As the new
'Great Game' between the US and China unfolds, grouping runs risk
of being trampled underfoot
04:46 AM Jan 14,
2012
The
Philippine foreign ministry this week protested to the Chinese
embassy over the latest intrusion by Chinese vessels into
Philippine waters in the South China Sea.
In Beijing,
a foreign ministry spokesman reacted by calling for joint
development of disputed areas in the Spratlys but reiterated that
"outside forces" should not meddle in regional disputes - an
oblique but standard reference to the United
States.
Claims and
counter-claims between China and several South-east Asian states
over disputed parts of the South China Sea will continue into the
new year, as they have been for years, without any resolution. The
difference now is that China will increasingly insist that outside
parties - meaning the US - stay out of the region's maritime
disputes.
Chinese
rhetoric defining the "internal" nature of the South China Sea
disputes is expected to become more frequent as the US steps up its
"return to Asia". This is only to be expected as Washington has
only recently unveiled its "pivot" to the region - a consequence of
its grand realignment following a strategic disengagement from Iraq
and Afghanistan.
The growing
US presence in Asia, especially East Asia, is bound to provoke a
response from China. Beijing, however, seems unsure of how to react
to Mr Obama's pivot strategy, resulting in ambiguity in its
position.
On the one
hand, some officials have tended to shrug off the pivot as a
non-issue, saying the US has never left Asia to begin with. Yet,
the media in Beijing, reflecting a more nationalistic view, have
reacted with some alarm, seeing the pivot as directed at containing
China's rise. This latter reaction is likely to be China's true
feelings.
China's
muted official line, however, suggests Beijing's fear of being cast
as an aggressive rising power, though China's anxiety over the
American pivot is likely to grow in intensity as the US steps up
its re-engagement in East Asia.
Besides the
South China Sea, North Korea, under a new Beijing-supported regime,
will also test US-China relations. In turn, the US can be expected
to further ramp up its strategic thrust into Asia.
This
response and counter-response is giving an East Asian twist to what
the commentariat is increasingly referring to as the "new Great
Game". As it unfolds further, South-east Asia - as a bloc of the
Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) - will find its
diplomatic skills increasingly tested.
In the old
great game during the Cold War, the protagonists were the US and
the Soviet Union. In the new great game, while the US remains the
established power, China is the new emerging giant. There is one
difference, though: In the new great game, analysts concur, ASEAN
has emerged as a significant facilitator - hedging and balancing
itself between the two powers.
Significantly,
the US pivot to Asia was unveiled by President Barack Obama in
Australia just before he attended the East Asia Summit (EAS) in
Bali on Nov 18 last year. That Bali EAS was itself historic due to
the unprecedented participation of an American president. By his
presence, Mr Obama underscored US seriousness with its
pivot-to-Asia strategy - much to the quiet satisfaction of ASEAN,
of course. But will, and can, the US sustain it?
The US
return to Asia through the EAS lends importance to ASEAN as a
central player in the East Asian region. Indeed, the emergence of
the EAS is yet another manifestation of ASEAN's role as shaper and
builder of the regional strategic architecture.
In this,
ASEAN has generated for itself influence far beyond what each
member state could wield individually. Yet it is a delicate game
not without risks. The biggest risk of balancing and hedging is the
loss of balance and of being trampled underfoot as the elephants
fight for their turf.
How China
reacts to ASEAN's hedging depends on how Beijing perceives ASEAN in
the context of the larger US pivot. Is ASEAN seen as the extended
arm of the US to contain China?
ASEAN is
highly sensitive to how it is viewed by a rising China. It does not
want to be dragged into China's fight with the US - and ASEAN has a
long historical memory.
At the
close of 2011, prominent Singapore strategic thinker Tommy Koh
turned to history to speculate which dynasty from old China would
surface in modern form to confront a future ASEAN:
Would
it be a Ming China, a Tang China or a Qing
China?
A Tang
China, he said, would be benign. A Ming
China would, on the contrary, be imperialistic. A Qing China would
not be much different from a Ming China. Given the contrasting
historical precedents, Prof Koh told a regional conference
co-organised by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in
December, there is today in South-east Asia some latent uncertainty
about China.
He
said: "Will China become a power that would expect others in the
region to be subservient to it, as the Mings did? We want China to
be like the Tang Dynasty - open, respectful of others, not like the
Mings. We need to hedge our bets in case the China of the future is
not China of the Tang dynasty, but China of the Qing dynasty or the
Ming Dynasty." Prof Koh's parting shot: "Our hope is that China
will continue to be a benign power."
In as much
as ASEAN sees China to be more benign than threatening, said Prof
Koh, China should not see the US re-engagement in Asia as an
attempt to contain it. ASEAN's fundamental desire is to be friends
of both and enemy of neither. It is this desire that has given
birth to "ASEAN centrality" - a doctrine and mantra that was absent
in the past but which is in essence a balancing and hedging
strategy.
The
regional security architecture that ASEAN is constructing,
brick-by-brick, is, however, still fragile. If it is seen as
evolving, it is precisely because the region is in a state of flux.
Regardless, it is clear which powers will determine its final
shape.
Yang Razali
Kassim is a senior fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
http://www.todayonline.com/Commentary/EDC120114-0000001/Will-ASEANs-hedging-strategy-work
