Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in
Singapore
By William Ashton
(Jane's Intelligence Review. March 1,1998. ASIA: Vol 10, No3. Pg.
3298.)
While China may be the most obvious country trying to win over
Burma's affections, Rangoon has, in fact, received significant
advances from an altogether more subtle suitor, as William Ashton
reports.
EVER since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have been persistent
claims that Burma's military government has been secretly supported
by Singapore. Rumours of a close strategic relationship continue to
circulate under the SLORC's successor, the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), the formation of which seems to have
been prompted by representations made to General Ne Win during his
recent Southeast Asian tour. While Singapore's motives clearly
include a wish to take advantage of the commercial opportunities
flowing from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies, wider
strategic factors are just as important.
Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation
of the SLORC in September 1988, Burma was severely criticised by
most of the international community. Aid and financial flows
critical to the survival of the military regime were suspended. In
addition, Burma's traditional arms suppliers announced that they
would not sell it any new weapons or military equipment. Even West
Germany, until then the main source of Burma's military technology,
suspended co-operation on indigenous arms production. The SLORC,
faced with the country's economic collapse and fearful of a link-up
between ethnic insurgents in the countryside and urban-based
dissidents, was desperate to restock its depleted armouries. China
and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the
first country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact
Singapore.
Traces of a relationship:
DETAILS are hard to come by but, according to one regional journal,
in October 1988 hundreds of boxes marked 'Allied Ordnance,
Singapore' were unloaded from two vessels of Burma's Five Star
Shipping Line in Rangoon's port. These shipments reportedly
included mortars, ammunition and raw materials for Burma's arms
factories. The consignment also contained 84 mm rockets for the
Burmese army's Carl Gustav recoilless guns, which were made by
Chartered Industries of Singapore under licence from Forenade
Fabriksverken in Sweden. The shipment thus violated an agreement
under which the original export licence had been negotiated,
requiring that any re-exports only be made with the permission of
the Swedish Government. No such clearance was granted.
In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the
SLORC when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel
were trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of SKS
Marketing, a newly formed Singapore-based joint venture with the
Burmese military regime. There have been reports that these latter
shipments included second-hand 40 mm RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57
mm anti-tank guns of Eastern Bloc origin. One well-informed
Burma-watcher has suggested that this equipment may have come from
Palestinian stocks captured in southern Lebanon by Israel in 1982
and re-sold to Burma.
It is highly unlikely that any of these arms shipments to Burma
could have been made without the knowledge and support of the
Singapore government.
Winning friends:
THESE gestures of practical assistance to the SLORC, at a time when
it felt most vulnerable, won Singapore some powerful friends in the
military regime. Largely because of this high-level support, the
bilateral relationship has blossomed. Since 1988 there have been
frequent exchanges of senior visitors, including the heads of state
of both countries. Economic ties have also greatly expanded.
Singapore is now Burma's largest foreign investor, with over US$1
billion committed to nearly 50 different projects (mainly in
hotels, property development and tourism). Both governments appear
to be prepared to overlook the fact that some of these investment
dollars have been generated by narcotics production in the Golden
Triangle. Notorious traffickers like Lo Hsing-han are thought to
control a number of companies in Singapore that are investing
heavily in Burma. The flow of illicit funds can also go in the
opposite direction. For example, it has been suggested that in 1991
foreign currency generated by narcotics sales was used by the SLORC
to pay for a large shipment of arms from China, with the money
being passed through a bank in Singapore.
The close political and economic ties that now exist between
Singapore and Burma are well known, but much less publicity has
surrounded the bilateral co-operation that is occurring in a number
of more controversial areas. Burma's armed forces, for instance
have apparently continued to order arms and ammunition from
Singaporean companies. They also seem to have turned to Singapore
for military training, intelligence advice and defence technology.
This has placed Singapore in a category reserved for Burma's
special friends, a category currently shared only by the Burmese
junta's main financial backer and strategically: China.
Bolstering the friendship:
SINCE those early consignments, a wide variety of additional arms
and ammunition has reportedly been shipped to Burma from firms
based in Singapore, and Singaporean brokers appear to have
facilitated the sale of munitions to Burma from other suppliers.
The details of these deals are not always clear, but they are
believed to have included M16A1 automatic rifles and 5.56 mm
ammunition (apparently in violation of another export agreement
attached to their licensed production in Singapore), 7.62 mm
assault rifles and ammunition, communications equipment of various
kinds and at least one (but possibly more) British Aerospace
Bloodhound Mk 2 surface-to-air missile systems with Scorpion target
illuminating radars. If this latter report is true, then Singapore
would be responsible for providing the Burmese armed forces with
their first guided missile system.
