122. Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, October 20, 1975, 4:15–6:35 p.m.
SUBJECT
Global Strategy for Dealing with the Soviet
Union; the Historical Lessons
of the 1930s
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing: You visited the Forbidden
City?!
Secretary Kissinger: I love to visit there. During my last trip I
escaped
my keepers and visited there by myself.
I appreciate all the arrangements you have made.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing: It seems to me that of all
emperors and kings
[in the world], the Chinese emperors did not know how to enjoy
life.
Secretary Kissinger: Didn’t know how to enjoy life?
Vice Premier Teng: In terms of food and clothing, yes; but in
terms
of the quality of their residences they did not know how to enjoy
life.
One other thing is that the
Chinese emperors changed their clothes
every day—new clothes every day! Do you think they would be
very
comfortable wearing new clothes every day?
And at every meal the
emperor would have 99 courses. Actually they could only take
whatever
was close to them.
Secretary Kissinger: It doesn’t sound like trouble or hardship
to
me. If you give me one corner [of the Forbidden City] I would
be
comforable.
Vice Premier Teng: That was built by the Empress Dowager.
And the other feature of the Chinese emperors was that
whatever
[food] they thought of they would try to get immediately. The
Imperial
cooks would only give them food that was most obtainable.
They
didn’t give them any other dishes, otherwise the emperor would
kill
the cooks!
Secretary Kissinger: Why was that?
Vice Premier Teng: Because the cooks could only get the
things
that were available in that season. If the emperor liked a dish and
asked
for it but could not get it, he would kill the cook.
Secretary Kissinger: That is what my staff does in the State
Department.
They try to limit my choices.
Vice Premier Teng: Let’s turn to the subjects we are going to
discuss.
I will first explain our views.
Our relations were started in February, 1972. That was during
President
Nixon’s visit to China. And before that Doctor made visits to
Peking to prepare for President Nixon’s visit to China. And we
have
stated on more than one occasion that we appreciate the first
remarks
by former President Nixon to Chairman Mao. When he met the
Chairman
he said, “I have come to China out of our national interest.”
We
also appreciate that President Nixon took this courageous step.
And
we also understand the sincerity of President Nixon when he said
that
he had come to China out of the national interest of the United
States.
We believe this is not diplomatic talk.
And thereafter, the Doctor made several visits to China, and
Chairman
Mao told President Nixon, as well as the Doctor, that we have
common points which were reflected in the Shanghai
Communiqué.
Our common aim is to fix the polar bear, deal with the polar
bear.
I believe the Doctor also remembers that when in talking
about
the Middle East, Chairman Mao also advised the United States to
use
two hands. You should not only use one hand to help Israel, but
also
the other hand to help the Arab countries, especially Egypt. In the
talk,
Chairman Mao emphasized that China supported the Arab
countries.
And this position of China is different from that of the United
States.
But we can also see a common
ground—that is we can both fix the polar
bear.
Chairman Mao stressed on many occasions that between us there
are certain problems of bilateral relations, but what is more
important
are the international problems. On international issues, we think
we
should look at the international problems from a political point of
view.
Only in this way can we have a common view, can we have
coordination
in some respects. And exactly on this point we appreciate the
statesmanship of President Nixon. We have never attached any
importance
to what you call the Watergate event. By political problems I
mean how we should deal with the Soviet Union. This is a question of
strategy—a question of global
strategy.
And this morning I listened attentively to the Doctor’s
remarks,
and according to what you said this morning the United States has
a
clear world view with regard to strategy, and now you are only
thinking
of tactics. As I understand it, tactics
are guided by strategy and
serve strategy. The tactics manifest in various fields may conform
to
the strategy and may also deviate from
strategy.
The Doctor seems to believe that the Chinese are intransigent
in
tactics, and I know what you are referring to. You put stress on
flexibility.
If we are to make an assessment of ourselves, we can say that
we have never been intransigent. We think that flexibility must
conform
to strategic needs. Too much flexibility leads people to
wonder
what the strategy really is.
