AEN told me
No, the Buddha did not encourage him to commit suicide, but he
did not stop him.
But please remember that an Arhat is a special case and has gone
beyond the cycle of birth and death -- he achieves Nirvana right
after his death. If we were to do the same thing we will cycle
through samsara again according to our karma. If we kill ourselves
and as a result commit negative karma and fall into the lower
realms, then we have to reconsider carefully our actions.
The case of Channa<!--[if
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is the fullest account of a suicide in the Pali Canon. Damien
Keown, editor of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, has
produced a detailed analysis of the sutta in an article entitled
‘The Case of Channa’.<!--[if
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Saariputta, Mahaa Cunda and
Channa are all living on Vulture’s Peak Mountain, and Channa is very ill.
Saariputta suggests to Mahaa Cunda that they visit Channa to see
how he is. They find him in a bad state with violent pains in his
head and belly, and a burning fever, and his condition is steadily
worsening. Channa ends a florid description of his symptoms by
saying that he has no desire to live and will therefore ‘use the
knife’.
Saariputta is obviously
deeply affected. He offers to attend to Channa personally. ‘Let the
venerable Channa not use the knife,’ he says, ‘let the venerable
Channa live. We want the venerable Channa to live.’<!--[if
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But Channa declares that he lacks nothing, that he has worshipped
the Teacher with love, and concludes, ‘Friend Saariputta, remember
this: the Bhikkhu Channa will use the knife blamelessly’, implying
that he is already an arahant and therefore cannot act
unskilfully.<!--[if
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Saariputta, however, is
clearly not convinced about Channa, and proceeds to question him
about his attainments, especially with respect to how Channa
regards the six senses, and about self-view. Channa gives the
answers that we would expect of an arahant: he is not attached to
the six senses and doesn’t cling to any self-view. Saariputta
further asks him how he came to these conclusions and Channa
answers that he has ‘seen and directly known’ them – that is that
they are the result of transcendental insight. Now Mahaa Cunda
intervenes; it is clear that he too is not convinced by Channa’s
words, and gives Channa some pithy advice on what insight and
awakening are really about.
Shortly after Mahaa Cunda
and Saariputta have left, Channa cuts his throat and dies.
Saariputta then asks the Buddha about the circumstances of Channa’s
rebirth. The Buddha, apparently surprised, reminds Saariputta that
Channa said that he would ‘use the knife blamelessly’. Saariputta
in response expresses his doubts by pointing out that Channa
appeared to be blameworthy since he was attached to his family. The
Buddha then echoes Channa’s own words to the effect that he was an
arahant and his suicide was not an unskilful act.
There is an argument that
that in the cases of Godhika, Vakkali, and Channa, the Buddha
actually condones their suicides on the grounds that the three
bhikkhus were arahants, incapable of acting unskilfully. Indeed, if
we only had the suttas to go on we might come to this conclusion
ourselves. However, as in Vakkali’s case, the commentaries once
again argue that Channa has overestimated his
attainment.
Keown is uneasy with the
thought that the Buddha is seen to be condoning suicide because it
seems out of context with the wider Buddhist reverence for life
(c.f. comments on the Paayaasi sutta below). The
interpretation relies on viewing ethics solely from the point of
view of the motivations of the one who acts. Keown points out that
if we look only at motivation then, for instance, murder could be
carried out with impunity despite the victim not wanting to die.
However, the consequences also need to taken into account. A person
deprived of life will suffer and an act that leads to suffering is
judged to be unskilful, even if it is carried out with no apparent
ill will.
While the Buddha is not
critical of either Godhika or Vakkali, it is only in the case of
Channa that he appears to make an unequivocal statement exonerating
suicide. He says of Channa:
‘Saariputta, when one lays
down this body and clings to a new body, then I say that that one
is blameworthy. There was none of that in the Bhikkhu Channa; the
Bhikkhu Channa used the knife blamelessly.’<!--[if
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The first sentence of this
statement is not related to suicide. It is clinging to a new body
which is blameworthy. This could be read as the Buddha simply
making use of a tragic situation to highlight a point of Dharma,
much as we often do at funerals. The second sentence is the crux of
the problem and to Keown it comes down to the difference between
condoning an act and exonerating someone who acts. The Buddha was
not making a generalised statement about the acceptability of
suicide; he was exonerating Channa in this particular case. This
weakens the case of those claiming that suicide amongst arahants is
acceptable, and accords with the previous two cases.
