There are 2000 armed Gurkhas in Singapore and their number grows
annually by 140.
This is a dangerous sign.
Gurkhas are not Singaporeans. They are mercenaries. AND
Mercenaries work for money.
In other words, Gurkhas can be bought with money. Loyalty is a
tricky issue here, for their loyalty is dependent on their having
to be satisfied with material reward. AND NOW this has proven to be
true with their recent rioting incident in Mount Vernon Camp over
pay issues which is very worrying.
I do not know how the trouble makers will be taken to task in
this incident and whether or not there will be a coverup because of
the way in which the MHA has conducted itself with the lack of
transparency in the way it fumbled over the Mas Selamat Kastari
escape.
The latest Gurkha rioting incident raises many questions in the
minds of Singapore Citizens as to: How this mercenary unit being
brought in and being armed? How is this mercenary unit empowered to
act in Singapore? How is this mercenary unit subject to law and
discipline and control?
Will the rioters be charged and disciplined accordingly? What
sort of discipline will they receive?
As seen from the Mas Selamat Kastari escape, our administration
will bend over backwards for these foreign mercenaries. The Gurkhas
on duty ought to have been charged under the Penal Code but instead
they were let off with a slap on their wrists. I believe the
negligent Singaporean ISD officers received far heavier sanction
compared to the negligent Gurkhas. It is amazing how much better
treatment these foreigners are being treated in comparison to their
Singaporean counterparts in the Police.
[By the way when Singaporean boys have petty fight in groups,
they are often charged with rioting and they go to jail for it, I
wonder if our Singapore Police Force is held to any higher
standards of conduct]
We can trust that the Singapore Police Force and the Ministry of
Home Affairs will do their best to cover up this incident and sweep
it under the carpet. As if underneath the carpet is already not
dirty enough. I would caution against condoning such coverup and I
would also caution against the Singaporean public to be complacent
enough to overlook the need to pressure the MHA into revealing the
worms in the innards of the Gurkha Contingent.
This is because it is my view that the continued presence of
Gurkhas in Singapore is the greatest danger to Singapore itself. My
reasons are stated below.
If the PAP administration persists on being unrepentant on their
mercenary ways and insist on using mercenaries for their security
or should i say “the security of Singapore”, it would not be
difficult to imagine the possibility of such attitudes infecting
the Gurkha Contingent [which is mercenary in the first place] and
resulting in the Gurkha Contingent selling out Singapore in time to
come.
Imagine, there are 2000 mercenaries armed and ready. Their
allegiance unknown. It is easy for them to even try to eliminate
the entire leadership and neutralize the other Singaporean units in
the Singapore Police Force should they ever decide to do so. And it
would be easy for them to do so because the PAP trusts the Gurkhas
more than they trust Singaporean Police Officers, they get the
Gurkhas to guard Ministers homes.
Furthermore, the Gurkhas are professional soldiers and
mercenaries, they are put constantly under training during their
service. They upon completion of their vocational training continue
to serve their careers in the position they have been trained
for.
Singaporean National Servicemen on the other hand are under
training only whilst doing their national service and they only
turn operational near to their Run-Out-Date (Operationally ready
date) only to be released and returned to their civilian
status.
In the Singapore Armed Forces, we all know that in each SAF
camp, there are roughly only 10-12 rifles in each aggregated guard
detail and maybe 200-300 rounds of ammunition in each guardhouse.
Other than that, all other weapons and ammunition are stored
separately and drawing of arms and ammunition in times of need will
take time.
As of now, we know nothing of the Gurkha Contingent’s weapons
drawing protocol and ammunition storage and drawing protocol but
there is reason to believe that their ammunition and weapons are
stored in the same camp unlike the weapons and ammunition which are
stored separately in all SAF units. Therefore, it is my belief that
our SAF units cannot react fast enough to be mobilized, armed and
ready for action if their was a mobilization call to neutralize the
Gurkha Contingent when the need arises.
The red tape from the rules set by our leaders surrounding SAF
weapons and ammunition drawing and the inherent fact that our
Singaporean National Servicemen stay in the far flung corners of
Singapore [with compliments from the Central Posting Centre in
Mindef] as opposed to the Gurkhas being accommodated in their camp
whilst on duty and being accommodated near their camp whilst off
duty will prevent our local units from reacting fast enough
to tackle the mercenary unit should the mercenaries turn
renegade.
[Please recall that in this incident, the SOC reacted fast
enough to deploy Mount Vernon Camp because it was an incident
of scuffle and rioting. This situation would be vastly different
from the scenario where the entire Gurkha Contingent
co-operate and mutiny, there would be no 999 call to the Radio
Division Singapore Police Force, there would also be no advance
warning call to the Special Operations Command.]
The PAP had better come up with much better reasons for
maintaining the need for the Gurkha Contingent.
Should the Gurkha Contingent revolt for reasons unknown, the
PAP’s policy of recruiting and arming foreigners heavily on its own
soil may prove to be the worst ever decision the administration has
made and might in actual fact lead to the downfall of
Singapore.
I repeat myself. Gurkhas are not Singaporeans, they are
mercenaries and they intend to retire in their homeland when they
finish their terms of services. Gurkhas are i believe more heavily
armed, from what the photos reveal, with at least Heckler &
Koch MP5 submachine guns and M-16 assault rifles as opposed to most
of their Singaporean counterparts with their Smith & Wesson
0.38 revolvers. God knows whether or not they have the same heavy
weapons as a SAF Infantry Battalion e.g. GPMGs.
Thank God that Singapore still has its Special Operations
Command, Police Task Force unit, KINS and PINS. This however does
not square the equation because do we have as many as 2000 fighting
men in the Special Operations Command? I believe not.
The question is to MHA is this - What function does this unit
perform which cannot be performed by true blue Singaporeans?
I hereby declare my intention to campaign for the disarming and
disbanding of the Gurkha Contingent and I hope other Singaporeans
will rally with me with this call.
Until the administration gets pressured enough to be accountable
with how the Gurkhas’ recruitment, training, deployment and weapons
access and cost of upkeep, I pray for all Singaporean police
officers, especially those in the Special Operations Command, to
keep a keen and watchful eye on the Gurkha Contingent for reasons
which i need not say more.
No one need to look too far into history to know the dangers of
having a foreign armed mercenary unit in Singapore.