Hi, welcome to the forum.
There is willing going on... there is intentions. How do
intentions arise? Inseperable from the requisite conditions of
latent tendencies, preferences, environment, etc etc... countless
causes and conditions coming together manifesting as this action,
this intention, this thought.
There is no intender but there certainly is intention.
Determined implies 'you' cannot do a thing to change the way
things happen. But since there is no 'you' separate from the
universe, it cannot be said that things are determined, since
determined implies there is a 'you' and 'your actions' not being
able to affect 'the universe which is predetermined'.
In other words, determinism presumes that there is a 'self'
determined by 'others' or a 'self' being helpless in the face of
'others', or 'this' determined by 'that'... whereas in reality
there is no such division, reality, D.O. is flat without hierarchy
(that in control of this or this in control of that) and as such,
all are free-manifestations of D.O. beyond extremes of determinism
(subject at mercy of object) and free will (subject in control of
object).
'Your actions' is not really 'your actions' but it is the action
of the whole universe manifesting freely now, with no one at the
center being at the mercy of, or being in control of, the
process.
This is a good article (even though David Loy is unable to
differentiate Buddhism anatta and Vedanta brahman, it nevertheless
has good contents):
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/loy3.htm
For Nietzsche,
intention and the will in general are epiphenomena not amounting to
the cause of an action. This denial of volition (by no means
uncommon [46]) would seem to imply determinism, but the concept
of nondual action suggests an alternative that escapes the usual
dilemma of freedom or determinism. The classical statement of that
problem is dualistic in presupposing a conscious subject whose
actions either are completely determined by a causal chain (the
strongest causal influence reaps effect) or are free from a causal
chain (or, rather, free from complete determination, since totally
uncaused, random choice does not seem to provide freedom in any
meaningful sense). Both alternatives assume the existence of a
conscious self distinct from its actions and existent outside the
causal chain -- although its actions may be totally determined by
external causes. But if, as the nondualist maintains, there is no
self, this does not imply complete determinism, for if there is no
subject then there are also no "objective" causal factors. The
deterministic view implies a self, helpless before causal
influences which struggle among themselves to see which is
strongest, rather like medieval knights competing to see who will
win the hapless lady; but if there is no hapless consciousness
here, the situation must be understood differently. If "liberty or
freedom signifies properly the absence of opposition" (Hobbes
[47]) then non-duality would seem rather to imply
limitless freedom, since there is no "other" to be opposed.
Elsewhere I have argued that the nondualist denial of self (as in
Buddhism) is equivalent to asserting that there is only the Self
(as in Vedānta). [48] We would normally infer that the former implies
complete determinism, the latter absolute freedom. However, if the
universe is a whole (Brahman, Tao, Vijñaptimātra, and so forth) and
if, as Hua Yen Buddhism develops in its image of Indra's Net, each
particular is not isolated but contains and manifests that whole,
then whenever "I" act it is not "I" but the whole universe that
"does" the action or rather is the action. If we accept that the
universe is self-caused, then it acts freely whenever anything is
done. Thus, from the nondualist perspective, complete determinism
turns out to be equivalent to absolute freedom. [49]
