The Online Citizen speaks with Dr. Thum Ping Tjin, a
historian on the merger of Singapore and Malaya along with
Operation Coldstore which can be said to be a period of white
terror of our country. He has researched extensively and
have been documenting the unclassified documents that
have been recently released by the British Government on the two
topics.
Dr. Thum PJ in one of his talks and one of
many slides of the unclassified documents.
Q: What is “Merger”?
A: On 16 September 1963, the Federation of Malaya, and the British
colonies of Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak merged to form
Malaysia.
Q: Why did merger happen?
A: Before 1945, there was only one Malaya, which included twelve
states: the four Federated Malay states (Selangor, Perak, Pahang,
and Negri Sembilan), the five Unfederated Malay states (Johor,
Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu), and the three Straits
Settlements (Penang, Malacca, and Singapore). People moved freely
up and down the country from the northern tip of Perlis to the
southern tip of Singapore. Singapore to Malaya was like New York to
the USA: the commercial, artistic, and cultural capital. From the
late 19th to
the mid 20th century,
people seeking their fortune moved to Singapore.
In 1945, Singapore was divided from the rest of Malaya. People on
both sides of the causeway viewed the division of Malaya into two
as highly artificial. Families were divided. Malayans on both sides
of the new border thus hoped for reunification.
Reflecting this, every political party in post-war Singapore was
committed to the eventual reunification of Singapore with the rest
of Malaya. In both the 1955 and 1959 general elections, all parties
publicly committed themselves to merger. Merger was the genuine
democratic wish of the overwhelming majority of Singapore’s
people.
The British also deeply desired merger as it would mean that their
commercial and strategic interests in Singapore, including the
critical naval base, would be placed under the control of a
reliably friendly, pro-British UMNO government. A democratic
Singapore with a representative government was likely to move away
from Britain and pursue a much more independent path.
Q: Why was Singapore separated to begin with?
A: Colonial Politics. Before World War II, Malaya at the time was
roughly 43% Malay and 43% Chinese. After the war, the British were
resolved to leave their colonies, but they needed to leave friendly
governments behind to ensure their strategic and economic interests
would be protected. In Malaya, to guarantee the cooperation of the
conservative Malay politicians, as well as to protect their
military bases in Singapore, the British split off the
Chinese-dominated Singapore from the rest of Malaya, while
continuing to rule Singapore as a crown colony. This left the rest
of Malaya as around 60% Malay, allowing conservative Malay
politicians to comfortably dominate the country. In return, they
protected and supported British interests in the Federation.
Q: So why would the Federation politicians change their minds and
reunify with Singapore in 1963?
A: Again, politics, this time that of the Malay leadership in the
Federation. They actually didn’t want to reunify. From independence
in 1957, Federation Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman grew less and
less enthusiastic about Singapore. Bringing Singapore back in would
have jeopardized UMNO’s political dominance. Thus, until 1961,
everyone in the Federation and Singapore referred to merger as a
vague aspiration that was “five to ten years away”.
Q: What happened in 1961 that made the Tunku change his mind so
quickly?
Yet again: politics, this time, in Singapore. Singapore’s PAP won
the 1959 elections and formed the government. But the leadership’s
inexperience showed, and they made a lot of mistakes in their first
year. They moved away from the progressive platform on which they
had been elected, failing to fulfil a number of election promises.
To compound this, they refused to admit their mistakes, and acted
in a very arrogant and smug manner. Thus, the British and the PAP’s
backbenchers grew very frustrated with the government, and the
popularity of the PAP government declined heavily from 1959-60.
As a result of this, the PAP began to fracture from internal
arguments. The PAP leadership sought to remove the highest source
of dissent, Minister for National Development Ong Eng Guan, but the
dismissal of such a popular politician only added to the PAP’s
woes.
Meanwhile, the PAP
backbenchers, grassroots, and trade union leaders, who were much
more progressive and liberal than the more conservative PAP
leadership, were unhappy with the leadership’s mistakes and
arrogance. The biggest issue, however, was over the continued
detention of political prisoners. The PAP’s progressive left wing
kept reminding Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee that they had
promised to work for the release of the political prisoners who
were detained by the Lim Yew Hock government in 1956 and 1957. This
promise was a major plank of the PAP election platform, and had
also been personally promised by Lee to the trade union leaders in
1959. Naturally, this group – the PAP’s progressive left – grew
increasingly upset when Lee refused to commit himself to working
for the release of the remaining political prisoners.
Q: Wait a moment. Why was the continued detention of political
prisoners such a big issue to the PAP’s progressive
wing?
A: The PAP’s progressive left all grew up faced with systematic
discrimination, violence, and repression from the state. First the
colonial government from the 1930s, then the Japanese occupation
from 1942-45, then again the British from 1945 onwards. Singapore
in this period was an extremely discriminatory place, and the use
of violence and terror against the people of Singapore by the state
was routine. If you were not English-educated and wealthy in
Singapore, you were a second-class citizen in your own country. The
colonial state could come and throw you out of your home and
destroy your life at any time, without proof, if they were
convinced that you were an enemy of the government.
