By Peter Grier | Staff writer of The Christian Science
Monitor
WASHINGTON – One of the shredded documents
the FBI says it recovered from Chi Mak’s
trash seemed to be a set of instructions. Machine printed, in
Chinese, it urged Mr. Mak – an engineer for a California defense
firm and a naturalized US citizen – to attend more seminars on
special subject matters. It went on to list technologies of
interest to its unnamed author, including torpedoes,
aircraft-carrier electronics, and a “space-launched magnetic
levitational platform.”
The second document, also in Chinese, was handwritten. It was a
list of nine related naval technologies, including ship propulsion
– Mak’s expertise.
Innocent notes, or evidence of something sinister? The latter,
according to the FBI. Late on Oct. 28, agents
burst into Mak’s modest Downey, Calif., home and arrested him and
his wife, Rebecca Laiwah Chiu. At the same time, agents detained
Mak’s brother, Tai Wang Mak, a Chinese national, as he waited at
Los Angeles International Airport for a flight to Hong Kong.
Thus one month ago US officials rolled up what they allege to be
a family spy ring, linked to the country some American officials
call the most active collector of intelligence in the US today: the
People’s Republic of China.
China has spent more than two decades creating a large and
varied intelligence infrastructure in the United States, according
to US counterintelligence documents. High-profile prosecutions in
recent years related to alleged Chinese espionage may merely hint
at the depth and breadth of China’s collection efforts.
It isn’t a classical KGB-like operation,
featuring dead drops and microfiche passed in the night. China’s
espionage style is unique, according to US law enforcement. It
depends on a multitude of relative amateurs: Chinese students and
visiting scientists, plus people of Chinese heritage living in the
US.
Each individual may produce only a small bit of data. But
collectively the network might vacuum up an extensive amount of
sensitive military and economic information.
“To the extent we suffer losses against China, typically we
suffer them day in and day out on a modest scale of operation,”
says Paul Moore, who was the FBI’s chief
China analyst for more than 20 years.
According to an affidavit filed in federal court late last
month, Chi Mak was born in China. He and his wife became
naturalized US citizens in Los Angeles in June 1985.
At the time of his arrest Mak worked as a principal support
engineer at an Anaheim, Calif., defense firm named Power Paragon,
leading an effort to develop a new electric-drive submarine
propulsion system.
His brother Tai Mak is a Chinese citizen who entered the US
legally on May 22, 2001. He works as broadcast and engineering
director for Phoenix North American Chinese Channel, a satellite
television service that provides Chinese-language programming in
the United States.
Law-enforcement officials allege that Chi Mak took computer
disks containing sensitive information from his workplace, and then
passed the information to his brother, who duplicated it on his own
disk in encrypted files.
Tai Mak was allegedly carrying this data when he was arrested
Oct. 28.
An FBI agent has said in court documents
that Chi Mak has admitted passing information to China for
years.
However, the members of this purported family spy ring have not
been charged with espionage. Rather, they’ve been indicted on a
charge of being unregistered agents for a foreign government.
All three have pleaded not guilty. Ms. Chiu is free on a
$300,000 bond. The Mak brothers have been denied bail.
An attorney for Tai Mak, John Early, told a judge at a hearing
Monday that the FBI rushed forward with an
incomplete case when it learned that Tai Mak and his wife were
flying out of the country.
“The grandiose allegations suddenly seem smaller and smaller,”
said Mr. Early.
Trouble making the espionage case
It’s certainly true that in recent years the US government has
run into trouble when prosecuting cases of alleged espionage
involving China.
Six years ago the US accused Los Alamos National Lab scientist
Wen Ho Lee of stealing nuclear secrets for China. He eventually
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of mishandling computer files.
His case became a rallying point for many in the Chinese-American
community who felt he was being targeted because of his ethnic
heritage.
This January a federal judge, citing what he felt was
prosecutorial misconduct, threw out charges of taking classified
documents filed against Katrina Leung, a Chinese-American civic
leader in California. Ms. Leung was a paid FBI informant whom prosecutors suspected was also passing
information to China.
But former and current counterintelligence officials insist that
the collapse of these cases does not mean that they are targeting a
nonexistent threat. China is one of the top five intelligence
collectors in the US, if not the top one, they say.
And China’s methods are different than those used by other
nations eager to glean US secrets, say experts. In some ways that
makes them more difficult to counter.
Recent cases involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “are
just the tip of the iceberg of an already-large and increasingly
capable PRC intelligence effort,” concludes a
US government Intelligence Threat Handbook, an unclassified manual
for security officers produced by an arm of the National Security
Agency.
According to this document, Beijing does not favor the classical
methods used by other big intelligence services, featuring tight
control over a few, deeply buried and valuable agents.
Instead, it employs a vast, decentralized network that employs
Chinese students, businesspeople, and delegations in the United
States, and targets Americans of Chinese ancestry as possible
espionage recruits.
Chinese factories and research institutes eager for US economic
or military information often concoct and control their own
collection schemes.
Intelligence officials in China may pass along possible contact
names to a scientific team traveling to the US, for instance. The
Chinese scientists may then make a direct appeal for help – or
invite the US contact for a reciprocal visit to China, where they
can be tired out with banquets and visits and then swarmed by
questioners, in hopes of eliciting an unguarded comment.
Chinese human-intelligence operations “primarily rely on
collecting a small amount of information from a large amount of
people,” says the Intelligence Threat handbook.
Seeking Chinese-Americans
The Chinese-American community is the target of an estimated 98
percent of recruitment efforts by China’s equivalent of the
CIA, the Ministry of State Security,
according to the handbook.
Chinese intelligence aims its efforts at Chinese-Americans
because it feels it can make an effective approach to them – not
because it considers them more vulnerable than other ethnic
groups.
The crux of the Chinese approach is to appeal to an individual’s
desire to help out China in some way. “Whatever the reason, ethnic
targeting to arouse feelings of obligation is the single most
distinctive feature of PRC intelligence
operations,” concludes US counterintelligence.
In some ways, the alleged misdeeds of the Mak brothers are not
typical of the Chinese approach, according to Mr. Moore, the former
FBI China analyst.
The torn-up lists of technologies that the FBI claims to have taken from Chi Mak’s garbage would be
evidence of more direct control than Chinese agents typically have,
says Moore. “Usually what you see is a Chinese-American fellow on
this side just making it up as he goes along.”
In court FBI agents have struggled to
explain why the case against the Maks doesn’t include espionage
charges. The government says it’s not clear the information on the
disk or disks allegedly found in Tai Mak’s possession is, in fact,
classified. It may be sensitive data that are unclassified but
banned from export to other countries.
News reports have described information about sensitive weapons
that Chi Mak may have been passing to China for years, but the US
government has not publicly made such sweeping allegations.
Clearly, however, the FBI has had Chi Mak
under surveillance for at least a year, if not longer. Electronic
eavesdropping equipment was salted throughout his house. At one
point, Chiu said to her husband that the “things” his brother was
asking him to take “are certainly against the law,” states an
FBI affidavit.