We are not clear the warhead never detonated
indication from Janes is Janes own judgment or Israeli source,
but indication at least is not to the level of confirmed, anyway,
such indication is in direct contradiction to the Israeli
official source claiming the missile exploded above 
Heres the full article
JANE'S NAVY INTERNATIONAL - SEPTEMBER 01, 2006
Intelligence failure led to strike on Hanit
By Alon Ben-David and Richard Scott
* INS Hanit, hit by a missile off Lebanon's coast, did not have its
self-defence systems fully activated at the time of the Hizbullah
attack
* The Israel Navy has acknowledged that a lack of prior
intelligence caused it to underestimate the threat level off
Lebanon
A preliminary Israel Navy investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the missile strike suffered by the Sa'ar 5 Eilat-class
missile corvette IN Hanit has acknowledged that the incident was
largely the result of an intelligence failure that led to
operational gaps.
Early indications are that the warhead of the Iranian-supplied Noor
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) that hit Hanit off Lebanon on 14
July did not detonate. Even so, the missile - fired by Hizbullah
forces - killed four crew and inflicted severe damage to the ship's
flight deck and steering systems.
Hanit, part of a force of Israeli naval vessels enforcing a
blockade on Lebanon, was hit at approximately 2015 h local time on
the evening of 14 July while approximately 16 km off Beirut. Two
Noor missiles were fired from a coastal site: one struck Hanit aft
while the second sank a Cambodian merchant ship 60 km off shore.
The 12 crew of the latter vessel were all rescued. On paper, the
Sa'ar 5 is well equipped to defend itself against the Noor threat,
being fitted with the Barak-1 point defence missile system, a
Phalanx close-in weapon system, the NS-9005 multibeam jammer and
the Deseaver soft-kill decoy system. However, it appears that Hanit
was caught unaware by the attack and that its self-defences were
not fully activated at the time. At such short range, the missile
would have only had about a minute of flying time from crossing the
coastline to striking its target. It cruises at a height of 30 m or
20 m, then descends to a final attack altitude of 7 m or 5 m. Local
sunset was at 1850 so the missile made its approach in darkness.
Flying under turbojet power, it offered minimal visual signature to
Hanit's lookouts. "We were not aware that Hizbullah possessed that
kind of missile," admitted Rear Admiral Noam Faig, Israel Navy Head
of Operations. "We are familiar with that missile from other areas,
but assumed that this threat was not present in Lebanon."
The impact caused a fire in Hanit's aft section and caused
substantial damage to the flight deck area, but was ultimately
contained and the ship limped back to Ashdod. Its automatic
fire-protection system closed up the rear section, where the four
servicemen who died were trapped. "The crew managed to put out the
fire and regain some independent sailing capabilities," said Rear
Adm Faig. "Hanit lost its steering and we had to tow it with
another ship until the crew partially fixed the steering."
Another Israel Navy source told Jane's: "It's true that the Sa'ar 5
could easily handle radar-guided missiles, but we were just not
expecting this kind of short-range threat. It's a very painful
blow, but it could have been worse if they had hit another section
of the ship and sunk it." According to Major General Gadi
Eisenkott, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Operations,
Hizbullah operatives received targeting information from the
Lebanese Navy's radar station in Beirut. "That is why we destroyed
all the radar stations along the Lebanese shore immediately after
the attack," he said. Israel has accused Iran of deploying military
advisers alongside Hizbullah to enable the deployment and operation
of the Noor system - a clone of the Chinese C-802/YJ-2 'Saccade'
radar-guided ASCM. "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
[IRGC] has maintained a constant presence in Lebanon's Baka'a
Valley since the early 1980s," said a senior IDF source.
"They have been training Hizbullah and supplying them with advanced
weapons. I can't determine for certain that IRGC personnel were
present during the launch of the missile, but they have certainly
supplied the Hizbullah with a top-end missile, providing them
capabilities which many countries do not have.
"From now on we have to assume that every weapon that exists in
Iran has also been supplied to Hizbullah in Lebanon," a senior IDF
source told Jane's. "We are prepared for more surprises," said Maj
Gen Eisenkot. Senior IDF sources were furious that the Israel Navy
had not taken into account the existence of such missiles in
Lebanon. "The air force has been flying in Lebanon as if all known
threats exist there and taking all precautions," Jane's was told.
"The navy should have done the same." By any standards, the C802 is
not an easy missile to deploy clandestinely. Its launch crew would
require extensive training, while the minimum convoy that would
make up an operational unit would be a radar/command truck, a
power-generating truck and a single launch vehicle. In the original
Chinese system, all three are heavy six-wheeled trucks. The radar
mounted on the roof of the radar/command truck only has a range out
to the horizon, so a single battery would have needed knowledge of
the approximate location of potential targets.
On 16 July, Israeli air and naval forces destroyed several Lebanese
Army radar stations; Israeli press reports claimed that these had
participated in the attack against Hanit.
Israel innovates for the asymmetric, jni.janes.com, 21.03.06
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, jsws.janes.com
