This is a good write up by an online forumer. Very interesting
read.
Before we look at how we can best use an AWCS, we'll have a
closer look at air defense systems in general. Contrary to much
mythology, AWACS birds are not some great, all conquering denizens
of air combat, they are just a way by which we can do some
necessary things very efficiently. This is a modified and updated
version of something I wrote about three years ago.
The backbone of an integrated air defense system is a series of
command centers. The lowest level of these are the Local Operations
Centers (LOC) which simply gather information from sensors assigned
to them and pass that up the tree. The LOCs also receive
instructions and issue orders to the defenses. LOCs are very often
mobile and in some cases built into the radar itself. Giraffe is
the most notable of the systems where the LOC is built into the
radar. Everybody outside IADS professionals laughed at Ericsson for
doing it that way then made themselves scarce when the Iraqi IADS
went down. The LOC can be compared to an infantry platoon fighting
is own private little war and not really knowing or caring whats
going on around it.
Next up the tree is the Sector Operations Center (SOC). This takes
the information from the LOCs, deconflicts it (this means assembing
all the LOC pictures, resolving any contradictions between them and
ensuring that multiple reports of the same contact are identified
as such) and adds in additional material such as safe routes for
own aircraft, secure operating zones, details of prohibited and
special-threat areas etc to construct a tactical picture of what is
actually happening in the sector in question. Note that a LOC
doesn't really know what is going on, it is reliant on the SOC
telling it what is happening and putting its data into context.
This is a very important thing to remember; the guys at the front
DON'T know what is happening; they only know what they can see and
thats usually very misleading. SOC is the tactical command of the
air battle. In Army terms it can be compared to a company or
battalion command.
One step higher is the Regional Operations Center or ROC. The ROC
takes the tactical picture assembled by the SOCs and adds yet more
data, of own operations, specific requirements, logistical
considerations etc. Usually it is at this level that information
from other services is added to the pool so that a rounded picture
can be obtained. The ROCs then issue instructions to the SOCs who
convert them into operational orders for the LOCs.Its also at ROC
level that assets are distributed, threats assessed and a general
overview of the picture kept. In a real sense, its the ROC that
actually has the best idea of what is happening. In a way, the ROC
is the operational command of the air battle. In Army equivalence,
it can be thought of as the Divisional command level.
Finally, at the top of the hill is the National Operations Center
or NOC. This takes all the information from the ROCs and assembles
a nation-wide picture of how the battle is going. Ideally, the role
of the NOC should be one of masterly inactivity, doing nothing but
watch, intervening only if there is a matter of overriding national
importance in question. This all sounds very clumsy but it isn't,
provided its computerized and works. If it isn't and/or doesn't
then the defense has problems. The NOC is the strategic command of
the air battle.
The eyes of the air defense system are mainly its radars. The
nomenclature we'll use here is the modern one wherein radar
frequency bands run from A to P increasing in frequency as we go
up. As a rule of thumb, the lower the frequency, the longer the
range but the less precise the contact. The higher frequencies give
us much more precise contacts but have shorter ranges and are much
more restricted in their search ability. As we go from A to P,
antennas get progressively smaller (P-band radars fit in the nose
of small missiles). This convention replaces the old L, S, C, X and
Ka/Ku band convention
The primary radars used are the long-range air surveillance radars
(sometimes these are called Volume Search Radars or VSRs). Up to
the late 1980s, these almost invariably operated in the E and F
bands since this offered the best compromise between range and
precision. Since the early 1990s, the D-band solution is becoming
more popular since modern processing has greatly improved precision
while D-band gives better coverage in bad weather and is more
difficult to jam. These days VSRs are mostly 3-D systems; the old
days saw two radars used for this role, a 2-D VSR and a seperate
height-finding radar. The VSRs provide long-range coverage
(typically 300 - 400 miles) but their use is tricky. Because their
range is so long, their coverage is actuially quite spotty; things
like mountains get in the way creating terrain shadows, the radars
can't look into valleys etc. This can be reduced by placing the
radar high up - eg on a mountain. the ultimate expression of that,
of course is to put the VSR on an aircraft. Another problem is
lobing. Although most artwork shows radar coverage as a symetrical
mushroom, this is far from the truth. In fact, coverage is a series
of layered lobes (rather like the cross section on a hamburger) and
its quite possible for an attacking aircraft to detect the null
areas between these lobes and fly through them.