In 1956, the colonial government easily stopped Singapore’s
incipient civil rights movement by simply arresting and detaining
all of its leaders without trial. As a result, the progressive left
realized that simply winning elections was not enough. In order for
Singapore to have self-determination, a democratically elected,
fully representative government of Singapore must control the
internal security laws. It’s important to note here that they did
not call for the abolition of the laws, only that they were
controlled by a democratically elected, fully representative
government of Singapore.
Q: So you’re saying what happened is that by 1961, Lee and the PAP
government were growing more unpopular and were not confident of
maintaining their electoral base. How does this relate to
merger?
Since his own party’s base was not supporting him, Lee secretly
turned to the Malayan Communist Party for support. However, despite
their promised support, Lee lost two by-elections in Hong Lim and
Anson. Lee realised that the MCP was either unwilling or unable to
command popular support. He also turned to the British for support.
The British did not want to see a truly progressive left wing party
win the next election, but felt that they could not openly
intervene in the political process without opening themselves to
accusations of attempting to rig the democratic process.
To win the next election, Lee needed an achievement he could
campaign on. The only popular desire he could deliver quickly was
the achievement of merger. The British already wanted merger, but
the Tunku didn’t. Thus, to get the Tunku on board, they told the
Tunku that the PAP’s unpopularity was a sign that the island would
soon be taken over by communists, and only the Tunku could save the
island by taking it over. The British also urged the Tunku to
accept merger, and offered the inclusion of North Borneo and
Sarawak. This would dilute the influence of Singapore’s Chinese in
Federation politics, as well as give the Federation access to
Borneo’s vast natural resources. Eventually, after much persuading,
pleading, and bargaining, the Tunku agreed to merge.
Q: Finally, we have merger. How did everyone
react?
A: They didn’t know. Merger negotiations were originally done in
secret. Then, in late June 1961, news leaked that Lee and Goh had
been secretly negotiating merger with the Federation and British.
Singapore erupted in shock, and PAP’s backbenchers and members
demanded to know what was going on. They suspected that Singapore
was simply trading one colonial master (the British) for another
(the Federation). Rather than answer to his party, Lee chose to
purge the PAP of the progressive left. The progressive left went on
to form the Barisan Sosialis in August 1961.
Q: Okay. What does this have to do with Operation
Coldstore?
A: The Tunku was openly worried about the impact of the Barisan
Sosialis in a unified Malaysia. He feared their organisational
skills and the inspired, “talismanic” leadership of Lim Chin Siong.
He thus demanded that Singapore’s political opposition be arrested
as a condition of merger.
The British didn’t want to conduct arrests because they already had
a poor reputation around the world for colonial abuses. Reports out
of Kenya and Nyasaland (Malawi) in 1959 had embarrassed them. Such
acts would also have been very unpopular in the UK, jeopardising
the government in the next election.
Lee wanted the arrests to be launched after merger, so that the
federal government in Kuala Lumpur would take the responsibility.
He feared that arresting such popular politicians would severely
damage his popularity in Singapore.
Q: Hold on. Lee did not want to use detentions against the
political opposition?
A: To be precise, he did not want to take responsibility for the
arrests. By launching them after merger, the federal government
would take responsibility. However, the Tunku told him that it was
a condition of merger that the arrests take place before merger, so
that the Internal Security Council comprising the British,
Singapore and Federation governments would share joint
responsibility. Lee was thus forced to agree.
Q: But this was August 1961. What happened between then and
Operation Coldstore in January 1963?
A: The British did not want the arrests, so they stalled and played
for time. They repeatedly pointed out there was no evidence of any
violent communist subversion in Singapore. If they arrested people
without evidence, their international and domestic reputation would
suffer.
Q: So the British were happy to use detention without trial in
Singapore in the 1940s and 50s, but the moment it might affect
their international reputation and make them lose an election in
the UK, they baulked?
A: Yes.
Q: Also, hadn’t the British told the Tunku that Singapore was on
the verge of being taken over by communists? So how could they
justify not taking action?
A: They were in a tricky situation. They had to insist there were
communists in Singapore, while simultaneously saying there was no
evidence to arrest them. Also, they pointed out that it was not
illegal to be communist in Singapore.
Q: It wasn’t?
A: No. Just as in Britain, in Singapore you couldn’t arrest someone
just on the basis of what they believed. You had to show they were
breaking the law, for example by planning violence.
In response, the Tunku and Lee worked hard to find some evidence on
which the arrests could be conducted. But when this evidence was
given to MI5 in April 1962, MI5 rejected it and basically said that
it was entirely ‘surmise’ – that is, speculation, not real
evidence.
Q: MI5? As in, James Bond?
A: Not quite. Bond is MI6, the foreign arm of Her Majesty’s Secret
Service. MI5 is the domestic arm. Remember, Singapore was still
part of the British Empire.
Q: Right. So how did Coldstore eventually happen?
