http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1644023,00.html
Martin Jacques is a visiting professor at Ritsumeikan University in
Kyoto, Japan
[email protected]
As China rises, so does Japanese nationalism
Japan is stuck in its past, and its refusal to come to terms with
it threatens to define its future and that of the whole of east
Asia
Martin Jacques
Thursday November 17, 2005
The Guardian
The past year might be described as the moment time of China's
rise. Of course its rise long predates these years, but this fact
has suddenly been recognised worldwide, well beyond the global
elite. It is now part of the popular common sense, not simply in
Europe but everywhere; indeed, Europe has been relatively tardy in
this process. The buzz surrounding Hu Jintao's visit is part of
this picture. The phenomenon is even evident in China itself, where
the past two years have seen a much wider awareness of both the
fact and implications of the country's rise. In the face of this
changed consciousness, it is inevitable that new stances will be
adopted and new policy positions struck around the world. This is
already happening in Japan, notwithstanding its typically
understated tone. Developments there can only be described as
ominous. While Europe still thinks of itself as somehow central to
the future, east Asia is where the future will be played out. It is
in that context that we should see the import of current trends in
Japan.
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When Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese prime minister, secured his
dramatic and overwhelming victory in September's general election,
its significance was generally interpreted as a victory for his
programme of privatisation and deregulation. This, however, is
secondary. Far more important to Japan's future is Koizumi's
implicit and incipient nationalism. This was demonstrated again on
October 17 with his latest visit to the Yasukuni shrine, where
class A war criminals are honoured, despite the opposition of China
and South Korea and the wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations in
China earlier this year.
Little is made too explicit in Japanese society, but the new cabinet, which Koizumi announced last week,
spoke volumes about both his intentions and likely future trends in
Japan. The two top positions, chief cabinet secretary and foreign
minister, were given to Shinzo Abe, the man most likely to succeed
Koizumi when his term finishes next September, and Taro Aso
respectively. Both are rightwing nationalists and both, like
Koizumi, are regular visitors to Yasukuni. This is the first time
that the three key positions in the cabinet have been occupied by
such figures. The previous cabinet secretary, who had opposed
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni, was dropped from the cabinet and the
former foreign minister, who did not visit Yasukuni, lost his
position.
One might think that this is to read too much into such visits to
the shrine. On the contrary, they are symbolic acts, an expression
of how Japan's past and future should be seen, and as such a
deliberate, if coded, signal to the Japanese. Nor are these visits
naive or innocent in the message they send to China and South
Korea. Koizumi may express the view that they do not give offence
to these countries but he knows that they do. And this, indeed, is
their very intention. The more these countries protest, the more
likely it is that Koizumi will continue to visit the shrine. He is
laying down a marker - for the Japanese and to the Chinese and
Koreans. Japan's future is already beginning to take
shape.
The causes of growing Japanese nationalism may be diverse, but they
are increasingly driven by one overwhelming factor: a fear of the
rise of China. That is the only way the behaviour of Koizumi and
the other leading lights in the Liberal Democratic party can be
understood. It could be different. China, widely credited with
having pulled Japan out of its long-running recession, represents
an enormous economic opportunity for Japan, and is already Japan's
largest trading partner. But far more powerful forces than mere
economics are at work. Ever since the Meiji restoration in 1868,
Japan has turned its back on Asia in general and China in
particular: its pattern of aggression from 1895 onwards and the
colonies that resulted were among the consequences.
To engage with China requires Japan to come to terms with its past,
and Koizumi's visits to the shrine represent a symbolic refusal to
do so. Japan is stuck in its past, and its past now threatens to
define its future and that of east Asia. Even during the postwar
period, when Japan dominated east Asia economically and China was
weak and self-absorbed, it never had an influence commensurate with
its economic strength. The reason was simple: its failure to atone
for its past and embrace a new kind of relationship with its
wronged and distrustful neighbours. If Japan could not do it then,
it is even less likely to do it in the face of a resurgent China
that is rapidly displacing it as the economic and political fulcrum
of east Asia.
The broader significance of the shift
within the cabinet, and the Liberal Democratic party more widely,
should not be underestimated. Japan remains a profoundly
hierarchical society. Apart from a brief few months a decade ago,
the Liberal Democrats have continuously held power more or less
since the war. This lies in a much longer tradition in which the
ruling elite has enjoyed an extraordinary continuity as the
determinant and arbiter of Japan's course. If anything, that
situation has been strengthened over the past decade with the
effective collapse of the Socialist party, once the second-largest
party, and the marginalisation of the Communist party; both
fiercely opposed Japanese nationalism.
The rise of Japanese nationalism should be seen alongside another
trend: the increasingly close links between Japan and the US.
Earlier this year Japan affirmed, for the first time, its
willingness to support the US in the event of a conflict over
Taiwan. It has also agreed to work with the US to develop and
finance a missile-defence system whose intention is clearly the
containment of China. It is not difficult to see the early signs of
a new cold war in east Asia, with Japan and the US on one side and
China on the other. It does not have to be like this. If Japan
grasped the nettle of its past and ushered in a new era in its
relationship with China, South Korea and the rest of the region, it
would surely play a major role in the evolution of the most
economically powerful region in the world. Instead it looks
increasingly likely that Japan will remain in splendid isolation
from its continent, weighed down by fear, suspicion and anxiety
that its neighbours, above all China, will seek to lord it over
Japan in the way that Japan did over them for over a century. Its
only solace will lie in looking across the Pacific to the US, which
is likely only to intensify its isolation. Japan faces an extremely
uncomfortable future.