The yanks thought about giving the Thais "fighter bombers
capable of taking out ground targets in Northern Laos and Northern
Vietnam" in 1961.
Any idea what it could have been? My take is the F-100 Super
Sabre.
The person who wrote the memorandum below is Maxwell Taylor, who
jumped into Normady in June 1944 as the divisional commander of the
101st Airborne.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/53957.htm
164. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative
(Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, August 22,
1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional
Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61-8/25/61. Secret.
The source text is an unsigned copy for McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asian
Planning
1. Whatever the final plan for Southeast Asia, we now know that we
will want to accomplish certain things. These objectives include
the minimizing of any loss of territory in North Laos to the PL,
the protection of the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand from
guerrilla infiltration, and the stabilization of the entire area
with minimum U.S. military involvement. Accepting these purposes,
we should undertake at once those actions which will contribute to
the attainment of these objectives, and which will be necessary
parts of any ultimate plan. Time is working against us so that it
is import!ant to telescope as many of these supporting measures as
possible in order to reduce the lead time of results.
2. The following tabulation indicates some of the courses of action
which should be initiated at once:
a. Political discussions should be started in Bangkok, Vientiane
and Saigon to determine the willingness of these countries to make
a common front against the military and political threat from the
North, and the determination of the price which the United States
might be obliged to pay for effective collaboration.
b. SEATO Plan 5 should be examined to determine whether, with
modifications and variants, it will suffice as the single military
plan for the area. Once an affirmative conclusion has been reached,
we should initiate action within SEATO to secure agreement upon the
necessary modifications to the plan. We should try to get the Thais
and Filipinos to raise their contribution of forces. Consideration
should be given the early introduction of the SEATO Field Commander
and staff into Southeast Asia to coordinate the efforts of the
three local countries involved.
c. Plans should be made with Laos to increase the foreign advisers
with Laotian units with the ultimate goal of providing them down to
company level. Concurrently, press Phoumi to relieve incompetent
commanders and replace them by the best available leadership.
d. We should plan to expand the Thai air capability to
include fighter bombers capable of taking out ground targets in
Northern Laos and Northern Vietnam, and reconnaissance
aircraft capable of overt and covert missions in the
North.
e. We should urge Diem to increase his capability for operations in
the Laotian panhandle and for offensive action against North
Vietnam. In connection with the latter point, particular attention
is needed to the possibilities of operating by sea against coastal
targets.
3. The principal question which remains unanswered at this moment
is the amount of U.S. and outside military force which will be
necessary initially and ultimately to accomplish our
objectives--then how to disengage the forces brought in. It
presently appears that we must be willing to make some commitment
at the outset in order to assure Sarit's support. In any case, we
must be willing to give a guarantee to the indigenous governments
that, in case of major attack, we will come to their assistance
with our own forces. Meanwhile, our study should be directed at
establishing upper and lower limits of military involvement which
we must be prepared to undertake in order to attain our
objectives.
4. I recommend that the courses of action tabulated in paragraph 2
above be assigned for implementation to the responsible
governmental agencies at once, and that we press forward in
developing these points while the over-all plan is taking
form.
Maxwell D. Taylor/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Cheers,
Sunho