Your initial post addressed major issues except for one - is the
navy large enough to protect an aircraft carrier?
IF the RSN is large enough, then I believe over 90% of major
surface combatants will be deployed with the carrier - you end up
with a CVBG. But 1 CVBG cannot cover all waters around Singapore,
many loopholes.
I don't see any current solution to the problem above.
On another point, if you have the carrier hit (assuming we use
your theory of "1 land airfield for 1 sea airfield"), wouldn't that
result in destruction of at least an entire squadron of
aircraft?
I believe a land based staging area for aircraft is much easier
to protect than a sea based one.
I acknowledge the points raised. Further, some may also
regard 1 CV as insufficient to provide round the clock
coverage (in-port times required) and that 3 CVs
are actually minimum requirements.
The contention of having a CV sunk = loss of all aircraft
onboard applies not just to SG but all CV operators. That is the
risk any CV operator takes. If the argentines had sunk or
crippled a british CV in '82, it would have had a
significant impact on the ability of the British to take back the
Falklands and defend the fleet. Yet ultimately, the argentines did
not manage that. Since 1945, no CV has been lost in combat.
It is as mentioned a trade off. The question is
whether cost savings afforded by giving up a
land airfield offset CV operations? A base the size
of PLAB may generate several $Billions in revenues
from land sales/redevelopment (DC charges) and more than
adequately cover the cost of purchasing sqns of next gen
fighters, possibly CVs and other assets.
Also, the purpose of having a CV is
not meant to put SG's entire security into a single egg
in the basket. There will still be land based assets in land
bases.
Indeed, a land base in a prime area can also be shifted to
a land base in a less costly location maybe affording
some savings as well.
