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Red Flag Exercises Prepare Units Prior to Combat Deployments
By William B. Scott
10/30/2005 08:08:06 PM
NEW THREATS, NEW TACTICS
"Actual combat wasn't as tough as Red Flag" is a comment from
veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that is music to Col. Dirk
Jordan's ears.
It validates a decades-old concept that the U.S. Air Force's highly
realistic, large-force Red Flag exercises are giving inexperienced
pilots the equivalent of their first 10 combat missions, greatly
improving their chances of survival in real-world situations.
As commander of the 414th Combat Training Sqdn., Jordan and his
staff design, script and run 2-5 Red Flag exercises a year. Each
runs four weeks, but is broken into two-week segments. Some units
can only stay for one segment, but most complete all four
weeks.
As new threats, weapon systems and tactics emerge, Jordan's team is
ensuring the exercises keep pace. "We need to look [exactly] like
what we and our joint and coalition partners see when we go to
war," the colonel says. "If we're not using all the assets here
that they'd use [in real combat], then we run the risk of becoming
irrelevant."
Red Flags grew from a realization that, during the Vietnam War,
kill ratios and weapon effectiveness were on a disturbing downhill
trend. By the mid-1970s, USAF aircrews were downing slightly less
than two enemy MiGs for each U.S. aircraft lost in combat, far
below the roughly 10:1 ratio achieved during the Korean War.
Numerous U.S. fighters and bombers also were lost to surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery fire. Furthermore, tons
of air-delivered weapons were missing their targets.
"We were dumping millions of pounds of bombs in the jungle, just
blowing up timber," Jordan says.
But Maj. Richard (Moody) Suter, an aggressive, visionary fighter
pilot kept asking: "Why? What's the problem? How do we fix it?"
USAF leaders eventually conceded that more realistic training was
needed. Red Flag exercises became the answer, and the 15,000-sq.
mi. Nellis range complex was the place.
Today, Jordan's staff designs Red Flag scenarios that reflect new
threats and changing air combat operations. For example, dynamic
targeting, quick-response attacks on time-sensitive or "fleeting"
targets, combat search-and-rescue missions and coordinating with
special operations teams are integrated into traditional
large-force exercises.
Although still infrequent, unmanned platforms such as Predator and
Global Hawk also are becoming highly valued participants. "We use
Predators at every opportunity, especially for time-sensitive
targeting. But the problem is, they're very highly tasked [with]
real-world combat, or used 14 hr. a day to train new operators,"
Jordan says.
Another significant upgrade is the integration of combined air and
space operations centers (CAOCs) into Red Flags, elevating the
tactical-level exercise to an operational level of war and
providing CAOC operators training they can't get elsewhere. "A
little over a year ago, we stood up our 505th Command-and-Control
Wing under the Air Warfare Center, and training is its sole
responsibility," says Col. Terry L. New, vice commander of the Air
Warfare Center (AWC). "We're now treating the CAOC as a weapon
system on its own, developing tactics, training and procedures--all
at the operational level."
Although all U.S. military services and numerous allies routinely
participate in Red Flags, a broader, more complex version of the
exercise was launched earlier this year. The first "Joint Red
Flag," sponsored by Joint Forces Command, was structured to meet
Pentagon criteria for joint training. It combined Red Flag's
traditional live flying of aircraft on Nellis ranges with virtual
and "constructive"--computer-generated--missions at myriad sites
across the U.S.
The cornerstone of modern Red Flag exercises is the Nellis Tactics
and Training Range (NTTR). This huge expanse of sparsely populated
desert and treeless mountains in central Nevada is considered "the
crown jewel of Air Force training ranges," Jordan says.
Significantly upgraded in recent years, "NTTR has all kinds of
advanced, high-fidelity threat emitters and simulators, with
120-150-mi. run-ins and the ability to drop live munitions." Manned
and unmanned simulated SAM sites replicate both single-digit
threats--SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 missiles--and a growing number of
modern double-digit SAMs. These are augmented by "red force," or
aggressor, aircraft that simulate contemporary Russian MiG fighters
(see p. 49).
