1964 study to arm Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons

datafuser SG

After China successfully tested its first nuclear bomb in 1964, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk initiated a study to provide friendly countries in Asia with US nuclear weapons as a degree of deterrence to possible Chinese threat.

Similar arrangements were actually made for NATO countries. For instance the West German Luftwaffe maintained a few F-104G Starfighters each armed with a single 1MT B43 hydrogen bomb on round-the-clock QRA, fully fueled and ready to take off within 17 minutes of authorization during the Cold War period.

Below is from George Perkovich's book "India's Nuclear Bomb" published in 1999.

While the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was contemplating providing Plowshares services to India, advisers to Secretary of State Dean Rusk had requested Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John McNaughton and his staff to study "the possibilities of providing nuclear weapons under U.S. custody" for use by "friendly Asian" military forces in the event that China threatened or attacked them. McNaughton provided a preliminary version of the requested study to Deputy Under Secretary of State Llewellyn E. Thompson in the late fall of 1964, and Thompson forwarded it to Rusk on December 4. The study, which had not been cleared by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, sought to give the United States means to counter the geopolitical and military gains China might otherwise win through its new nuclear weapon capability.

The basic idea was to make arrangements for friendly Asian countries to receive and militarily deliver low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that the United States would provide to them in the event of Chinese aggression. The study contemplated making nuclear weapons available to Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Pakistan, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The authors noted that American personnel would have to train military units in the recipient countries to handle and deliver the weapons.

The study paid special attention to India. The authors estimated that India could produce and test a nuclear device "in one to three years after a decision to do so," and could produce "by 1970 about a dozen weapons in the 20 kt [kiloton] range." While noting that the balance of political opinion in India still inclined against the bomb, the study averred that the "chances are better than even that India will decide to develop nuclear weapons within the next few years." The authors believed that American security assurances in the face of Chinese nuclear threats would not be adequate to stem other Asian countries' demands for "some national capability." Thus, "the primary objective of a U.S. nuclear assistance offer to India would be to preclude an independent national nuclear development program."

The study recognized that providing nuclear weapons to India would complicate American relations with Pakistan. Thus the authors suggested that the offer to India "should be low key." The United States would help India modify its fleet of Canberra bombers, train air crews, provide dummy weapons for exercises, and supply "weapons effects data for planning and necessary target data to support the feasibility and desirability of weapon use." Washington would provide the same basic assistance to Pakistan, too, in part to offset that country's reaction to the proposed U.S. arrangement with India. The United States would not store nuclear weapons in either country but instead would develop facilities in each to handle weapons if and when they were needed.

Beyond reducing the proliferation incentives of China's neighbors, the Defense Department staff argued that the plan would give the "U.S. President . . . the option of allowing controlled use of nuclear weapons" against China, without running the more direct risks of escalation to a global conflict involving major U.S. forces. "It could assist in avoiding a direct confrontation between the United States and the [Soviet Union] in a Far East regional conflict." This suggested a possible way to satisfy the desire to "use" nuclear weapons to deter or prosecute war on foreign soil while avoiding escalation that could lead to attacks on the U.S. homeland. Nuclear deterrence ultimately rests on the threat of massive devastation being visited on combatants' homelands, but the United States sought to escape this pitfall of deterrence by finding ways to contain nuclear exchanges to the foreign battlefield or theater level. This possibility--as much as the aim of stemming proliferation in India and other states--motivated the Pentagon's approach to the problem.

Cheers,
Sunho

specfore SG

Not surprising. When the British were in Singapore in the 50s and 60s, they admitted that some of their bombers based in Singapore, were armed with tactical nuclear bombs.

MobyDog SG

I'm sure even today.. there would be a nuke or two lying around in US bases in those countries.

When under circumstances when US forces are about to be over-run.. they will use those magic bullets.. even if they are the perpetrators or aggressors.

Nothing like exploding a nuke in someone else's land .. you know the phrases.. "We had to destroy the village.. in order to save it".. A usual US war Habit... and that scares me

SpecOps87 SG

Curious…are they the man-packed verions or air/ship launched? This MAD theroy…with N.Korea becoming Nuke capable is crazy to say the least.

boy in blues SG

Is Japan going to go nuclear because of Pyongyangs test of a nuclear explosive device? Who knows. But we may find some clues if we look at statements over the years by former Japanese leaders.

Lets start with Nakagawa Shoichi, who as Chairman of the Policy Research Council is one of the three most important men in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). On October 15, he went on Television Asahi to say the constitution does not prohibit Japan from having nuclear weapons. "Its one thing if Western nations have nuclear weapons," he said. "But if nations that think in ways that just cannot be understood announce [they have nuclear weapons], we have to eliminate [that possibility], and the option should be a nuclear one."

