by Ronald Epstein2
(Originally published in Vajra
Bodhi Sea, March, 1975, pp. 17-23.)
SETTING
When Ananda was
passing a brothel on his begging rounds,
his samadhi power failed him and a prostitute was able to
use the power of a deviant non?Buddhist mantra to entice Ananda
into bed with her. Since Ananda was on the verge of breaking his
vows, it became nec essary for the Buddha to send Manjusri
Bodhisattva to save him. Upon his return to the Jeta Park, Ananda,
newly cognizant of the dangers of his lack
of samadhi power, requests that the Buddha teach him
about the only three types of samadhi he is familiar with,
“wonderful samatha, samapatti and dhyana,
the very first expedients by which
the tathagatas of the ten directions
attained bodhi.” Before answering Ananda's request,
the Buddha lays the groundwork by first posing a series of
questions to Ananda. He begins by inquiring about Ananda's motives
for going forth from the home life. Ananda replies that he had done
so because he had fallen in love with the world?transcending
quality of the Buddha's physical appearance.
The Buddha then
informs Ananda that rebirth is caused by lack of knowledge of the
pure, bright sub stance which is the nature of the eternally
dwelling true mind and that enlightenment comes through the
exclusive use of the straightforward mind.
He then asks Ananda
what he uses to love and enjoy the Buddha's physical appearance.
When Ananda replies that he uses his mind and eyes, the Buddha then
informs him that they are to blame for his being trapped in the
conditioned world. In other words, before Ananda can understand any
type of cultivation which leads to en lightenment, he must first be
able to distinguish the false thinking of his discriminating
consciousness from his true mind. Therefore, before he can do
anything else, it is imperative that he find out where his mind and
eyes are located. What follows are synopses of Ananda's seven
successive attempts to find a plausible location for his mind. Each
in turn is shown by the Buddha to be untenable.
THE
ARGUMENTS
It is important to
keep in mind that, throughout the arguments, what Ananda is
referring to by "mind" is neither the fleshly
heart3 (the organ inside his chest) nor his true
mind; he is referring to discrim inating consciousness. Different
terms, such as “the divine efficacy of the mind” or “the mind which
totally comprehends and is able to know”, are used, but the referent is the
same.
Location
One
Ananda first supposes
that his mind is located inside his body. Through the use of
analogy the Buddha shows Ananda that that cannot be the case.
During preliminary questioning Ananda admits:
(1) He and the Buddha
are inside the hall and the hall is inside the Jeta
Park.
(2) Since he is inside
the hall, he first sees what is inside the hall and then sees the
park outside.
(3) He is able to see
what is outside because the doors and windows are open.
(4) It is impossible
to be inside the hall and see what is outside without being able to
see what is inside.
The Buddha then points
out that the situation just described is analogous to Ananda's
model of the mind inside the body. Ananda is equivalent to the
mind; the hall is equivalent to the body, the doors and windows to
the perceptual faculties (in this case the eyes), and the park to
the external environment. Ananda has already admitted that it is
impossible to see the park without first seeing the inside of the
hall; it follows that if the mind were actually located inside the
body, it would be necessary to see the inside of the body before
seeing the external environment. Since this is not the case, Ananda
opts for an alternative location.
Location
Two
Ananda suggests that
the mind is located downside the body, and he employs his own
analogy to make his new case. He explains that a lamp first
illuminates the room it is in; and, providing that the door to the
room is open, only afterwards can its illumination reach the
outside. It can be readily seen that Ananda’s analogy is really no
different than the one used by the Buddha. Ananda has merely
substituted the lamp its light for himself and his vision. He
concludes that since we only see the external environment and not
inside of our bodies, then in terms of the analogy, lamp must be
located outside where it illuminates yard rather than the inside of
the room.
The Buddha responds
with his own counter?example and asks Ananda whether the assembly
can all be filled when a single person eats. Ananda replies that
since our bodies are separate and distinct from one another, such a
situation cannot occur. The Buddha then argues that two people, one
eating and the other not, can be compared to the mind being outside
and therefore separ ate from the body. Employing the analogy both
ways, it follows that if when one person eats the other is not
filled up, then when the mind knows the body should not receive its
knowledge. Or, vice versa, when the body perceives, the mind should
not know about its percep tions. The Buddha then demonstrates that
such a model does not fit the actual situation. He shows Ananda his
hand and asks him whether his mind discriminates the perception of
the hand when his eyes (part of his body) see the hand. Since
Ananda must reply in the affirmative, he can no longer contend that
body and mind are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the mind can not
be located outside the body.