Another problem is datarate, the number of strikes per second that
the radar gains on a given targe. For VSRs, this rate is low, often
as low as six paints per minute. This means the track can fall
behind what the target is trying to do. Yet another is
deployability. These radars are large and relatively immobile (even
the "mobile" ones can take a couple of hours to strike down ready
for moving). Moving these radars is not a good idea for a number of
reasons, one being that it makes deconfliction almost impossible.
Also, because of the terrain problems, the number of suitable sites
is limited. Even then, there will be areas that are completely
masked out by inconvenient mountains. These voids in coverage are
usually covered by so-called "gap filler" radars that are
positioned as needed and add their input to that of the primary
VSRs. The LOC gets all this data and tries to make common sense of
it before handing it up the chain. By the way really good air
defense systems have another level of radars that have ranges of
3,000 - 5,000 miles. These backscatter radars are so imprecise that
they are only able to warn the network that something is coming;
nevertheless, that limited role is very valuable, particularly in
missile defense.
Once the order has been given to engage a target tracked by the
VSRs, that target has to be located with enough accuracy to allow
it to be fired on. This is the role of the Target Aquisition Radar
or TAR. These days these are often called MFRs or multi-functional
radars since modern signals processing means they can do part of
the VSR and part of the fire control job as well as their own. The
TAR takes the imprecise track of the VSR and refines it with great
precision. TARs usually operate in the G and H bands and have data
rates of around 1 paint per second. The TARs report to the LOC but
their data does not usually go up the chain - their role is to
ensure that the target is being tracked and its the LOCs job to
ensure the TAR is tracking the right target. Once all that is done
we go to the final stage.
For this we drop to the last class of radar, the Fire Control
System or FCS. This is a high-frequency (normally I or J bands but
increasingly K band) radar that doesn't scan. Its pointed at the
target by the TAR and once contact is made, follow that contact
only. The FCS can feed the range, altitude course and velocity data
to anti-aircraft guns or steer missiles to targets or coach
fighters into the attack.
So now we come to weapons (note, right at the end of a prolonged
system). Some will be batteries of very long range missiles. these
strike at high-altitude targets, those just entering the defended
zone, those coming in along anticipated routes or just launched to
shake up the attackers. They have a lot of roles other than
shooting down aircraft; they break up carefully calculated
formations, force the attackers to burn fuel with evasive
manoeuvers, and add to the general air of gloom and despondancy.
Its quite possible that inexperienced pilots under this type of
attack will fly into the ground trying to evade missiles that are
actually of little threat to them. The long-range missiles will
have big warheads that can damage aircraft even if it doesnt kill
them. These big missiles can be equated to barrage fire from
artillery - the kill rate isn't high but thats not the point
(although against an unsophisticated or careless enemy these
long-range missiles can be devastating).
Intermediate range missiles basically provide area coverage against
intruders. These are the workhorses of the system; they are the
ones that brings specific aircraft under fire and attempt to stop
them penetrating the system. Remember (this is very important) the
function of the system is NOT to shoot down aircraft, its to make
the results they achieve not worth the effort made to achieve them.
An aircraft forced to abort is as much a success as one shot down;
each aircraft forced to divert its efforts to attacking the ADS is
as much a victory as one left burning in a field. This is a key
phrase and if you remember nothing else from this lesson, remember
these two words. Virtual Attrition. Each aircraft mission used to
penetrate the defense, each hardpoint used for fuel or ECM instead
of weapons, each aircraft flying tanker instead of strike, each
fighter escorting the strike aircraft or tankers instead of
dropping bombs is as much a loss to the attacker as if it had been
shot down. Virtual attrition is crucial, war winning stuff. Look at
it this way, if the IADS works well it will kill around 10 percent
of each attacking wave but if it forces each aircraft to divert one
of its four hardpoints to an ECM pod instead of a bomb, its
inflicted 25 percent casualties - without firing a shot.
In this world, numbers are key. The more missiles there are, the
more sustained the assault on the attacking aircraft and the
greater the variety of threats those aircraft have to face. Large
numbers of missiles also gives the air defense system the option of
putting batteries in non-optimum locations as nasty surprises. In
many ways, the Soviets had the right idea, it doesn't matter how
good the individual missiles are, the important thing is to
wallpaper the country with them. The fabulous Nike system worked
the same way; everything expensive was on the ground and reusable;
the missiles themselves were barely more complex than a child's toy
rocket.
