On 24th July 1965 Sukarno asserted that Indonesia would develop
its own nuclear bomb in the near future. Acting on this claim, the
US investigated three possibilities - pure propaganda, Chinese bomb
test on Indonesian soil and Chinese bomb test in China with
Indonesian participation. They concluded China would not help
Indonesia have, or appear to have, nuclear weapons.
133. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs (Barber) to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (McNaughton)/1/
I-25237/65
Washington, August 11,
1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA
Files: 70 A 3717, 400.73 Indonesia. Secret. Prepared by Commander
Gorman of the Arms and Trade Control Division.
SUBJECT
Indonesian Claims on Nuclear
Capability
On 24 July Sukarno stated
that Indonesia would build its own atomic bomb in the near future.
He added it would not be used for aggressive purposes. Last
November General Hartono, Director of the Army Arsenal said
Indonesia planned to explode a bomb in 1969. The same officer
declared on 2 February 1965, that 200 scientists were working to
produce bomb and promised a "surprise" at the Armed Forces Day
celebration in October 1965. A third statement by Hartono made 27
July stated that there is a good possibility that Indonesia will
test an atomic bomb following the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers
this coming November.
Indonesia does not have the capability to produce an atomic bomb
without outside assistance. Therefore, Sukarno's behavior may be
explained by the following:
1. Just propaganda.
2. Forthcoming test of a
Chinese bomb on Indonesian soil with Chinese
cooperation.
3. Forthcoming test of a
Chinese bomb with "Indonesian `participation' " and
attendant publicity.
4. Sukarno may denounce the test ban and withdraw from it.
If 1. above is the case and Sukarno is making a strictly propaganda
pitch (our Embassy in Djakarta suspects this), then no comment on
the part of the United States is required.
Regarding 2., a test in
Indonesia, our Embassy remains doubtful that a detonation will take
place. Yet the Embassy allows that if the detonation is to
be made almost purely for political purposes and if auxiliary
scientific expertise needed to collect technical research data is
held to a minimum or dispensed with entirely, it is conceivable
that a ChiCom-Indonesian collaboration could successfully meet the
deadline. Reporting for
the ChiCom side, our Consul General in Hong Kong believes the
ChiComs would recoil in horror from conducting a test in Indonesia,
mainly on security grounds. AmConGen Hong Kong notes that
the ChiCom hypersensitivity on maintaining security with respect to
conventional military developments is notorious and without
question would be even greater with respect to nuclear weapons.
AmConGen Hong Kong doubts
that the ChiComs would expect that their role could be kept secret.
If it became known this would defeat Sukarno's presumed purpose,
i.e. that it was solely an Indonesian nuclear
breakthrough.
We can not doubt that Sukarno would like to detonate a bomb in
Indonesia. He would believe that it would enhance his prestige
among the Afro-Asians and it would, quite frankly, shock the
British and their Malaysian allies, along with Australia. It would
add tremendous drive to Indonesia's plan to set up the Conference
of Newly Emerging Forces (CONEFO) as a rival and eventual successor
to the UN. The problem is
not whether Indonesia would detonate a bomb if they could but
whether the ChiComs will help them. We don't think they
will. Nevertheless we have requested DIA to intensify their
efforts in watching for indications of a preparation of an
Indonesian testing site and association of Indonesians with the
ChiCom test program.
If it is indicated that the ChiComs and Indonesians are preparing
for a detonation then we should
a) Coordinate early with the British on intelligence.
b) Prepare a pre-emptive statement which would take much of the
wind out of the Indonesian sails.
Regarding 3., a test of a
ChiCom bomb in China, with "Indonesian participation,"--we give
this a better chance of being carried out than we do a detonation
in Indonesia but we are doubtful it will be done. Besides
the problem of security, there is the question of whether or not
Peiping really wants another Asian state to claim the status of
being a nuclear power. AmConGen Hong Kong believes that Peiping is
trying to reduce Asian, and especially Japanese, criticism of its
nuclear program and wonders if ChiCom nationalistic and
chauvinistic pride might not cause them to take a dim view of an
additional Asian country attempts to climb on the nuclear
bandwagon. We don't think Peiping wants Indonesia alongside--at
least for the present. However, we have asked DIA carefully watch
for any Indonesian participation in the ChiCom test program.
If there is an indication of this, we should prepare a pre-emptive
statement which would denounce the Indo-ChiCom collaborative
effort.
The final case is that Sukarno may denounce the test ban treaty and
withdraw from it. There is a good chance that this might happen.
State believes that recent Indonesian pronouncements regarding
atomic bombs point toward the possibility that Sukarno might regard
a denunciation of the test ban treaty as valid and dramatic
material for use in his 17 August Independence Day speech. State
particularly notes Foreign Minister Subandrio's recent statement to
the effect that the only real way of removing the threat of nuclear
war is for all nations to have their own stocks of nuclear weapons.
We recommend:
a) Watch Sukarno's 17 August speech. In addition to possibility of
a test ban denunciation, it may indicate more about a future
detonation.
b) Prepare a contingent statement in case Indonesia withdraws from
the TBT./2/
/2/In an August 19 memorandum to Barber, (I-2543
Acting
Director of the Far East Division of ISA William C. Hamilton, wrote
"there is enough of a possibility that Indonesians may acquire an
atomic device and explode it for psychological reasons to warrant
an investigation by the intelligence community and to prepare a
public position." Hamilton suggested consulting the Department of
State. (Ibid.) On September 22 Barber wrote Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Joseph J.
Sisco a letter stating that "there was a very real possibility that
an atomic bomb will be set off in Indonesia in October, with
Chinese assistance." Barber hoped that the United Nations could
pass a strongly worded resolution condemning any such test.
(Ibid.)
Arthur W. Barber/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Barber signed the
original.
Cheers,
Sunho