Location
Three
Ananda tries again by
suggesting that the mind must be hidden in the perceptual faculty,
in this case in the eye. He claims that the relation of the
eye-faculty to the mind is analogous to that of eyeglasses (lit.
crystal bowls)4 to the eyes, so that, just as
vision is not obstructed by eyeglasses, the discrimination of the
mind follows upon vision without any obstruction.
Here Ananda is
returning to a model quite similar to that of the original analogy.
He has now replaced himself inside the lecture hall by the
eye-faculty andreplaced the doors and windows by the glasses. There
are, however, two differences. First', he has taken care of the
problem of seeing inside the hall by implying that there are
obstructions blocking all views except those leading outside, and
second, he has put glass in the doors and windows.
It is the second point
which gets Ananda in trouble for when he admits to the Buddha that
eyeglasses are seen by the person who wears them, the Buddha then
wants to know why the mind does not see the eyes. More over, the
Buddha points out that if the eyes were seen, then according to the
basic Buddhist doctrine of perception, they would by definition be
part of the exter nal environment instead of belonging to the
perceptual faculties (indriya). Therefore, regardless of whether the eyes are
seen or not, Ananda's analogy is shown to be
inappropriate.
Location
Four
In an attempt to
bolster his case by redefining inside and outside, Ananda
postulates that what is dark is inside and what is light is
outside, so that he can return to his initial contention that the
mind is located inside the body. Because the inside of the body has
now been defined to be in darkness, the Buddha can no longer object
that the mind should first see the internal organs. His mind can
only' see what is light through the orifices of the
body.
The Buddha demolishes
Ananda's new position in two stages. He first attacks Ananda's
contention that what is seen is necessarily not internal by
analyzing the darkness which is seen when the eyes are closed.
According to the Buddhist doctrine of perception, the darkness to
be seen must be a state opposite the eye-faculty and therefore
outside; therefore, to define darkness as internal does not make
sense. Then, taking up the case of the darkness which is seen when
the eyes are open, such as in a pitch-black room, the Buddha points
out that, if Ananda contends that all darkness is internal, then
everything in a pitch?black external environment must then be
considered as the inside of one’s body.
The Buddha then
anticipates Ananda's possible ob jection that the eye?faculty might
also come into contact with an internal state to produce the
"seeing" of internal darkness, so that even though the darkness of
the room might be external, some darkness could still be internal.
But if such an inward opposite is postu lated for the case of the
darkness which is seen when the eyes are
closed, then when the eyes are open, the Buddha points out, the
inward opposite should not disappear. And so it ought to be
possible to see one's own face.
The argument seems to
be that if you can see inter nal darkness and external light, then,
although the face cannot be seen as part of the illuminated
external world, it ought to be seen as an illuminated internal
opposite. Or to put it the other way around, since when you open
your eyes and see the illuminated external environment, you are
unable to turn your vision around to see your face, why should you
suppose that when your eyes are closed you turn your vision around
to see the darkness inside your body?
If one's own face
could be seen??if it had become part of the normally seen external
environment??it would have to be external to one's eyes and mind.
Since the face is part of the body, the eyes and mind would then
have to float in empty space, external to the body. The Buddha
continues to explain to Ananda that if his eyes and mind are not
part of his body, then his body is just one in a class of external
objects which are all seen in the same way. Or vice versa, if one
still considers them part of one's body, then other minds and eyes
ex ternal to one's body should be considered in the same way.
Therefore, the Buddha concludes that it should be the case that
“the tathagata, who now sees your face, ought also to be part
of your body.”
In the second part of
his refutation the Buddha shifts his focus from what is seen to the
one who sees. He points out that if the eyes and mind are separate
from the body, then if one locates awareness in the eyes and mind,
the body is left without awareness. If one insists that both have
their own separate awarenesses, and accordingly two different
stores of knowledge, then since two different sets of consciousness
are involved, there should be two different people. Therefore, the
Buddha concludes “in your one body you should become two
Buddhas.”5
Location
Five
Because he has had
little success with his own considerations, Ananda now attempts to
apply his knowledge of the Buddha's teaching about conditioned
causes to the problem. He concludes that the mind has no definite
location but comes into existence by uniting with the necessary and
sufficient causes for its existence regardless of their
location.