This morning the Doctor first talked about strategy towards
the
Soviet Union. There exist differences between us in this respect.
We believe
the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe—in
the
Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf—all the
places
linked to Europe.
Although the Soviet Union has stationed one million troops
along
the 7,200 kilometer border [between Russian an China] the Soviet
strategy
remains toward the West. The Soviet strategy is to
make a feint toward
the East while attacking in the West.
In this regard, the U.S. has stressed to us on many occasions
the
danger of a Soviet attack against China. I believe that the Doctor
still
remembers that Chairman Mao had a deep talk with you in this
regard.
He concluded that the polar bear is out to fix the United
States.
We have heard, on not less than one occasion, that the Doctor
has
said that whether the Soviet Union was making a feint in the East
while
attacking the West, or making a feint in the West while attacking
in the
East, this makes not much difference.
We hold different views. How to assess Soviet strategy? This is
not
a matter of rhetoric but a matter of substance. This assessment is
the
starting point of the tactics formulated to deal with
international
matters.
We say that the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West and it
is
out to fix the United States. Even the one million Soviet troops
stationed
in the East are directed against the U.S. Seventh Fleet first of
all
and not merely against China. First we say that the Soviet troops
are
directed against the Seventh Fleet, and then Japan, and then
China.
Also we say that the Soviet focus is in the West.
We are also making solid preparations. But one should by no
means be under the false impression that when China proposes
this
theory that China wants to direct the Soviet Union Westward so
that
the Soviet Union will not go to the East.
I heard that during your first trip to China, prior to
President
Nixon’s visit, Premier Chou talked to you. I was not present, but
he
said China’s strategy was to get prepared to deal with aggression
from
all sides. At that time we did not have the Shanghai Communiqué
yet.
Well, although I have read the verbal record of your talk, I do not
remember
what the original words were; but anyway, the Premier told
you that even if the Soviet Union siezes the land north of the
Yellow
River, and Japan grabs the northeast, the United States the east,
and
India grabs Tibet, we are not afraid. That was what we thought at
that
time.
After the Shanghai Communiqué, we made no reference to these
words. We have always believed that we should rely on our
independent
strength to deal with the Soviet Union, and we have never
cherished any illusions about this. We have told this to the Doctor
as
well as to visiting American friends. We do not depend on
nuclear
weapons; even less on nuclear protection [by other
countries].
We depend on two things: First is the perseverance of the 800
million Chinese
people. If the Soviet Union wants to attack China it must be
prepared
to fight for at least two decades. We mainly depend on millet
plus rifles. Of course, this millet plus rifles is different from
what we
had during Yenan times. We pursue a policy of self-reliance in our
economic
construction and also in our strategic problems.
As I said just now, we are not directing the evil of the Soviet
Union
Westward, but we are concerned about the West because if the
Soviet
Union is to make trouble its focal point is in the
West. Naturally we
are concerned about it. It is precisely proceeding from this
assessment
that we are interested in a unified and strong Europe—including
the
improvement of relations between Europe and the United
States.
It is also precisely proceeded from this strategic assessment
that
we advised you to use both of your hands in dealing with Arabs
and
Israelis.
It is also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we
expressed
that we did not understand the attitude of the United States
in the case when the Soviet Union and India dismembered
Pakistan.
These are political problems as well as strategic problems,
and
these include tactics under the guidance of these problems, these
strategic
problems—for instance, when we advised you to use both of
your
hands [in the Middle East] this was tactics.
It was also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we
have
often told you, as well as Japan, that Japan should put a first
priority
on relations between Japan and the United States and then
between
Japan and China. This not only concerns the West but also the
East.
On this point, we have advised our American friends on many
occasions
that the United States should formulate its own focus of
strategy.
We have often said the United States was keeping ten fleas
under
its ten fingers and that the United States should not let itself
bog down
in the quagmire of Indochina.
And out of this strategic consideration, when the United
States
was building its military base in Diego Garcia on the Indian
Ocean
China did not criticize this.
