1942 - The Beginning of the End: The
Destruction of the Johore Causeway
On 31 Jan 42, the mournful skirls of bagpipes were heard in the
vicinity of the Causeway separating Singapore from Malaya. The 2nd
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders were crossing the Causeway, the
last British and Commonwealth troops to leave Malaya after covering
the retreat of the rest of the British Army. When the last man, LTC
Ian Stewart, the Commanding Officer of the Argylls, was across, the
order to blow up the Causeway was given and at 0815hrs, Singapore's
link with the Malay Peninsula was broken.
The destruction of the Causeway was the culmination of events that
had begun on 8 Dec 41 with the Japanese landings in the North. The
British and Commonwealth forces had fought a long, hard and
courageous but losing campaign in mainland Malaya. The final
decision to destroy the Causeway saw the retreat of the British
Army into the "Fortress Singapore" with its large civilian
population, limited resources and hastily prepared northern
defences.
Like most cases throughout history with regards to water crossings,
the destruction of the Causeway was intended to delay the enemy and
give the defenders a chance to rest, regroup and prepare for the
next battle. The Causeway's destruction did achieve this to an
extent, as the Japanese themselves admitted. The Causeway with its
60 - 70 foot gap, although bridged to allow their tanks to cross to
support the final assault, was only repaired on 14 Feb 42.
Meanwhile the Japanese forces that had landed in Singapore on 8 Feb
42 were able to push the British back to the outskirts of the city,
largely due to the way Singapore's pre-war defences had been
constructed. On 15 Feb 42, the British surrendered.
The gap in the Causeway. (Courtesy of the
Imperial War Museum)
Although Singapore was strongly defended in the south, there was no
such defensive capability in the north of the island. The original
mission of defending the Sembawang Naval Base meant that the enemy
had to be prevented from shelling or besieging the base. As such,
the British concentrated their defences in the south. Thus
according to this thinking, having defences in the north 'would
have been folly as this would not have stopped the enemy from
bombing or shelling the base'1. This would negate the strategic
benefits of the base. This coupled with the overconfidence of the
British meant that defences weren't seriously begun until the
Japanese entered Johor in mid-Jan 42. The defences were too little,
too late.
The Japanese, on the other hand, were able to change their plans
quickly to bypass the Causeway and launch an amphibious attack
concentrated in the north-west of Singapore with the same
thoroughness that had characterised their speedy campaign down the
Peninsula.
A lesson that can be drawn from these events is of the danger of
overconfidence and not knowing the capabilities of an enemy. In
addition, one should always be operationally prepared and ready to
adapt to any changing situation. Had the British gone ahead and
built the defences in the north, the mere presence of prepared
defences could have had an impact on the Japanese advance.