The Buddha discusses
the ramifications of Ananda's new view in terms of the substance
and location of the mind.
(1) If the mind is
without substance, it either (a) lacks location, or (b) has
location.
(2) If the mind has
substance, then (a) to be in accord with conditions it must have a
defin ite locus as it moves from one set of conditions to the next,
and (b) it must be comprised either of a single substance which
pervades the body or of multiple substances.
(la) If the mind has
no substance of its own, it makes no sense to talk about it uniting
with something else.
(lb) Were it to have
location without substance, it would be outside of the eighteen
elements (dhatus), which is doctrinally
impossible.6
(2a) By referring to
the case of pinching one's body, the Buddha further shows that it
is not logical to talk about a mind that has substance but no
definite location. According to Ananda's theory, the mind cannot
exist until the proper conditions arise. Since a pinch is located
on the boundary between internal and external, then previous to the
arising of the proper conditions for the mind to exist at that
location, the substance of the mind must be located either inside
or outside the body, positions which have already been
refuted.7
At this point Ananda
makes a basic objection to the Buddha's argument and states that it
is the eyes which see and the mind which knows. The eyes do not
know and the mind does not see. To point out the fallacy in
Ananda's assertion, the Buddha returns to location one, and asks
Ananda whether the door of the room is able to see. He further
points out that if the eyes were able to see, as long as they are
intact, they should be able to function after the death of the
body.8
(2b) The Buddha then
turns to exploring the pos sible characteristics of the substance
of the mind which Ananda has proposed. Returning to the example of
the pinch, he asserts that if the mind is composed of a single
substance which pervades the body, then the pinch should be
discriminated not only at its actual location, but wherever the
mind extends (i.e., over the entire body). If on the other hand the
mind is composed of more than one substance, then, as already has
been established above (see Location Four), there cannot be a
single person. Were the mind a single substance and not totally
pervasive, then when you touch your head and foot at the same time,
it should be impossible to be aware of both at the same time. Thus
the possibilities of Ananda's fifth location are
exhausted.
Location
Six
Ananda now suggests
that the mind is located in the middle, but does not indicate
clearly what he means. The Buddha then demonstrates that the
location of anything which has an appearance ("representation”) is
merely relative, so that the middle cannot be considered any
definite, specific location. Existence without "representation", he
says, is the same as non existence. However, Ananda then clarifies
his statement t saying that by "middle" he means inbetween the
perceptual faculty and its perceptual
object (visaya). He claims that since the Buddha taught that
consciousness arises between the two, that consciousness must
constitute the location of the mind.
The Buddha destroys
Ananda's argument by consider ing whether the mind's substance
includes those of the faculty and its perceptual object. Here the
Buddha returns to an argument similar to that already estab lished
(see Location Four) about the impossibility of the mind consisting
of two different substances that are aware. But in the present
case, one substance, the faculty, is aware, and the other, the
perceptual object, is not. If the mind includes both, then “things
and [the mind’s] substance become a chaotic mixture.”
Location
Seven
In his final attempt
to find a location for the mind, Ananda suggests that
non-attachment to everything is the mind, and so it should not be
considered as having any definite location. However, the Buddha
shows Ananda that non-attachment implies something which exists and
has characteristics (such as non?attachment) and therefore
location. Having a definite location is a form of attachment, and
so Ananda's argument collapses.
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NOTES
2 Originally
published under the Buddhist Chinese name ‘I
Kuo-jung’.
4 Although eyeglasses
were a later invention and unknown In India or China
at the time, they are introduced by Tripitaka Master
Hsuan?hua in his commentary on the section in order
to make the argument clearer for themodern reader.
5 The reference is presumably to
the rupakaya and not
to the dharmakaya.
6 i.e. Since the
eighteen dhatus are comprehensive,
they 1eave no imaginable possibility for further
states of existence.
7 See the arguments for Locations One and
Two.
8 For the Buddhists,
death is defined as the body's permanent loss of the
consciousness.