U.S. militarism is at least as off-putting as China's. And it
threatens to section the world into a pair of warring camps. Not a
good idea: "If we end up with a closed Asian bloc centered on China
on the western side of the Pacific, with a rival bloc centered on
the U.S. on the eastern side, rivalry, antagonism and conflict will
be inevitable." That was the thought of Lee Hsien Loong, the prime
minister of Singapore, which hosted the conference. Singapore has
been a staunch U.S. ally, but if the mutual bulk-ups continue, it
is uncertain how much longer that will last.
There has been an unsettling discordance about U.S. policy toward
China that was brought home anew by Donald Rumsfeld recently at the
Asia Security Summit in Singapore. Why this discredited man with
his failed Iraqi policies remains U.S. Secretary of Defense is a
profound mystery only the ever-loyal President George W. Bush can
possibly unravel. But there he was, as a principal speaker,
jabbering at the summit, and yet -- fully five years into the job
-- still parsing out the nuances of the Sino-U.S. relationship in
public. It was as if the utter necessity of getting along with
China was somehow a new hard-to-grasp idea.
Five years as defense secretary should be enough time to get that
all-important relationship right and tight. Thus, it was pleasant
to see that the immediate Western news-media reports from the
International Institute for Strategic Studies conference suggested
that Rummy was getting closer than ever to peaceful
coherence.
In remarks formal and informal, the defense boss painted a regional
international relations picture that was more modified multilateral
mosaic than pointed unilateral unicorn.
It emphasized a bigger picture of cooperation over a narrower
vision of confrontation. Afterward, one noted Asia hand concluded
optimistically that "it is clear that there is a kinder, gentler
view in the Pentagon toward China." I think not: As the saying
goes, the wish is often father to the thought.
In reality, our Pentagon in America is focused, not unwisely
because that is its primary job, on China's continuing military
bulk-up. Americans are warned regularly, through periodic reports
and episodic statements, of its relentless ferocity.
Warnings are worth getting, but what's harder to get a handle on is
the melodramatic Pentagon story line. The idea under official
conveyance appears to be that some major mystery surrounds the
bulk-up. There's no mystery at all. Three reasons readily explain
what China is up to militarily.
The first reason is that economically expanding nations almost
always simultaneously increase their arms spending. Certainly, both
growing India and now growing Russia have increased their
spending.
The second is that the official stated Chinese policy of eventual
integration of Taiwan into historic "mother" China, probably in a
Hong Kong style confederation arrangement, depends vitally --
Beijing believes -- on its own military credibility. Continuing
with this logic, it is Beijing's view that the greater the arms gap
between the mainland and the island, the less likely war will be
resorted to. In this way, Beijing reasons, the faster the mainland
bulk-up, the sooner the political integration, the faster the
cooling of feral nationalistic fever on the mainland on the Taiwan
issue, and the more permanent and reality-based becomes the true
passage of peace across the Taiwan Strait.
The third reason for China's not-so-mysterious bulk-up is as plain
as the nose on Rumsfeld's face. It is an absolutely logical
response to America's buildup. Why it is that U.S. leaders seem
incapable of understanding this continuing factor in world politics
is utterly mystifying.
What precise theory of exceptionalism would allow the United States
to forge ahead militarily, spending far more of its national
treasure on arms both proportionately and aggregately than other
countries, but would also forbid other nations from doing the
same?
Is it that the United States would never, ever (in a million years)
use its vast military might without unequivocal international
sanction to do so? Right but...then there's Iraq.
Is it that it's okay for the United States to possess a vast
stockpile of weapons but it's not okay that others have them,
precisely because we would never use them but they might? Maybe
but... Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (This thought is never lost in Asia,
by the way.)
Is it that U.S. military doctrine is clearly defensive and pacific
and trustworthy, unlike those of almost all present and would-be
nuclear powers? Well...many nations (like China) have a announced
nuclear-weapons policies that expressly prohibit nuclear use unless
in retaliation for a nuclear attack by another. Guess which
superpower has consistently refused to offer the world a no-first
use policy?
All of the above seems to me to add up to a totally satisfying
explanation of what China is up to. It is no more mysterious than
America's own military bulk-up. If we want others to build down
their forces, then we have to downsize ours as well so that we can
then righteously insist that others follow our lead.