Bilateral links:
THE close bilateral relationship is also reflected in links between
the armed forces of both countries. For example, the Singapore
Armed Forces (SAF) have provided training in Singapore to
specialist units like the Burmese army's parachute team, and there
have been persistent rumours in Rangoon that the SAF are providing
the Burmese army with artillery training in Burma. Another version
of this story has it that the SAF are, in fact, undertaking
artillery training on Burmese ranges. This is one explanation given
to account for the occasional visits to Rangoon of Republic of
Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Fokker F-50 and Lockheed C-130
transports. In fact, RSAF aircraft regularly stage through Rangoon
on their way to Bangladesh, reportedly on 'navigational training'
flights. While some of these reports are difficult to prove, the
relationship between the armed forces of the two countries is
clearly much closer than publicly acknowledged.
Singapore is also believed to be the main source of information
technology being obtained by Burma's military regime. For example,
a Singaporean firm, or group of firms, has apparently installed
computers throughout Burma's Defence Ministry and helped to upgrade
its communications links with the 10 Regional Military
Commands.
Singapore is probably also the source of the equipment installed in
the ministry's 'cyber war centre' (created a few years ago under a
new Directorate of Defence Services Computers). This centre is
reported to be closely involved in the monitoring and recording of
foreign and domestic telecommunications, including the satellite
telephone conversations of Burmese opposition groups. A recent
study has also suggested that Singapore may have provided the
Burmese armed forces with modern frequency-hopping radios and
encryption devices to protect their own signals from
interception.
Bilateral co-operation may have also been extended to other
intelligence areas. One Australian analyst has recently cited a
claim that Singapore is providing intelligence training to Burma's
'secret police' in central Singapore. Hundreds of Burmese officers
are reported to be involved. There has also been at least one
credible press report that Singaporean intelligence officers have
been observed in Burma near the Thai- Burma border. The current
Singaporean ambassador to Burma is a former senior SAF officer and
a past director of Singapore's defence-oriented Joint Intelligence
Directorate. This appointment may simply be a coincidence, but it
is curious that Singapore has chosen to assign someone with a
military background to this new member of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and not one of its many capable
professional diplomats.
There have also been repeated, if still unconfirmed, reports that a
Singaporean company, or group of companies, has stepped in to help
modernise and expand Burma's arms industries, drawing on
Singapore's well-developed expertise in this field. Singaporean
technicians, for example, have apparently replaced the German
technicians formerly based at Padaung, across the Irrawaddy River
from Prome and close to one of the regime's well-guarded defence
industrial complexes. Once again, these claims are difficult to
verify, but Singaporean involvement in these factories would be
consistent with the SLORC's (and now the SPDC's) aim of making
Burma more self-sufficient in arms production. Singapore is less
likely to face the kinds of domestic pressures which in 1988 forced
Germany to reconsider its support for Burma's arms
industries.
Singaporean denials:
EVER since they began to surface, these rumours and news media
reports have been consistently denied by the Singaporean
government. Indeed, Singapore has shown considerable sensitivity to
any suggestion that it is secretly supporting the military regime
in Rangoon or turning a blind eye to Burmese money-laundering
operations. Some of the reasons for this sensitivity are obvious.
Despite ASEAN's ambivalent attitude toward Burma since 1988, there
would be considerable diplomatic embarrassment to Singapore if it
was known to be actively supporting an international pariah like
the SPDC in such a fashion. Singapore can hardly accuse Western
countries of interfering in Burma's internal affairs (by condemning
the military regime's repressive policies) when it is helping to
provide the same regime with the means to retain its iron grip on
power. Nor does Singapore wish to lose its reputation as an honest
dealer in regional affairs and a staunch opponent of narcotics
trafficking.
There is another explanation for Singapore's sensitivity on this
issue, however, and that is its wish to avoid any potential
difficulties in its developing relationship with China. Despite
statements to the contrary from elder statesmen like former prime
minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore is acutely conscious of China's
growing economic strength and strategic influence. It has watched
China's behaviour in the region, including its rapidly growing
links with the military regime in Burma, with some concern. In
order to avoid pushing the SPDC further into the arms of the
Chinese, Singapore and the other ASEAN states have refused to join
in the widespread condemnation of the Burmese junta for its abuses
of human rights and have undertaken instead to 'constructively
engage' the Rangoon regime.
These countries have included in their efforts the pursuit of
commercial opportunities in Burma and in some cases modest defence
ties, but in Singapore's case a close (and hidden) strategic
partnership appears to be a very high priority.