He went on to say that Japan should be able to talk about the idea because "some could argue that possessing nuclear weapons makes it unlikely you are going to be attacked." Soon after saying this, both he and the politically similar prime minister Abe Shinzo scurried to quiet the controversy by repeating something called the "three principles of nuclear non-proliferation."

Minister of State for Defense Kyuma Fumio spoke up the next day. "Talking like this could send other countries the wrong message. Discussing the idea is alright, but one should be careful," he said. In other words, go ahead and consider the idea; just do so while watching what others think at the same time. The history of the Japanese inner circles two-faced attitude toward the question of whether to go nuclear or not is a long one.

Former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro has long styled himself an opponent of nuclear armament. But at a policy seminar put on by a research center he heads, he said that "in order to be prepared for future changes in the international community, it would be good to have already considered the nuclear question."

Lets look back in time at the issue, as well.

Prime Minister Abe says the man he respects the most and most wants to emulate is his maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who was once classified as a Class A war criminal before later becoming prime minister. While in office, Kishi sent the Americans an unofficial message in which he said Japan might go nuclear if it felt the need. Alarmed, the United States hurriedly moved to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Fomer prime minster Ikeda Hayato, the standard bearer of Japans fast-paced growth years ago, looked at U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in November 1961 and said, "There are members of the cabinet who want the bomb."

In December 1962, Kishis younger brother, Sato Eisaku, told U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer that it "is common sense that if someone else has nukes, you need to have them, too."

In 1999, vice minister of defense Nishimura Shingo announced that "it would be advantageous for Japanese security to have nuclear weapons" before stepping down.

In a 2001 magazine interview, a high-ranking government official said, "Japan could be armed with nuclear capabilities in three years."

On April 6, 2002, Democratic Party chairman Ozawa Ichiro announced that he had once told a Chinese Communist Party intelligence official that "making a nuclear warhead is simple." He said Japan had the plutonium it needed in its power reactors. "We can keep from falling behind in military preparedness if we just decide thats what we want."

Back on May 13, 2002, when he was deputy chief cabinet secretary, Abe stood before a room full of students at Waseda University and said that the constitution does not prohibit Japan from having nuclear weapons "whether nuclear or conventional, as long as it does not exceed what we need for self defense."

A U.S. Defense Department white paper published in 2003 predicts that Japan will go nuclear by 2050. On February 25, 2005 Omae Kenichi, an economic commentator known quite well in Korea, had this to say:

"Japan can make nuclear bombs in 90 days if it wants to, and it has the technology it needs to put them on missiles. We already have [rockets] that are at the level of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and we have more than 50 tons of plutonium stored away. That's enough to manufacture 2,000 nuclear warheads. Japan has already completed all the tests it would need to create an atomic bomb 30 to 40 years ago...Public opinion will change if we come to face a situation in which we have an actual threat in the form of nuclear arms in North Korea."

A classified British document made public on December 28, 2005 says that in 1975 the head of the Japanese science and technology agencys nuclear power department told the British ambassador that Japan has the ability to produce nuclear weapons within three months.

boy in blues SG

Japan's foreign minister said Tuesday that the country should openly debate whether to develop its own nuclear deterrent following North Korea's atomic test, while stressing that the government doesn't support such a move.

Foreign Minister Taro Aso told a parliamentary committee that the Japanese government would stick to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, developing or allowing nuclear bombs on Japanese soil.

"As the government, there is no change to those principles," he said, stressing his adherence to the policy a week after stirring controversy by saying Japan should consider the nuclear option to counter the threat posed by Pyongyang's Oct. 9 atomic test.

But he said the regional security environment has changed since the policy were introduced in the 1960s.

"It's only natural to discuss how we should cope with the changing environment around us," Aso said. "I'm not in favor of suppressing a debate over whether we should or should not possess nuclear (bombs) or stick to the three non-nuclear principles."

Possession of nuclear weapons is a sensitive political issue in Japan, which suffered a nuclear attack when U.S. atomic bombs were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Other Cabinet ministers, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma, were more cautious.

Kyuma, attending the parliamentary committee with Aso, said the timing is not right for a debate.

"A debate when the issue is boiling could cause misunderstanding. It should be discussed calmly," he said.

Abe last Wednesday said Tokyo had no plans to stray from its postwar non-nuclear policy, trying to stem the debate hours after Aso said lack of nuclear policy debate is odd, though Tokyo should observe its non-nuclear principles.

Aso's comment is only the latest among Japanese leaders calling for debate of the nuclear option. A ruling party leader Shoichi Nakagawa caused a stir earlier this month for making similar remarks. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has also proposed Japan consider acquiring nuclear weapons.

Analysts say Japan has the knowledge and stockpile from its nuclear power program to easily build weapons if it decides to.

U.S. officials have expressed concerns that North Korea's nuclear development could spur an arms race in Northeast Asia.