On these questions and a number of other issues we proceed
from
political and strategic considerations to deal with international
problems
as well as our bilateral relations. We have made our
assessment
of Soviet strategy after careful study of the international
situation. In
our talks with the Europeans, they have constantly raised the
[following]
question: “If there is trouble in Europe, what will be the
attitude
of the United States?” I will be very candid with the Doctor, the
Europeans
are very apprehensive on this point.
Secretary Kissinger: But our question is what will be the
attitude
of the Europeans?
Vice Premier Teng: Perhaps this has something to do with your
relations
with the Europeans. The Doctor may recall that in 1973
Chairman
Mao asked you whether it was possible for the new
isolationism
to emerge in the United States.3 You answered in the affirmative,
negative
term. You said no.
Secretary Kissinger: I just now said to Mr. Lord that I knew I
was
tricky, but I am not that tricky—to answer “affirmatively no.”
(Laughter)
Vice Premier Teng: But from that you can assess what Chairman
Mao is thinking, what we are thinking about. This observation of
the
situation dates back as early as the first nuclear arms talks
between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Those talks took place in 1963.
That
treaty was prepared by three countries, and it left a deep
impression
on me at that time. I made my last visit to the Soviet Union as
head of
the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate with
the
Russians, and it [the non-proliferation treaty] was made public on
the
day when we left [Moscow].
At that time our talks with the Soviet Union were completely
bankrupt,
and we were certain that a most important part of the treaty
was
directed against China. I don’t doubt that at that time the
attitude of
the United States and the British was to restrain the Soviet Union
from
nuclear development. Of course this is a strategic problem and, in
terms
of tactics, after more than nine years—nearly ten years—in this
period
things have changed. They show that the aim—the purpose—of
these
tactics has failed to be achieved.
In 1972, when you reached the
second [SALT] agreement, the Soviet
Union drastically quickened their pace in the development of
nuclear
arms. Their pace was quicker than the United States. When the
third agreement [on prevention of nuclear war] was reached
between
your countries, it [the strategic balance] had reached equilibrium.
In
November last year when we met [after the Vladivostok
meeting],
the Doctor informed us that the number of Soviet missiles had
not
yet reached the ceiling, and this morning you told us that the
number
of Soviet missiles had exceeded the ceiling—leaving aside the
quality.
This is our observation from one angle. And in the race
between
the Soviet Union and the United States, the United States has
not
gained. In terms of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has far
exceeded
you and Europe.
It is almost eleven months since we met last year. During this
period
we have again made our observations. And through our
observations
we have got the impression that the Helsinki Conference is an
indication—and not only the Helsinki Conference, but things
before
the Helsinki Conference—that it is worthwhile to recall
history.
Secretary Kissinger: What things?
Vice Premier Teng: Well, problems of various descriptions
[mentioned]
earlier.
By recalling history, I mean the period prior to the Second
World
War—the period 1936 to 1939, which is particularly worthwhile
to
recall. The Doctor studies history and I think is more
knowledgable
than I.
As I understand, the Doctor once said that in actuality the
Soviet
Union has gone beyond the Rhineland. This shows that the Doctor
has
made a study of it. After the Germans entered into the Rhineland
you
may recall what was the attitude of the British and French, and
what
was the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier. They
pursued
a policy of appeasement towards Hitler, and shortly after that the
Munich
agreement was concluded.
In pursuing such policies the purpose of Chamberlain and
Daladier
was obvious. They wanted to direct the
peril Eastward, and their
first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash
actions.
Their second aim was to direct the peril toward the
East. The stark historical
realities have brought out the failure of the policies carried
out
by Chamberlain and Daladier. Their policies have gone to the
opposite
of their wishes. They neither got international peace and stability
nor
achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the
East. Instead,
the spearhead of Hitler was directed to the
West—Czechoslovakia
and Poland. These countries were in the West, and they [the
Germans]
did not attack the Soviet Union first.