Short range missiles basically defend key points. They defend the
air defense system itself plus provide last-ditch defenses around
airfields, SAM site and the various levels of OC.To some extent it
may appear their deployment represents a failure of the Air Defense
System since it implies that aircraft have actually penetrated the
main defenses but actually this is misleading. The presence of the
short-range missiles means that aircraft penetrating the net have
to reserve enough combat capability to hande the last line. This
can be the last straw. Its easy to imagine an attack aircraft
expending its defensive munitions penetrating the screen and having
to abort because its got nothing left (or has been too badly
damaged)to chance the point defenses.
Where do guns fit into this? Often dismissed as obsolete, they have
advantages all of their own. They and their ammunition are cheap.
They are not dependent on radars to work - if all else fails they
can spew bullets skywards and hope. They are simple to operate.
Their tracers scare the living daylights out of inbound pilots and
may distract that pilot from the less obvious threat of an inbound
missile.
The important thing is to see how interlinked and how
interdependent this system is. The long-range systems break up
attacks to give short-range system easier targets, Short range
systems protect long range ones. Ground-based defenses provide safe
havens over which airborne command posts can fly; the airborne
command posts provide coverage that can't be matched by
ground-based systems.
A curious thing about these systems is that, when they are subject
to systems analysis, it becomes obvious that dramatic improvements
in capabilities of one system component are virtually meaningless
unless matched throughout the system. On the other hand, small,
incremental improvements replicated throughout the air defense
system can have a dramatic effect on capability. This is
particularly true of communications - so much communicating goes on
that even a small increase in its efficiency significantly upgrades
the system as a whole. So there we have an Air Defense System. The
systems integrator dusts the consoles and hands the keys to the
national command authority and its up and running. And
waiting.
So where does the AWACS fit into all this? The problem with an IADS
is that it all has to work together. If it can be discombobulated
(that is, broken into its individual elements) it can be taken down
quite easily. The key is to knock out the SOCs and ROCs (the LOCs
are of no great concern and the NOC should only be attacked out of
undiluted sadism. On the first night of an air offensive, generals
have better things to do than shoot at eachother. But if we take
out the ROCs and SOCs the whole system falls apart. The LOCs can't
shoot because if they do, they could be downing their own planes,
and they don't know where the enemy comes from. Without the ROCs
and SOCs, the radars have no tactical picture to work from and will
be picked off by the bombers. Thats why such attacks on the
operating centers are called knocking the enemy's SOCs off. With
the radars going down the weapons don't know whats happening and
they get hit. With the weapons gone, the system can be penetrated
and the targets it protects destroyed. The problem is, next
morning, the ROCs and SOCs can't be set up again until the radars
are back on line; they can't be fixed until the missiles and guns
are back in operation to defend them and that won't happen until
the ROCS and SOCs tell them whats going on. Uhhh bad problem guys.
Next night the bombers come back and head for the NOC - which is
why the defending commanders have rippled their pants and taken to
the hills.
Now imagine that first night seen from the air through an ESM
system. We have the twinkling little lights of the defense system.
Suddenly they all start going out along some specific axes. This is
where the AWACS comes in. Its mobile so it can be deployed where
the threat is developing; its agile so it can't be bombed (note
that any competent attack will know exactly where every part of the
defense system on the ground is). It can be "got at" but it can
shelter in the unaffected parts of the system and fight the battle
over the downed section. It sends in fighters, relays
communications - now see how valauble the C4I built into Giraffe is
- it means the LOC can hook to an AWACS and keep fighting the
battle. The AWACS can track the attacking aircraft, determine which
are real threats, which are escorts, which are tankers. Its ESM can
pick out the enemy Wild Weasels and vector fighters in on them.
Again, its synergy. The ground air defense system protects the
AWACS by giving it sheltered areas to fly in; the AWACS protects
the IADS by fighting the attacks aimed at it.
There are two ways of doing AEWC. The first is to put everything in
into the AEWC aircraft. This includes the radar, the datalinks, the
data processing computers and the associated ESM and IFF equipment.