Well-placed to gain:
OF all the ASEAN countries, Singapore is perhaps best placed to
pursue this particular aim. It is not one of Burma's immediate
neighbours and therefore does not have to cope with the territorial
disputes and refugee outflows which tend to characterise Burma's
relations with Thailand. Similarly, Singapore cares little about
human rights, in particular the plight of the ethnic and religious
minorities in Burma, which occasionally troubles Muslim states like
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Also, having developed one of the region's most advanced armed
forces and defence industrial support bases, Singapore is in a good
position to offer Burma a number of inducements which other ASEAN
countries would find hard to match.
Singapore seems to have decided that, in a number of ways, close
links with the military regime in Rangoon serves its long-term
national security interests. Having apparently assessed that Aung
San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy forces were unlikely to win power
for the foreseeable future, Singapore has deliberately set out to
forge closer ties with the real centre of power in Burma: namely
the armed forces.
By assisting with arms sales, defence technology transfers,
military training and intelligence co-operation, Singapore has been
able to win a sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's
official councils. From there, it is in a good position not only to
encourage its own commercial interests but also to pursue wider
strategic aims. These relate in part to Burma's own growing
military capabilities, but also to China's future role in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Singapore has recognised, perhaps more readily than most countries,
that Burma has the potential to become a more influential factor in
the region's changing strategic environment. As part of an
ambitious expansion and modernisation plan, for example, the
Burmese armed forces have grown from around 186,000 in 1988 to more
than 400,000 - and at a time when all other regional countries are
reducing the size of their armed forces. In addition, since 1988
the SLORC has acquired around 130 new combat aircraft, nearly 30
new naval vessels and large numbers of AFVs, multiple rocket
launchers and artillery pieces. The Rangoon regime has also
improved its command and control systems, and upgraded its military
infrastructure. With one of the largest armed forces in Southeast
Asia, newly equipped with a wide range of more modern weapons,
Burma now has the potential to play a far greater conventional
defence role than at any other time in its history.
The Chinese factor:
MORE importantly, most of the new arms and equipment facilitating
this massive military expansion programme have come from China,
assisted by the provision of generous loans and special
'friendship' prices.
In addition, hundreds of Burmese servicemen have undertaken
training courses in China, and up to 100 People's Liberation Army
instructors have been posted to Burma at different times to teach
Burmese personnel how to use their new weapons. China seems to have
negotiated a comprehensive intelligence co-operation arrangement
with Burma, which may even extend to the operation of joint signals
intelligence posts scattered around Burma's long coastline. Since
1988 China has also played a major role in the development of
Burma's civil and military infrastructure.
This dramatic departure from Burma's traditional neutrality in
international affairs, along with its new strategic partnership
with a major power like China, has sent ripples of concern around
the region. There are fears that Burma may eventually become a
'client state' of China, provide support to Chinese naval
deployments to the Indian Ocean or act as a stalking horse for
Chinese interests in regional councils such as ASEAN. At times,
these fears appear rather exaggerated and fail to take into account
Burma's passionate nationalism and deep-seated suspicions of
Chinese intentions. Some of these fears may in fact be politically
inspired by countries like India in an effort to discredit China
and garner favour with the ASEAN members. Even so, real concerns
remain - including in Singapore - that China is developing such a
hold on Burma's economy and armed forces that it will constrain the
Rangoon regime's ability to act independently in the future.
Singapore's motives:
THUS, Singapore has a number of immediate and obvious reasons for
wanting to develop a close working relationship with Burma. These
relate mainly to Singapore's own perceived commercial and political
interests. Less obvious, perhaps, is Singapore's desire to
cultivate better links with a regional country that is expanding
its military capabilities and external contacts after decades of
self-imposed isolation. In the final analysis, however, China's
shadow falls constantly across Singapore's relationship with Burma,
and it is concern about China's future role in the region that has
prompted many of the steps taken by Singapore in recent years to
consolidate its special relationship with the military regime in
Rangoon.
While this remains the case, Singapore will continue to be very
sensitive about any publicity which may complicate its long-term
plans. These include a two-track approach of cultivating close
relations with China while hedging its bets by supporting an
independent Burma within ASEAN. In these circumstances, any
prospect of Singapore's hidden partnership with Burma being
re-examined as a result of international pressure seems
remote.
* William Ashton is a freelance journalist based in Canberra,
Australia. http://www2.gol.com/users/brelief/Index.htm
http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/Human%20Rights/burmasing.html
I find this an interesting article about secret dealings between
Singapore and Myanmar. Something which most Singaporeans have no
knowledge about. Comments on the article? 