A: The Brunei rebellion broke out on 8 December 1962. The Barisan
issued a statement the next day declaring ‘a popular uprising
against British colonialism and must command the support of all
genuine anticolonialists’. The British, Federation, and PAP seized
upon this as an excuse to arrest the Barisan leadership. By
endorsing the rebellion, the British could plausibly argue that the
Barisan were endorsing violent subversion in Singapore, and thus
the arrests had to be made for security and safety.
Ironically, the evidence that MI5 had said was speculation in April
1962 was now quickly recycled to use as a legal basis for the
arrests.
Q: Why on earth would the Barisan issue this
statement?
A: Several reasons. Firstly, they had issued similar statements
before – most recently in January 1962 when they had supported the
nationalist freedom movement of West Irian. When this was moved in
the Legislative Assembly, it was supported unanimously, including
by the PAP. Thus, they had consistently supported violent
anti-colonial resistance, and did not see this as any different.
They had issued statements supporting revolution in Aden, Cyprus,
Algeria, and other colonies.
Second, it was a matter of principle. Lim Chin Siong argued that
you can’t be anti-colonial, then stop being anti-colonial when it
means you’ll get arrested. That just makes you a hypocrite.
Finally, I think the Barisan were simply politically inexperienced
and naïve. Remember, their leadership was composed of trade
unionists and doctors, unlike the PAP’s leadership, which was full
of lawyers and civil servants. The Barisan saw the world much more
in terms of right and wrong, rather than in terms of rules and
institutions.
Of course, the British, Federation, and PAP leaders had already
decided the arrests would happen, so it didn’t really matter what
the Barisan chose to do. For example, the Sarawak United People’s
Party condemned the rebellion, but the British colonial government
still arrested many of them.
Q: So this led to Operation Coldstore?
A: Yes, Operation Coldstore was scheduled for 16 December 1962.
Q: Wait, Operation Coldstore happened on 2 February
1963!
A: The original Operation Coldstore collapsed when, at the last
minute, Lee Kuan Yew inserted fifteen extra names of his political
opponents into the arrest list. When the Tunku found out, he
furiously accused Lee of manipulating the arrests for his own
political gain and refused to allow the arrests to go ahead.
Neither man would back down, so the arrests collapsed.
Q: Why did Lee do that?
A: Remember, he was worried about the political consequences of the
detentions. So he inserted the names to ensure that even if his own
popularity collapsed after the arrests, there would be no real
alternative to the PAP at the next election.
Q: So how did Operation Coldstore get
resurrected?
A: It took two months of shuttle diplomacy by the British. Finally,
Lee was given two major concessions. The first is that the
post-arrest press release would refer to Malaysia, allowing Lee to
argue that merger depended on the arrests, and thus his hands were
tied. The second, and much more controversial concession, is that
Lee was allowed to insert three names (out of the fifteen) into the
arrest list.
Operation Coldstore then went ahead in the early morning of 2
February 1963. The first day, 111 people were arrested; by April,
133 people had been arrested.
Q: Okay. So let me get this straight. The primary purpose of merger
was for political gain, not to reunify a divided
nation?
A: Lee Kuan Yew’s and the PAP’s unpopularity provided the
opportunity and drove the timing of merger. Without it, merger
might not have ever happened – it certainly was growing more and
more unlikely in the immediate future as the Tunku and other UMNO
leaders grew more and more opposed to it. For Lee and the PAP,
merger was an issue on which he could campaign and win the 1963
elections, and for the British, merger guaranteed the protection of
their commercial and strategic interests, including their naval
base. They convinced the Tunku and Federation leaders to agree by
giving them the Borneo states and arguing that merger would allow
them to reduce political instability that might arise from
Singapore electing a progressive left government. But the condition
the Federation imposed was the arrest of Singapore’s political
opposition. Thus, throughout all this, the calculations were
chiefly political.
Q: And I guess this helps explain why Singapore separated from
Malaysia in 1965?
A: Well, here’s a question for you: if the Federation’s and PAP’s
rationale for merger and the creation of Malaysia was to neutralise
Singapore’s political opposition, then once the opposition was
gone, what was the rationale for both parties to stay together?
Dr. PJ Thum is a Singaporean academic who teaches history at the
University of Oxford. A Harvard graduate in East Asian Studies. And
for trivia, did you know PJ swam for Singapore at every level
including the 1996 Atlanta Olympics? He is also the first Oxford
graduate and first Singaporean to swim across the English Channel
in August 2005, completing the journey despite inclement weather in
12 hours and 24 minutes.
http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2013/11/what-is-it-about-the-singaporemalaya-merger-and-operation-coldstore/
Operation Coldstore: No evidence of communist
conspiracy
http://singaporerebel.blogspot.sg/2013/11/operation-coldstore-no-evidence-of.html
Book launch : 50 Years of Operation
Coldstore
http://singaporerebel.blogspot.sg/2013/11/book-launch-50-years-of-operation.html
PAP committed "crimes against humanity"
http://singaporerebel.blogspot.sg/2013/11/pap-committed-crimes-against-humanity.html
