"The Eagle and the Albatross", a doctoral thesis by Commander
David Joseph Wilson RAN, at the Australian Defence Force Academy of
the University of New South Wales in 2003 reveals an interesting
contingency plan drawn up by the Royal Australian Navy in the
1950's.
Under ANZAM the RAN was committed to the proposition that, as
the RN intended to withdraw from 'East of
Suez' at the outbreak of a Europe-centered war, it would be
responsible for the protection of sea routes 'over a large
proportion of three major oceans' and to convoy Australian land and air forces to the Middle
East. Once this commitment was met, the RAN was expected to
provide a proportion of its strength (including the Carrier Task
Group) for 'service elsewhere'.51
Three months later the Defence Committee considered that the Soviet
threat to sea communications would be attacks by long-range
submarine that would use the traditional torpedo/gun attack on
shipping at sea and the laying of mines at focal points.52 The
anti-submarine role was well suited to the Light Fleet Carrier and
its embarked aircraft, but placed the Navy in a defensive role. The
RAAF maritime reconnaissance force also shared this defensive
charter. Plans drawn up in February 1951
for the deployment of a Mobile Task Force to the Middle East or
Malaya illustrate this mind-set. The plan envisaged a
squadron of eight Lincolns supplementing the three heavy bomber,
two long range fighter and two transport squadrons - but these
would be utilised only to 'patrol the maritime approaches' of
Malaya.53
51 Defence Committee, 29 November 1951, 1365/8, CRS A5954/60,
AA.
52 Defence Committee, 14 February 1952, ibid.
53 Stephens, Going Solo, pp 32, 35
The Australians assumed that in a general war against the Soviet
Russia in the 1950's they would have to defend the Middle East just
like they did against the Germans in the 1st and 2nd world wars and
defend Malaya against - probably - the Chinese Communists.
He also argued the RAAF and RAN of that time were pressured by the
UK and US to fit into a capability niche within their force
structures.
The RAAF and RAN have been subjected to the pressures of
powerful allies to fit into a capability niche within the
overbearing numbers and technology of their combat power. The has
tended to distort the structure of both then RAAF and RAN.
For example, in the 1960s, the RAAF maritime force and the RAN
became anti-submarine oriented. The lack of combat capability
during the period of Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia was an
unpalatable prospect for both Australian services.
This example illustrates that the national interest of a small ally
may not always be of paramount importance to, or even recognized,
by a great power.
The navies of Canada and the Netherlands were built to fit into
the capability niche - anti-submarine warfare - within NATO as
well.
You can download the thesis at
http://www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-ADFA/public/adt-ADFA20031029.102545/index.html.
Cheers,
Sunho