If I remember correctly from what I read in newspapers, when
Chamberlain visited Germany he carried an umbrella. But it
neither
shaded him from the moon or the sun—no, the rain or the sun. At
that
time France boasted that they had the Maginot line. But Germany
did
not attack the Maginot line. They attacked from Belgium and
attacked
France, and France collapsed and Chamberlain gave up all
resistance.
He mobilized all the ships to move from Dunkirk—that is, he
wanted
to slip away.
So in fact this appeasement policy led to an earlier break out of
the
Second World War. In our contacts with quite a number of
Europeans
they often raise the lessons of Munich. According to our
observations,
we may say that the danger of such historical tragedy is
increasing.
The Doctor asked just now what were other things apart from
the
Helsinki Conference. I raised three questions to you this morning.
This
shows there were other things apart from the Helsinki
Conference.
In terms of strategy, Soviet weapons have far exceeded those
of
the West. Also you have reached the equilibrium of weapons.
In terms of total military strength, the Soviet Union has a greater
military
strength than the United States and the European countries put
together.
But the Soviet Union has two big weaknesses: One, they lack
food grains; the second is that their industrial equipment and
technology
is backward. In the long run although the Soviet Union has a
greater military strength, these two weaknesses have put the
Soviet
Union in a weak position. It is limited in its strength so that
when a
war breaks out the Soviet Union cannot hold out long.
Therefore, we do not understand why the United States and the
West have used their strong points to make up for the Soviet
weakness.
If the United States and Europe have taken advantage of the
weaknesses
of the Soviet Union you might have been in a stronger
negotiating
position.
As for our views on the Helsinki Conference, I think you know
our views, which differ from yours. We call it the European
Insecurity
Conference and you call it the European Security Conference. The
Munich
agreement pulled the wool over the eyes of Chamberlain,
Daladier,
and some European people.
And in the case when you supply them, make up for the weak points
of the Soviet Union, you help the Soviet Union to overcome its
weaknesses. You can say you pulled the wool over the eyes of the
West and demoralized the Western people
and let them slacken their pace. We have a Chinese saying: A
donkey
is made to push the mill stone because when you make the donkey
to
push around the mill stone you have to blindfold it.
This is a political or we may say a strategic problem in the
present
situation which people are most concerned with. And we are
now
speaking our views on these problems very candidly.
As for the Russians, they now feel you cannot restrain them.
They
are not reliable and cannot be restrained. And, of course, in the
West—
including the United States—there are two schools of public
opinion.
A greater part of the public opinion has clearly seen this. A
considerable,
greater part of the public opinion has seen this. We
understand
that the Americans, Europeans, and including the Japanese, do
not
want a war because they have gone through two World Wars. This
we
can understand. They fear a war.
We always feel that to rely on the European Security
Conference,
or anything else in an attempt to appease the Russians, will fail.
These
things will be counter productive. For example, the Europeans fear
war
day and night. They hope to obtain peace for a certain period of
time
at any price. Exactly because of that, we should not blindfold them
by
the evolution of détente. We should remind them of the possibility
of
attack from the polar bear. So every time Chairman Mao meets
foreign
guests he advises them to get prepared. Without preparation
they
would suffer. The most effective way to deal with the possible
attack
from the Russians is not what you call agreements or treaties,
[not]
what is written on paper, but actual preparations.
As for China, we have told you on many occasions, and I will
[again] tell you frankly, that China fears nothing under heaven or
on
earth. China will not ask favors from anyone. We depend on the
digging
of tunnels. We rely on millet plus rifles to deal with all
problems
internationally and locally, including the problems in the
East.
There is an argument in the world to the effect that China is
afraid
of an attack by the Russians. As a friend, I will be candid and
tell you
that this assessment is wrong.
Today we are only talking about strategic problems. The
Doctor
was a former professor. I have taken my 50 minutes to talk and I
have
gone beyond 50 minutes. That was because I am only a soldier. It
is
not easy to confine oneself within 50 minutes. I once taught in a
school.
I gave a lecture for 50 minutes, but I have never been a professor.