Today's NTTR emulates an advanced integrated air defense system
(IADS), enhanced by a dense electronic warfare environment,
complete with communications jamming. That environment underscores
the value of secure, jam-resistant communications and data links
for sharing vital information.
"All the annoying things that will bite you on day one of combat
will bite you on day one of Red Flag," Jordan explains. "If you
can't get into the Have Quick [secure communications network] or
into Link 16 [datalink network], and if you don't fix the
[problems], you're going to get comm-jammed and it'll be painful.
If you're not up on the datalink, you don't get the surveillance
tracks and don't know where those MiGs are. Then, you're left
listening to the radio instead of looking at a picture--and getting
comm-jammed. It's a cascading [situation] then."
As many as 100 participating aircraft now carry Nellis Air Training
System (NATS) instrumentation pods that capture and transmit data
about position, altitude, speed, maneuvers and weapons employment.
Those data are invaluable during debriefings, because they enable
accurate assessments of engagements.
"In the last 25 years, I'd say we've come the furthest in our
debriefings," Jordan says. In the past, "whoever had the chalk last
won. Now, we have a very high-fidelity environment and the ability
to track more than 100 aircraft at the same time. We know exactly
where every airplane is at all times."
"The sophistication of our surface-to-air threats has improved
quite a bit, even compared to five or 10 years ago," New says. "And
the NATS instrumentation helps us adjudicate all the [post-flight]
claims." Missile-flyout timing, bomb-scoring systems, on-range
video cameras and target-maneuvering assessment tools remove
considerable doubt, enabling Red Flag and weapons experts to
quickly determine whether a player was shot down or a striker hit
its target.
A recent range upgrade is the creation of an urban-combat
environment that simulates what many pilots will encounter in Iraq.
"We're taking Conex sea containers, stacking them up, and painting
windows and doors on them. From the perspective of someone at
3,000-5,000 ft. and 300-400 kt., they look pretty realistic," New
says.
Simulated roads and waterways are painted on the desert floor.
Enemy tanks and terrorist vehicles that prowl the streets of those
mock cities are emulated by small, remote-control "dune buggies"
covered with a thin metal shell. Aided by an onboard GPS receiver,
a remote-control driver moves the vehicles through those streets,
challenging overhead Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
assets to find, track and hand off the target to an attacker.
Laser and infrared detectors in the "city" allow the scoring of
simulated laser-guided weapon deliveries against a building. "And
not just the building, but the second floor, second window from the
right," New adds. "We can score the [laser-guided] weapon's
effectiveness by detecting its laser spot." A smoke charge
triggered remotely lets the pilot know he has hit the intended
target.
A recent Red Flag F-16 pilot participant noted that the Nellis
range has a "big donut hole where Groom Lake is," which funnels
attacking blue forces into a relatively confined, predictable
channel in the northern areas. New counters that such airspace
constraints occur frequently in today's combat zones, so the Groom
Lake restricted area actually contributes to Red Flag's training
objectives. It demands aircrews pay close attention to their
location, even when dodging SAMs and fighting MiGs.
Range upgrades and constantly evolving training scenarios are
structured to focus Red Flags first and foremost on two objectives:
providing a new pilot--referred to as "Blue Four" because he
typically flies in the No. 4 wingman position--the equivalent
experience of 10 or so combat missions, and training young mission
commanders to plan complex strikes.
"A lot of things at Red Flag have changed over the years, but . . .
the focus is still on Blue Four," Jordan stresses. "On his first
mission, if [the young wingman] can get his gas from the tanker and
not lose sight of his element lead in the first 45 sec. of the
push, he's happy. And it's a real bonus if he can get all the way
to the target, have his switches set right and drop scorable bombs
near his target. If he can do all that, he's a hero."
