A few extracts on this guy as well:
Percival was made a full colonel and from 1936 to 1938 he was
General Staff Officer Grade 1 in Malaya, the Chief of Staff to
General Dobbie, the General Officer Commanding in Malaya. During
this time, he recognised that Singapore was no longer an isolated
fortress.[15] He considered the possibility of the Japanese landing
in Thailand to "burgle Malaya by the backdoor[16] and conducted an
appraisal of the possibility of an attack being launched on
Singapore from the North, which was supplied to the War Office, and
which Percival subsequently felt was similar to the plan followed
by the Japanese in 1941.[17] He also supported Dobbie's unexecuted
plan for the construction of fixed defences in Southern Johore. In
March 1938, he returned to Britain and was promoted to brigadier on
the General Staff, Aldershot Command.
And of course, when the war started:
Churchill viewed the fall of Singapore to be "the worst disaster
and largest capitulation in British history." However, Britain's
defence, the Middle East and the Soviet Union had all received
higher priorities in the allocation of men and material, so the
desired airforce strength of 300 to 500 aircraft was never reached;
whereas the Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks, the
British Army in Malaya did not have a single one.[26]
In 1918, Percival had been described as "a slim, soft spoken man
with a proven reputation for bravery and organisational powers"[27]
but by 1945 this description had been turned on its head with even
Percival's defenders describing him as "something of a damp
squib".[28] The fall of Singapore switched Percival's reputation to
that of an ineffective "staff wallah", lacking ruthlessness and
aggression, even though few doubted that he was a brave and
determined officer. Over six feet in height and lanky, with a
clipped moustache and two protruding teeth, and decidedly
unphotogenic, Percival was an easy target for a caricaturist, being
described as "tall, bucktoothed and lightly built".[29] There was
no doubt his presentation lacked impact as "his manner was low key
and he was a poor public speaker with the cusp of a lisp".[30]
Some of the stuff against him might be unfair, but he did make
some mistakes:
Percival was ultimately responsible for the men who served under
him, and with other officers notably Major-General David
Murray-Lyon commander of the Indian 11th Infantry Division he had
shown a willingness to replace them when he felt their performance
was not up to scratch. Perhaps his greatest mistake was to resist
the building of fixed defences in either Johore or the north shore
of Singapore, dismissing them in the face of repeated requests to
start construction from his Chief Engineer, Brigadier Ivan Simson,
with the comment "Defences are bad for morale for both troops and
civilians".[31] In doing so, Percival threw away the potential
advantages he could have derived from the 6,000 engineers under his
command and perhaps missed his best chance to blunt the danger
posed by the Japanese tanks.
Percival also insisted on defending the north-eastern shore of
Singapore most heavily, against the advice of the Allied supreme
commander in South East Asia, General Archibald Wavell. Percival
was perhaps fixed on his responsibilities for defending the
Singapore Naval Base.[32] He also spread his forces thinly around
the island and kept few units as a strategic reserve. When the
Japanese attack came in the west, the Australian 22nd Brigade took
the brunt of the assault.[33] Percival refused to reinforce them as
he continued to believe that the main assault would occur in the
north east.[34]
