic cognitive perspective, which
scrutinises the nature of reality, nothing—subject and object—is
found to be ultimately real since all things are rationally reduced
to spatial parts or temporal moments. Thus he proposes the view
that both the subject and the object are conventionally
intrinsically real as both are conventional truths, where as both
are ultimately intrinsically unreal as both are empty of
ultimate reality, hence emptiness alone is the ultimate
reality.
Although Bhāvavevika is said to have founded the Svātantrika
Madhyamaka, it is important to note that there exists two different
subschools of the Svātantrika tradition:
The two schools of the Svātantrika Madhyamaka t