The Arab Spring has not had a major impact on regional balance of
power so far, but this could change if there is a regime change in
Syria, says Paul Salem.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s call for secularism
has calmed the fears of those concerned Turkey was about to create
a network of Muslim Brotherhood-led governments to control the Arab
world, said a regional expert. His statement also relieved the
secularists who feared the Islamists, said Paul Salem, the director
of Carnegie Middle East Center. Turkey stands as the most
attractive model, since other models like Iran have failed, Salem
told the Daily News in a recent interview in Beirut.
Q: Where are we with the Arab Spring?
A: It is a changed Arab world. Peoples’ mentalities have changed.
Even if conditions in certain countries have not changed, people
have changed. This change has gone in the direction of people
prioritizing democracy and pluralism. This was clearly a
pro-democracy revolution.
Now we are entering a new era. We had the era where political Islam
in a non-democratic, often violent, format was the proposed
solution. This is the era where democratization is the key.
Political Islam is coming under the context and conditions of
democracy. And obviously the Turkish example of a party with
Islamic roots successful in a democratic state is the most
attractive model for the states that have been through a
revolution.
Today the majority of Arab citizens by number are either living in
countries transitioning to democracy like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya or
semi-democracies like Iraq or Lebanon or in countries in
revolutions asking for democracy like Syria or Yemen. This is
significant. But the process is filled with uncertainties, risks
and challenges.
Q: How about the impact on international and regional
balances?
A: It did not so far have a major impact on regional or
international balance of power. This could change if the uprising
in Syria reaches its end point with a regime change. If Syria
changes its leadership this will mean the new regime will probably
not have the same deep relations with Iran or Hezbollah. And it
might lose access to Hamas and the Palestinian issue. This will be
a major loss for Iran. It will retreat and focus more on Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The U.S. has lost in the Arab Spring, but it has lost much less
than it thought. The relationship with Egypt like the one with
Turkey will be more challenging.
Turkey is one of the slight winners. The revolutionaries did not
say we want to be like Iran or Saudi Arabia or America. Most of
them were saying we want to be something like Turkey.
And these revolutions are pro-globalization and pro-business. That
is good for Turkey. Egypt wants trade and economic progress. The
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist forces, which are likely to be
important players, are looking to the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) to see if they can learn anything. Now they realize being in
the opposition is easier than being in the government. Arab Spring
was about poverty and lack of economic progress.
The Muslim Brotherhood is realizing that if they cannot get jobs
and the economy going, people will not like them either. And they
are aware of that. They look to Turkey for advice. It is not a
model. But they know that they have more to learn from Turkey than
from Saudi Arabia or Iran.
Q: For “political Islam” to function under democracy, isn’t
there a need to reconcile with secularism? Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s call for secularism was not welcomed by
all.
A: Secularism has failed as a word and as a strong philosophy to
build legitimacy in the Arab world. But what is meant by secularism
has legitimacy in the wider Arab world.
Many parties and citizens participating in the Arab uprising
actually believe in the details of secularism. Islamists won the
argument that if you say you are secularist it means you are
atheist. But Islamic slogans were hardly visible during uprisings
even though Islamists were there. They agreed on the words “civil
state”; they are the new buzz words.
This is where they disagree with Erdoğan: While accepting the civil
state, the Islamist say “since we are mostly Muslim, we should
include in the constitution a reference to Islam and sharia,” but
they don’t say “we want to be an Islamic state.”
Q: So will the Islamist parties be the dominant players in
the region?
A: They will do quite well in the elections. They will be the
biggest single blocs, but not majority blocs. This partly reflects
the strategy of Islamists. They are aware that they are feared.
Their strategy is to move gradually and to enter coalitions.
Q: There are fears that like in the Iranian example, the
Islamists will soon get rid of their coalition partners and impose
a less tolerant rule.
A: The risk is there, definitely. But, had the revolutions been an
Islamist revolution, with millions on the street with Islamist
slogans, that would have been a different situation. Second, the
biggest Islamist movement, for example the Muslim Brotherhood, has
certain Islamist ambitions, in which secularists and Christians
disagree. But they are also aware of the Iranian experience and
they are aware that it has failed. They don’t like it because it is
not popular with its people. It is repressive and people see that
it ended up very corrupt and unsuccessful at building jobs and
economic progress.
They don’t look at Saudi Arabia as an attractive model; they don’t
look to Taliban or al-Qaeda. This movement is coming to power after
people have seen the extremists and made a judgment about it. Ten
years ago Iran could have been a much more popular model. Ten years
ago Turkey was not an attractive model, but it just so happens that
it is now.
So 2011 is significant.
Also, in Egypt and Tunisia these parties are not entering into a
vacuum. There are military, bureaucracy and business circles. The
Islamists will be one among several players.
Any government in Egypt will be pleading for investment and money,
so they cannot be extremists. The economics are not there. But in
Libya or Syria that could be different.
Q: What makes Turkey so attractive?
A: It is the only real democracy in the entire Middle East. People
are impressed that the AKP found a balance between cultural issues
like faith, religion, nationalism and globalism. The extremists are
anti-globalists. And obviously the economy. It the only rapidly
growing non-oil economy in the region.
Q: Is this image not shaken by Erdoğan’s staments on
secularism?
A: Muslim Brothers did not like it, but they had always said: “We
have a lot of respect for Turkey and the AKP and have a lot to
learn from them. But don’t assume everything is the same. We will
not follow Turkey’s model as if it is a magical recipe.”
On the other hand it actually calmed a lot of fears. There was a
rapidly growing concern that Turkey was building a network of
Muslim Brotherhood-led governments to control Arab world. It was
drawing hostility. Some started saying “Turkey is becoming too
ambitious. It cannot rule the Arab world through Muslim
Brothers.”
And also, Islamists were pointing at Turkey, saying “Look at them.
Turkey is going Islamic too.” But Erdoğan said, “Wait a minute, we
are a secular state.” So that was also welcomed by those who feared
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Q: How was Turkey’s assertive role perceived in the region
prior to the Arab Spring? There was criticism of
neo-Ottomanism.
A: It was assertive toward Israel. But with the Arab world it was
engaged with trade relations, visa abolitions. This was nice and
welcomed. The neo-Ottoman argument is a bit silly. They are not
establishing an empire; they are just engaging in a region that was
part of the Ottoman region and are entering for good things like
trade. Nobody can blame them.
Q: Is this image changing with the Arab
Spring?
A: There is a new image. Before Turkey was about the “Zero Problems
Policy.” It was about dealing with the status quo. Stabilize it and
establish business deals. But now this has changed. It is not about
trade any longer; it is about democratic change. Turkey has a role
to play; it has responsibilities. Its position relates to different
questions. Will Turkey help democratic change to succeed? Will it
play a positive role?
Who is Paul Salem?
Paul Salem, the director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in
Beirut, works and publishes on the regional and international
relations of the Middle East, as well as issues of political
development and democratization in the Arab world. Prior to joining
Carnegie in 2006, Salem was the general director of the Fares
Foundation. In 1989, he founded the Lebanese Center for Policy
Studies, Lebanon’s leading public policy think tank, directing the
center until 1999.
In 2002, Salem was a member of the Senior Review Committee for the
United Nations Development Program’s Arab Human Development Report.
In 2006, he served as a member of the National Commission for
Electoral Law Reform in Lebanon.
A graduate of Harvard University, he has also held various
positions at the American University of Beirut. Salem is the author
of a number of books and articles on the Middle East, including
“The Carnegie Papers, Building Cooperation in the Eastern Middle
East” and “The Arab State: Assisting or Obstructing
Development?”