continueing from above..
"In the last six years, there hadn't been any preparation" for
putting soldiers into combat, said a retired major general, Shaul
Givoli, director of the Council for Peace and Security near Tel
Aviv. "Even the rations had expired."
Critics list a variety of miscues, some acknowledged by the army.
"We made some mistakes in preparation," a high-level military
officer said in an interview. "We need to recheck our intelligence,
our logistics, the readiness of reserves."
From the outset, Israel tried to wage the war largely from the air,
instead of sending a large ground force into Lebanon quickly. The
bombardment created scenes of devastation in Lebanon. Israeli army
officers insist that the operation brought serious damage to
Hezbollah's infrastructure, supplies and manpower. But the bombing
did not stop the rain of rockets fired by Hezbollah fighters.
Israeli forces also were surprised by the effectiveness of
Hezbollah and its missile armaments, which hit an Israeli ship, may
have downed a helicopter, and penetrated about 20 of Israel's most
modern tanks.
Public criticism was intense after Israel broadened the ground war
inside Lebanon in the last two days before the cease-fire. More
than 30 Israeli soldiers were killed during the fighting that
weekend to seize ground that the army then abandoned Monday morning
when the cease-fire took effect.
The senior Israeli officer, who helped plan the last-minute push,
said the ground operation was valuable. The officer, speaking on
grounds that he not be identified by name, said that the outlines
of the cease-fire were not known when the order to go ahead was
given and that the battles helped shape the final agreement.
But the coming cease-fire was clear to those in the field. "We were
called up to go in, and on that night I told my friends, tonight
and tomorrow people will die for nothing," said Drori, the reserve
sergeant. "The cease-fire agreement was there, and everybody knew
what was to be achieved, and people will die.
"It seemed the IDF was trying to drop every single bomb in its
arsenal. You could hear the blasts and bombs whistling around you.
Then at 7:55 Monday morning, it all went still. Those last 30
casualties were in vain."
Drori's squad escorted combat bulldozers. Then the bulldozers left
to be refueled and did not come back. "Nobody told us about it. We
finally called the army engineering commander, and he told us to
come back because the bulldozers are parked. He said we did a great
job. In fact, we didn't do anything."
Gerald Steinberg, who heads the conflict management program at
Bar-Ilan University in suburban Tel Aviv, said: "The screw-ups
could have been avoided. The hesitations and lack of leadership --
go in, don't go in, go there, go here. We all knew almost daily of
troops being told to go in, then being called back. Had the war
gone well, that would have been forgotten. But it didn't.
"Then in the last couple days, a mad rush when we all knew there
was going to be a cease-fire. We lost 33 soldiers, and so many
crippled and badly wounded. Wasn't there a better way to do
it?"
Many Israelis see a more ominous consequence of Israel's missteps.
The failure of Israel to silence Hezbollah, followed by the claims
of triumph from the militia, Syria and Iran may leave the
perception of weakness, they feel.
"The only lesson Israel's enemies can possibly have been learning
is that after decades of defeat and frustration, they have found
the means to effect the demise of the Jewish state. They need only
acquire greater rocket and missile capabilities," the editor of the
Jerusalem Post, David Horovitz, wrote Friday. "It was brought about
by a level of arrogance and complacency probably unparalleled since
the" victory in the 1967 war led to Israel being caught unprepared
for a surprise attack in 1973, he said.
Writing in the Haaretz newspaper this week, columnist Reuven
Pedatzur agreed. "The IDF's failure is eroding our national
security's most important asset -- the belligerent image of this
country, led by a vast, strong and advanced army capable of dealing
our enemies a decisive blow if they even try to bother us," he
wrote.
"In Damascus, Gaza, Tehran and Cairo, too, people are looking with
amazement at the IDF that could not bring a tiny guerrilla
organization to its knees for more than a month," he said. "What
happened to this mighty army?"
Knesset member Steinitz said Israel had long relied on a doctrine
that when attacked, it had to counterattack deep into enemy
territory "and defeat the enemy almost at any cost. Now, in the
last decade or so, we developed a culture of strategic war that is
less costly to human life. Instead of looking for a knockout, we
are looking to gain points. I think it's a mistake."
Others contend that any potential opponent looking at the
devastation wreaked by Israel on Lebanon will not see that as
evidence of weakness.
"The destruction in Beirut and southern Lebanon do create anger,
but they also create deterrence," Steinberg said. "Israelis are
coping with this. It's not a sense of denial. It would be a mistake
if Hezbollah or others look at Israel as a weakened society.
Israeli society is very determined to see this through, and
prepared to fight another war."
Zipper reported from Tel Aviv. Special correspondent Samuel Sockol
in Jerusalem contributed to this report.