A second point arises out
of translation issues. Saariputta enquires about Channa’s next
rebirth and the Buddha replies, ‘Saariputta, didn’t the Bhikkhu
Channa declare to you his blamelessness
(anupavajja).’<!--[if
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Keown suggests, on the basis of the commentary, that the word
‘anupavajja’ would be better translated in this context as ‘not
being reborn’.<!--[if
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In this case Keown says, ‘I think that when we place the Buddha’s
statement (quoted above) in context, we see that the Buddha is
offering not an exoneration of suicide but a clarification of the
meaning of anupavajja for Saariputta’s benefit.’<!--[if
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Keown then moves onto the
commentary, which informs us that Channa was not considered to be
an arahant before his suicide, despite his claim.<!--[if
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He wonders why, given that the writers of the commentary could not
have reconstructed events with any accuracy, they should have been
at pains for us to know that Channa was not an arahant before he
took the knife.
Keown offers three reasons
why the commentary might have objected to us believing Channa’s
claim. The first is that an arahant is said to be unable to kill a
living being intentionally. ‘Death-dealing acts of any kind are
certainly not in keeping with the canonical paradigm of a calm and
serene Arhat.’<!--[if
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The second is Channa’s apparent inability to tolerate pain which
‘shows a lack of self-mastery unbecoming to an Arhat.’<!--[if
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The third is that it was possibly an attempt to distance the
Buddhists from certain practices of other religious groups,
especially the Jain practice of sallekhanaa, or fast to
death (although, as we will see, this was not a concern for the
Pali commentary to the Vinaya). The other aspect of the
commentarial text is that it contains no discussion of the ethics
of suicide and, in particular, no reference to the Vinaya rule that
forbids suicide by monks.<!--[if
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Keown says, ‘By holding that Channa gained enlightenment only after
he had begun the attempt on his life, the commentary neatly avoids
the dilemma of an Arhat breaking the precepts.’<!--[if
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With his analysis of the
contextual and translation factors, Keown has weakened the case for
believing that the Buddha condoned arahants committing suicide. By
displaying an apparent abhorrence for such a belief, the authors of
the Pali commentary weaken the case even further. However, the fact
remains that in the three cases so far examined, these men did
commit suicide and yet were not reborn.
In conclusion Keown
says:
‘What Buddhism values is
not death, but life … a person who opts for death believing it to
be a solution to suffering has fundamentally misunderstood the
First Noble Truth … what is significant is that through the
affirmation of death he has, in his heart, embraced Maara.’
<!--[if
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However, by focusing on
only one of the three stories we’ve looked at, Keown has minimised
the reinforcement that occurs with repetition. The fact is that not
one but three arahants,or near-arahants, chose suicide and
succeeded in attaining final Nibbaana. Also it is not clear
whether, in taking their own lives, any of the three were affirming
death. In the case of Godhika the opposite point seems to be being
made: that he was not clinging to life! So while it seems clearly
established that the Buddha is not lauding suicide, it is by no
means clear that he is condemning it.
Immediately preceding this
sutta in the Majjhima Nikaaya is the story of the death of
the lay disciple Anaathapi.n.d.ika,<!--[if
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who describes the pains of his illness in identical terms
to those used by Channa when he was visited by Saariputta.
Saariputta gives him a profound discourse on not clinging to sense
experience, nor to this world nor to the next world (i.e. rebirth),
which moves Anathapi.n.d.ika to tears. He is not overwhelmed by
despair as Saariputta fears, but with joy and gratitude at hearing
such a profound discourse which, being a layman, he has never heard
the like of before, even though he was a long time disciple of the
Buddha and a stream entrant. He dies soon afterwards and is reborn
in the Tu.sita heaven. Despite having identical pains,
Anathapin.d.ika does not despair; does not even seem to contemplate
suicide, even though, on the face of it, he is much less
spiritually advanced than Channa. And yet he is reborn in a deva
realm, which, while a very pleasant place to be, is still part of
sa.msaara, still tinged with suffering: Channa, on the other hand,
escapes suffering altogether.
Keown suggests that moha,
or delusion, is the underlying cause of suicide, a failure to
appreciate that death is the greatest suffering. As we have seen,
according to the Buddhist tradition, death is a form of suffering,
but Keown appears to overlook the evidence that he himself has
presented. Death was not the greatest suffering for Channa, nor for
Godhika, nor Vakkali. Indeed we might say that the opposite is
true;
that for them the greatest
suffering was living, and that their death at their own hands led
to their final liberation from all suffering. We suffer at death
only because we cling to life, to our bodies, to our personalities,
to material possessions – but if we are not clinging to these
things then death is not suffering. I think we have to conclude
that for Channa, and the others, as for the Buddha and all the
other arahants, death did not involve suffering.
