New Aussie Gov may say No to superbug deal

duotiga83 SG

Australia faces hard choice in fighter review

The Australian government faces a conflict in timeframes for its air combat review, development of a Defence White Paper and decision points for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter acquisition and Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet deal, according to defence think-tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

The country's new Labor government has launched a review of air power requirements, including the former government's order for 24 Super Hornets to replace ageing General Dynamic F-111s and the planned acquisition of the JSF.

The review needs to be rigorous and systematic and it should be conducted by an independent analyst with extensive experience in the aerospace industry, says Dr Andrew Davies, ASPI's operations and capability programme director.

He says the government has two options - continue down the path of the previous government but with possible changes in aircraft numbers and timing, or the "blank sheet of paper" approach which makes sense but will be time-consuming and expensive. A decision would be made easier with the government's proposed Defence White Paper, but that is not expected to be completed until late 2008 at the earliest.

Maintaining the former government's approach would see the JSF as the centrepiece for Australia's air combat capability. The country is due to make a decision on a A$12-15 billion ($11-13 billion) JSF acquisition late this year.

If the JSF timetable slips further there will be a problem in maintaining a viable number of frontline aircraft, says Davies. The upgrade programme for the RAAF's F/A-18 Hornet fleet will keep that aircraft flying until 2018, but if the JSF has not matured into a suitable frontline aircraft then Australia will require more bridging capability, he says.

The Super Hornet provides an improvement on the current Hornet fleet and a boost in capability at little project risk, but questions have been raised over its capability relative to other aircraft in the region, says Davies. "As a matter of priority, the review should examine hard data on relative performance and decide whether the Super Hornet is a viable bridging capability," he suggests.

If the government does cancel the Super Hornet order, Australia would be responsible for all costs accrued to the date of termination and a possible termination liability, with accrued costs increasing with time, says Davies.

The blank-sheet approach should include "top-down" and "bottom-up" analysis, including strategic aims and force structure coupled with aircraft capabilities, costs of acquisition and operations and programme risks, he suggests.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/01/17/220863/australia-faces-hard-choice-in-fighter-review.html

lionnoisy SG

How can u believe they bought Vietnam era choppers in 1980's ?

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23129070-31477,00.html

''In truth, Fitzgibbon knows many of these procurement problems are systemic shortcomings within defence and that unless he can identify and solve the root causes, he will fail just like his predecessors have.''

This summarize the problems in ADF!!!

tankee1981 SG

It's budget time, and Boeing must be smelling blood, because they're going for what they think may be the most vulnerable of the Pentagon's aircraft programs, the Lockheed Martin-built F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Boeing says it's got a nifty plan to offer something just short of a fifth generation aircraft-- a souped-up Super Hornet -- to tide everyone over till it can build a sixth-generation fighter. This would allow the Pentagon (and foreign militaries) to skip the fifth-generation F-35, which has many shortcomings, according to Boeing (the biggest apparently being that's it not built by Boeing):

What sixth-generation fighter you ask? I'll get to that later. This is Boeing's sales pitch, as Aviation Week reports:

The idea is that customers could buy 4.5-generation Super Hornets (perhaps 4.75-generation with the planned extra forward stealth and extra range of Block 3 aircraft) and then switch to a new, sixth generation faster than if they bought the fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighter. To be available circa 2024, the sixth-generation aircraft would feature a combat radius of more than 1,000 miles and stealth against a much wider spectrum of radars.

"The [Navy] C-version of the F-35 doesn't buy you a lot that the Super Hornet doesn't provide," says Bob Gower, Boeing's vice president for F/A-18 and EA-18G programs. "Our strategy is to create a compelling reason for the services to go to the next [sixth] generation platform. How do you bridge F/A-18E/F to get us there? We want to convince customers to stay with [Super Hornet] a few years longer -- by adding advanced capabilities and lowering price -- so that they can get to the sixth generation faster. If you go to JSF first, it's going to be a long time."

Another part of Boeing's argument is that the "Navy is comfortable with the Super Hornet against the highest [enemy] threat through 2024, with the [improved] capabilities we have in the flight plan," Gower says. "The ability to counter the threat gets you to about the point that [Boeing's] sixth generation is available."

There's a few problems with this marketing campaign. Actually, there are many problems.

The Super Hornet may be a fine aircraft, but if you kill the F-35, you'll have a lot of explaining to do to all the international partners that have invested in it and planned their Air Force modernization around it. That includes the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Australia and Turkey. Oh well, allies, schmallies. We'll always have the coalition of the willing.

More important, where the heck is this sixth generation fighter? Did I miss something in the budget cycle? The article quotes the Boeing official as saying: "The U.S. Air Force and Navy are now talking a lot more about where they need to go with sixth generation to get beyond JSF. It could be unmanned, but I think you will see a combination of missions -- some manned, some unmanned."

Talk is cheap, aircraft are expensive.

As far as I can see, Boeing is pitching one real aircraft and one imaginary aircraft, and hoping that this equals up to one developmental aircraft. Actually, if you weight the imaginary aircraft as a zero, a real aircraft as a one, and a development aircraft as a .5, Boeing might have a point. Maybe it's a wash?

Anyhow, all I know is that a sixth generation aircraft ain't going to happen by 2024.
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/boeing-pitches.html

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