I
have taken too much of your time.
Secretary Kissinger: No, it was interesting and important.
Can we take a five minute break, and maybe I will make a few
observations?
Vice Premier Teng: Yes.
(There was a short break at this point.)
Secretary Kissinger: Do you want me to make some observations
now, or how do you propose to proceed?
Vice Premier Teng: Yes. Please go ahead.
Secretary Kissinger: I listened with great interest to the Vice
Premier’s
presentation and I would like to make a few observations.
First, I have noticed the frequent reference to President Nixon.
I
have worked very closely with President Nixon.
And I think it is correct to say that we jointly designed the
policy to which you referred
approvingly. It is also the case that I am still in touch with him
every
two or three weeks at some length, so I know his views very
precisely.
I can safely say that the policy we are pursuing today is the
policy that
President Nixon would pursue if it had not been for Watergate.
The
policy toward the Soviet Union that is being pursued today was
designed
by President Nixon and myself and is the same that is being
pursued today. There is no difference between President Nixon’s
policy
toward the Soviet Union and President Ford’s.
If anything, President
Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet Union. And I say
this
as the one man in public life who has maintained contact with
President
Nixon and never criticized him and has stated publicly that
he
has made a great contribution in matters of foreign policy.
Leaving this aside, I must say I listened to the Vice Premier’s
presentation
with some sadness. I had thought, obviously incorrectly, that
some of the public statements which I had heard were said for
public
effect. But this is obviously not the case. Now what I regret is
that I
can understand two countries, operating from the same perception,
can
operate using different tactics—and can understand each other’s
tactics.
That causes me no difficulty. But if there is not a common
strategic
perception, then one wonders what exactly the basis of our
policy
is. If you seriously think that we are trying to push the Soviet
Union
to attack in the East, then we are in grave danger of frittering
away all
our efforts—with yourself and everyone else.
The Vice Premier was kind enough to point out the lessons of
history
between 1936 and 1939. He pointed out that those in the West
who
tried to push the aggressor towards the East became the first
victims
of the attack; and that is true. But it is also true that those in
the East
who sought to escape their dilemma by pushing their aggressor
toward
the West eventually became the objects of the aggressor
anyway.
And when we say that the West and the East have essentially
the
same strategic problem, we don’t say this because we have an
interest
in participating in the defense of the East. Anyone who knows
the
American domestic situation must know that this cannot be our
overwhelming
ambition. We say it because strategically wherever the attack
occurs it will affect the other. And you act on these
assumptions
too.
And we are saying this not to do you any favors, because you
are
not all that helpful to us in other parts of the world. We are
doing this
out of our own national interest.
In 1971, in January of 1971, before we had been in China,
during
the crisis in India, when India had dismembered Pakistan, I talked
to
your Ambassador in New York on a Friday evening. He told me
that
China always fights as long as it has one rifle. I then told him we
would
move an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. On Sunday
morning,
when we were on the way to the Azores to meet President
Pompidou,
we received a message that your Ambassador in New York wanted
to
see us; and we sent General Haig to see him. We thought then that
you
might be taking some military action.
And we decided that even though we had no diplomatic
relations—President Nixon and I decided—that if you moved, and if
the Soviet Union brought pressure on you, we
would resist and assist you, even though you had not asked us to.
We
did that out of our conviction of the national interest.
And we have said recently again to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan—
because he asked us about this—we said that we would not be
indifferent if the Soviet Union brought pressure on China because
of
the Indian situation. He must have told you this. And again, you
have
not asked us to do this, nor did we do this as a favor to
China.
So, since I have been in Washington we have gone to a
confrontation
with the Soviet Union three times: Once over a nuclear
submarine
base in Cuba; once over the Syrian invasion of Jordan; once
over the question of the alert in the Middle East in 1973 and—no,
four
times—once on the question of access routes to Berlin. We did all
of
these things on our own, without knowing what any other
country,
much less China, would do.
