Time to wise up to China’s spying
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/arch…
The two cases of Chinese espionage uncovered in the US and
Taiwan within the past month indicate that China’s intelligence
operations are typical of other intelligence agencies worldwide,
which are not as unique as many Westerners tend to think.
In the first case, US citizen Glenn Duffie Shriver pled guilty
on Oct. 22 to applying to the CIA at the
behest of a Chinese intelligence agency — US authorities have not
yet indicated which agency. Chinese intelligence officers
identified Shriver in 2004 after he responded to an advertisement
in Shanghai calling for papers on US-China relations.
Between Shriver’s recruitment and his arrest in June, Chinese
intelligence officers apparently paid him US$70,000 to apply for a
position in the US Foreign Service and, later, the CIA.
Chinese intelligence officers identified Shriver and saw future
potential in a Chinese-speaking American with an interest in
international relations.
At first, one Chinese officer, “Amanda,” met him and later
introduced him to two other intelligence officers. Over the course
of several meetings, Shriver agreed to work for the Chinese
intelligence agency and discussed career options that would give
him access to US foreign policy and national security
information.
In the second case, the arrests of Taiwanese businessman Lo Pin
(羅斌) and Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) Colonel Lo Chi-cheng
(羅奇正) are typical of the way China conducts espionage against
Taiwan.
A businessman or a retired government official living and
working in China is first approached by Chinese military
intelligence or the Ministry of State Security (MSS). The person
then returns to Taiwan and starts trying to recruit friends and
colleagues to help Beijing. After this, normal trips between China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong to see family and conduct business are used as
cover for intelligence gathering operations for the Chinese.
The MSS allegedly recruited Lo Pin in
China and directed him to gather Taiwanese military and
intelligence secrets. Lo allegedly met with MSS officers in Hong Kong 12 times since 2007 to exchange
money for documents and information on MIB
operations against China that he acquired from Lo Chi-cheng.
Western observers, including the US, the UK and Australia, seem
to believe that Chinese intelligence agencies operate in a
fundamentally different way to themselves and the Russians. Often
called the “mosaic” or “thousand grains of sand” view, Western
commentators and retired counterintelligence officials believe
Chinese intelligence agencies indiscriminately gather up little
bits of information, which are then used to assemble a
comprehensive picture. In this view, Chinese intelligence does not
pay for these “grains of sand,” practice operational spycraft to
secure operations, pressure or pay for them.
Shriver and the two Los’ bank accounts show otherwise.
Similarly, the MSS held Lo Pin for 15 days
and coerced him to cooperate, by implicitly, if not explicitly,
threatening his business interests in China.
In these cases, China attempted to collect sensitive US and
Taiwanese national security and counterintelligence information. Lo
Chi-cheng’s value as an MIB colonel is
obvious. Shriver was in the pipeline to join the CIA’s operations directorate and, presumably with his
background, would have ended up working in an area related to
China. Beijing’s intelligence agencies deliberately — not
accidentally or incidentally — aimed their resources toward
sensitive information.
The West has mistaken China’s diffuse efforts in the pursuit of
national modernization and the acquisition of technology as
reflecting the operations of its intelligence agencies in the
national security arena.
The intelligence services are just one player among many in
China trying to steal technological secrets for the benefit of the
military, companies and national development goals.
Despite the multitude of Chinese actors and interests involved,
Western analysts have ascribed a coherent intent and methodology to
Chinese intelligence and technology collectors. With more illicit
technology transfer cases than espionage cases in the West, the
amateurish methods of non-professional technology thieves have been
mistakenly equated with China’s professional intelligence
operatives. This is not a problem of evidence, but one of critical
thinking.
If we really want to know what the Chinese intelligence services
are doing and how they do it, then we need to remember that
intelligence supports policymaking. Beijing’s interests and
policymaking cycle will define the information China’s intelligence
agencies need to collect.
The sensitivity of that information determines the method of
collection. A state does not employ amateurs to penetrate foreign
national security establishments; just like a state does not need
people trained in clandestine methods to exploit open source
material.
Taiwan has learned this lesson the question is when will the
West?
Peter Mattis is studying for a master’s degree in security
studies at Georgetown University and has experience in research and
analytic positions on China-related issues