Similarly, the mid-level-to-senior captain named as a Red Flag
mission commander is challenged with planning a mission involving
about 140 aircraft. He or she must meld a commander's intent,
priority targets, air refueling tankers, and always-limited air and
weapon assets into a plan that can be executed successfully. A
mission commander's job is to "make sure the greatest number of
priority targets are destroyed and the highest number of aircraft
survive the mission--and the commander's intent is achieved,"
Jordan says.
"We give them a limited amount of time to plan and not as many
escort assets as they'd like to have, then put them up against a
challenging simulated MiG and surface-to-air threat," he
adds.
To avoid demoralizing inexperienced aircrews, Red Flag's staff
follows a crawl, walk and run approach. "On day one of Red Flag,
nobody drops any real weapons," Jordan explains. "Around the third
day, they may start dropping inert [bombs], then full live drops in
the second week. Same with the MiG threat. Day one might simulate
MiG-29s with less-capable weapons, very vanilla tactics and no
electronic attacks. By the middle or end of the week, they get more
aggressive, simulating SU-27s with more-capable weapons. The next
week, they're flying SU-30 MKKs, and the surface-to-air threat also
cranks up, with more free play."
Each mission is carefully choreographed, but things inevitably go
wrong, requiring on-the-fly innovation. Those monitoring the battle
from a central facility watch a top-down view of colored icons
crawl across big screens and can spot subtleties that escape those
in the cockpits, who are confined to an insular world of SAMs,
MiGs, targets and swirling chaos. As a result, the real learning
takes place in a series of debrief- ings, capped by the "mass
debrief."
Held in an impressive auditorium at the Red Flag building, a mass
debriefing this Aviation Week & Space Technology editor
attended recently began at 8:30 p.m., long after the last aircraft
had landed. An accelerated computer replay of the mission,
displayed on the room's big screens, was accompanied by a running
commentary from Capt. Patrick (Newman) Small, a B-52 weapon systems
officer who served as the mission commander. Periodically, a flight
leader would call for the replay to halt, then provide a brief
verbal account of some noteworthy incident.
Overall, the mission was a mix of successes and frustrations.
Several foreign F-16s were unable to release their weapons. A B-1B
bomber "fell out," apparently for maintenance reasons, reducing the
number of targets hit to about 67% of the planned list. Several
F-16CJs were complimented for taking out SAM sites--but several of
the CJs were "hit" by high-probable-kill (high Pk) SAM shots. The
EA-6B Prowlers also won kudos for effective jamming.
At one point, a simulated MiG "aggressor," flying at low
altitude, slipped through a blockade of F-15 Eagles and immediately
went after an EA-6B in the blue force's "backfield." An alert
Singaporean F-16 pilot either spotted the simulated MiG or was
directed to intercept it by an AWACS controller, shooting down the
MiG and saving the high-value jammer aircraft.
Overall, the mission hit 94% of its main targets for an "excellent"
rating.
A chronic problem for Jordan's team is getting enough air refueling
tankers to support the 2-3 Red Flag exercises now being run each
year. Real-world combat operations are severely stretching the
aging U.S. tanker fleet, leaving few for even high-priority
training.
"If we don't get tankers, we have to go to the no-tanker plan, and
there's just no way to do things realistically," Jordan says. "If
we get the tanker support needed by the blue force, our training is
easily 10 times better. Without tankers, the training value drops
way off."
At some future date, Red Flags will incorporate unmanned combat air
vehicles and the USAF's newest air superiority fighter, the F/A-22
Raptor.
"As soon as they become IOC [initial operational capable], we'll
have F/A-22s mixed into Red Flags," New said. The first Raptors to
play will be those scheduled for an Air Expeditionary Force
rotation to a combat zone. "In some ways, the F/A-22 will change
the way we do warfare . . . not only enabling control of the air,
but control of the ground [war], too."