The Vice Premier referred to the spirit of Munich. I have
studied
that period and I lived through it, as a victim, so I know it
rather well.
The Munich policy was conducted by governments who denied
that
there was a danger, and who attempted to avoid their problems
by
denying that they existed. The current United States policy, as we
have
attempted to tell you, has no illusions about the danger, but it
attempts
to find the most effective means of resistance given the realities
we
face. A country that spends $110 billion a year for defense cannot
be
said to be pursing the spirit of Munich. But the reality we face is
a certain
attitude that has developed in the United States and an
attitude
that exists also in Europe even much more.
I know some of the Europeans who you talk about. Some are
personally
good friends of mine. But there is no European of any
standing
that has any question about what the United States will do. In
any
threat, we will be there. Our concern is whether the Europeans will
be
there. It is the United States that organizes the defense of the
North Atlantic
and that brings about the only cohesion that exists. It was
not
the United States that advocated the European Security Conference.
It
was, rather, to ease some of the pressures on the European
governments
that we reluctantly agreed to it in 1971.
Now the Vice Premier is quite correct, this is a problem that
greatly
concerns us, whether the policy that is being pursued may lead to
confusion.
This is a serious concern. But the Vice Premier should also
consider
that the policy we are pursuing is the best means we have to
rally
resistance. If we pursued some other approach, the left wing
parties in
Europe might split the United States from Europe with the
argument
that the United States is a threat to the peace of the world.
If you follow the present investigations that are going on in
America,
you will see that it was the present Administration, including
myself,
that has used methods to prevent the Soviet Union from
stretching
out its hands—even if these are not your preferred methods.
And if we were slow in our disengagement from Indochina—and
this was not a situation that we created—it was precisely to
prevent
the mood of neoisolationism from developing that Chairman Mao
talked of. We do not rely on the European Security Conference.
And
we do not rely on détente. Nor is everyone in the United States
who
talks against détente a reliable opponent of the Soviet Union,
because
without a strategic grasp of the situation much of it [anti-détente
talk]
is simply politics. To talk tough is easy—to act with strength and
maintain
support for a strong policy over a period of time in a
democracy
is a difficult problem.
If the Soviet Union should stretch out its hands, we will be
brutal
in our response, no matter where it occurs—and we won’t ask
people
whether they share our assessment when we resist. But to be able
to
do this we have to prepare our public by our own methods, and
by
methods that will enable us to sustain this policy over many years,
and
not go like Dulles from a period of intransigence to a period of
excessive
conciliation.
The Administration in the ‘50’s started out not willing to shake
hands
with Communists [translated as, “with China”] and wound up
almost
giving away Berlin—had it not been for Khrushchev’s
clumsiness.
Our strategy is exactly as we discussed it with Chairman Mao
three
years ago. It has not changed, and it has the strategic advantage.
But
we have to be the best judge of the means appropriate to our
situation.
And we will not stand still for a strategic advance by the
Soviet
Union.
And we do not separate the fronts into East and West. If the
Soviet
Union feels strong enough to attack in either the West or the
East,
the policy will already have failed. The Soviet Union must not be
in a
position where it feels strong enough to attack at all.
Now I would like to correct a few other misapprehensions
which
the Vice Premier voiced, and then I will make one other
observation.
One thing has to do with relative military strength. It is
perfectly
true that the Soviet Union has gained in relative strength in the
last
decade. This is not the result of the agreements that have been
signed.
This is the result of changes in technology, and the erroneous
decision
of the Administration that was in office in the 60’s when the
Soviet Union
was building up its strategic forces.
If you analyze the result of the [SALT] agreement of 1972, since
1972 the strategic strength of the United States has increased
considerably relative to that of the Soviet Union. It is also true
that after some point in the field of strategic weapons, it is
difficult to translate military superiority into a political
advantage.
With respect to the second agreement, the Vladivostok
agreement,
you must have translated what I said incorrectly from the
German.
There has been no change in the Soviet strength since
Vladivostok.