This makes the aircraft is completely independent so that it can be
redeployed as and when its owners wish . One deployed, possibly
many hundreds or thousands of miles from its base it can manage an
air battle all on own. The facilities built into the E-3 are the
reason why it costs so much. Its not the airframe; whether the
baseline is an old 707 or new 767 is not really significant. Nor is
it the radar; its the C4I built into aircraft. For American
purposes this approach is ideal because the US requires a
strategically deployable system
The other approach is to put radar on aircraft with a
special-purpose dedicated datalink to a ground station that
contains all the necessary facilities. This gives very cheap way of
getting an airborne radar. It also means we can use much smaller
aircraft with a small crew. Most birds of this type have three
perhaps four crewmembers. A side advantage is that the data
processing capability can be much better since it does not have the
weight or volume restrictions imposed by the aircraft. The problem
is that it is undeployable since the system configuration means
that aircraft must operate with an existing ground system.
The Russian A-50 is a superb example of the fact that offer the
Russians two ways to do something and they'll find another. The
A-50 has datalinks to Mig-31 fighters but also Mig-31 have
datalinks back. This means that the A-50 can take radar information
from fighters and add to own picture. It also means it is possible
to have a much greater area covered and to get the fighters to the
scene of the action. The A-50 can even fly the MiG-31 fighters from
its own
stations and can even fire the weapons from the MiGs. That means it
can deploy its fighters down the threat axis and then take radar
information from those fighters to extend radar coverage down that
threat axis. Imagine a circle changing to an ellipse as the
fighters move down the threat axis. Now imagine two of three such
combinations working together and merging their picture. Its not a
system the USAF wants or needs but its one the Russians find
greatly suited to their requirements. By the way, you may like to
think about F-14s partnering with E-2s the same way.
The large powerful flying radar part of an AWACS gets most of the
attention but the basic idea has been around for over 50 years. We
can expect to see some suggestions of its offensive use during that
time. The most prominent was the use of EC-121 Warning Stars over
Laos during the Vietnam War; there they monitored activity at
Vietnamese airfields and warned US crews operating over Vietnam of
developing threats. They could also vector air-to-air configured
aircraft in to intercept the defending fighters before they could
get to the air-to-ground configured aircraft. Earlier airborne
radar aircraft did much the same thing over Korea.
It's the other side of the equation that was really important; the
battle management capability. What that means is that an AWACS can
sit behind its own defensive screen and use its radar to monitor
hostile air activity deep into enemy territory. It can then use
that data to construct a tactical picture of whats going on. For
example hubs of air activity represent important enemy bases; an
"important base" on the map that lacks air activity may be a decoy.
Enemy air operations can be monitored and friendly interceptors
sent out to meet them. Friendly aircraft can be warned of threats
developing to them. The AWACS can also do resource allocation; for
example one outbound strike package (bombers and escorting
fighters) faces no threats but another is the focus of developing
air-to-air threats; so the AWACS can strip fighters from the one
and reassign them (or send reinforcements to) the other.
If AWACS is used the way its supposed to be used (that is as the
airborne complement to a ground air defense system), its a very
difficult target to take down. We're hitting our old friend virtual
attrition again; every aircraft diverted to taking down an AWACS is
one that isn't doing something else. One way is to use
ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles. The Soviets played with this
one with proposed air-to-airs that could reach out 400 kilometers.
One variant shown at Farnborough was passive radar homing. The
beauty of that was that (if it worked) it would force the AWACS to
shut down its radar. Thats working virtual attrition the other way,
force the AWACS to shut down its radar and its as good as shot down
even if it never gets scratched. Another way to threaten an AWACS
is to mount a co-ordinated attack preferably under the control of a
friendly AWACS. EW birds to jam the radar and the data-links,
fighters to engage the defensive fighters, other fighters to punch
through and go for the AWACS. Thats a lot of assets, virtual
attrition again.
And THAT is why AWACS is a stabilizing factor. It makes the air
defense system much harder to penetrate. In enhances the level of
both actual and virtual attrition to the point where the enemy
cannot penetrate the system. That means one-blow airstrikes of the
sort that took the Egyptian Air Force out in 1967 become almost
impossible. Since they are going to be hard and expensive, people
will think twice before doing them. That means they are less likely
to do them and (also) the guys on the other side of the defense
line are going to be less jumpy. Security and Stability are good,
they stops wars. The better the defenses the less likely the war.
And stopping wars is why defense forces exist.
