Your points are all valid. And to an extent I do agree with
atomic being a bombing of an extension to the strategic
bombing.
However there was one significant difference. "Normal" bombing
did not target civilian areas. The atomic bomb, whether on purpose
on not, did end up wiping out the entire city. And it's not as
though it's a military city like Eglin AFB/Nellis AFB, or even one
of the Saudi airbases.
You could, on the other hand agree that bombing of Dresden set a
precedent of targeting civilians (some say civilians were not
targeted, I beg to differ).
However, I personally believe that if Japan's "normal" surrender
was rejected, and strategic bombing continued, an unconditional
surrender would come. I do not think all Japanese had a suicidal
tendency and were willing to starve to death.
Take note that I'm not against the use of the atomic bomb. I
don't see it as a "necessary evil". I see it as a strategic weapon,
to be employed when needed. The loss of life has been regrettable,
but if employed well, nuclear weapons will be cheaper than
conventional weapons. It also has the shock effect none other
has.
On the contrary, "strategic bombing" includes the target of
civilians as a doctrine in the period of its birth. To quote
Stanley Baldwin, who served the third time as Britain's Prime
Minister from 1935-1937, "The bomber will always get through... the
only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more
women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save
yourselves."
Another note is that it is argued that strategic bombing
was more effective at causing civilian casualties than leveling
military and industrial targets.
In hindsight, we can believe that Japan would have eventually
succumbed to strategic bombing. However, given the ferocity
of the Japanese defenders on the outer islands and the Philippines,
the American military command had no reason to believe that the
Japanese would choose surrender unconditionally without escalating
the level of violence. The policy of war is to hit harder and
harder until the other side agrees to your terms and bends to your
will. To slacken or show no resolve to raise the level of
violence would work to strengthen the enemy's resolve to resist and
lengthen the war. Ironically, the Americans had to relearn
the lesson in Vietnam.
The demonstration of the will to fight, and / or the attack on
the will to fight is imperative in war. The Doolittle raid
wasn't necessary. It did little material damage to Japan at
the expense of 16 bombers and their crew. However, it
signaled to Japan the American will to resist and retaliate against
Japan. At the end of the day, the war and the violence is an
extension of policy and the exercise of the ability and will to
impose one state's policy on another. Hence, the will and ability
to impose or resist such imposition (aka "fighting spirit") is
pretty much at the center of war.