Since the Soviet Union does not dismantle their obsolete units,
they
have 2,700 units and they have had those for five years. After
Vladivostok
they would have to get rid of 200. Since we do get rid of our
obsolete units we have somewhat less than 2,400.
But numbers are not
so important anyway, as each [U.S.] unit can carry more warheads.
We
have gone ahead by a ratio of 6 or 7 to 1. Moreover, since the
Soviets
like big things which take room, they have about 85 to 90 percent
of
their forces on land, where they are vulnerable because the
accuracy
of our forces is improved. Less than 20 percent of our forces are
on
land, and they are less vulnerable. So it is not true that in the
strategic
balance we are behind, even though there are many newspaper
articles
in America written for political purposes that assert this.
In 1960 President Kennedy was elected by speaking of the
missile
gap, even though the Soviet Union had only 30 missiles, each of
which
took ten hours to get ready to fire and we had 1,200 airplanes.
Ever
since then it has been the secret dream of every American
presidential
candidate to run on a missile gap campaign, so we are in danger
of
this issue erupting every four years.
In 1970 when we confronted the Soviets on the submarine base
in
Cuba, in 1970 in Jordan, in 1970 in Berlin, and in 1973 in the
Middle
East, they always yielded within 36 hours when we made a
military
move. Their military calculations are not as optimistic as some of
our
European friends fear—such as Denmark.
On the question of food grains: We have moved at the slowest
pace
that is politically possible for us, and have even held up our
grain sales
—even while Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Western Europe
have
cleared out their bins in selling to the Soviets. The long term
program
we are now negotiating precisely prevents them from storing
large
quantities because it puts a ceiling on what they can buy in one
year
on the American market.
So our policy is quite clear, and in pursuing it we have not
asked
anything from China. We have kept you informed by our many
discussions,
but I don’t recall that we have ever asked for anything from
the People’s Republic of China. Of course, China pursues its own
policies,
and we respect your independence. I hope you will make the
positions
which you made clear to us clear to every European visitor
who
comes here. We do not object to your public posture. We think it is
essentially
correct, and indeed it is even helpful. We do object when you
direct it against us, when you accuse us of betraying our allies
and endangering
the security of the world by deliberately promoting war and
standing on the side lines, when in fact we are doing actual things
to
prevent a war and preserve the world equilibrium.
And you should also consider that if the United States public
finds
too much discouragement around the world, and if everywhere
we
move we find the opposition of every country, then precisely
this
mood of isolationism which concerns so many other countries
will
develop.
We attach great significance to our relationship with the
People’s
Republic of China because we believe you conduct a serious policy
and
because we believe your word counts. And we believe that the
world
is one entity from a strategic point of view and a political point
of view.
We are prepared to coordinate actions along the lines of my
conversations
with Chairman Mao two years ago. But the world situation
is extremely complex, and the domestic situations around the
world
are also extremely complex. It is important that you have a correct
perception
of our objectives. If you think we are engaged in petty
tactical
maneuvers then that would be a pity for both of us. You do not ask
for
favors, and we do not ask for favors. The basis of a correct policy
is an
accurate perception of the national interest and respect by each
side for
the perception of the national interest of the other.
This is why we think a visit by the President here would be
useful,
and that is the purpose of our policy. We don’t need theater,
and
we don’t need you to divert Soviet energies—that would be a total
misconception
and it might lead to the same catastrophe as in the 1930s.
After all we resisted Soviet expansion when we were allies, and
we
will resist it for our own reasons as you resist it for your own
reasons.
I repeat, we attach great significance to our relations. We are
prepared
to coordinate. We think you are serious, and we are equally
serious.
On that basis I think we can have a useful relationship.
As I have not used up 50 minutes, I will use the remainder
tomorrow.
Vice Premier Teng: Yes. It is quite late—shall we go on
tomorrow
afternoon?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Vice Premier Teng: As to the time, we can discuss it later.
Secretary Kissinger: We are not going anywhere.
Vice Premier Teng: Right.
Secretary Kissinger: Good.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100322.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/index.htm
