x2
But Iwant to add something abt ground pressure.
Conventionally it is calculated by the weight of the vehicle / area
of surface contact to the ground(i.e area of the track/surface
contact ).
But in reality , the pressure is higher at the point where the road
wheels contact with the track, so the pressure is not evenly spread
across the length of the track.
Therefore, when a 50 tons AFV vs a 13tons AFVs of the same ground
pressure, it does not mean that both have same tactical mobility
due to same the ground pressure. It is likely the smaller AFVs wil
be less likely to be mired.
As for the experiences of Vietnam, MBTS was statistically less
mobile than the lighter and smaller APC as reported.
Narrow jungle tracks which are "created" by civillian jeeps and
logging trucks etc are still frequently found in SEA. Likewise the
bridges there might not be able to withstand a 50 tons
weight.
And there are plenty of rubber & palm tree plantations in MY ,
in which the trees are planted in such way to fully utilised the
land which are quite narrow for big MBTs to maneuver.
During WW2, the Brits thought the armour is useless in MY only for
paved road, but in reality, the Japs used light tanks in great
effect against the Brits.
Let me quote an articles abt it:
For the most part, the story of Japanese armored employment in the
Pacific
war was a dismal tale of small units employed in static or infantry
support roles. The Malayan campaign is the one instance in WWII
where the
Japanese used armor effectively in an exploitation role. The best
example
from this campaign occurred in the battle of the Slim River on
January 7th,
1942. Although overlooked by most U.S. Army students of armored
warfare,
it holds some important lessons in exploitation, improvisation, and
junior
leader initiative.
The British defeat in Malaya has been the subject of much
misconception, the
greatest being that it came about due to the superior jungle
fighting ability of
the Japanese. In fact, little fighting was done more than a few
kilometers from
trafficable roads.
The battle for Malaya was a battle for the maneuver corridors
through the Malayan mountains and jungle. These corridors were from
50 meters to several kilometers wide, and were cultivated with
rubber tree plantations
as well as other agriculture. Towns dotted the main roads and
railroads
that ran down the length of the corridors. Although certainly lush
with
vegetation, the corridors could not truly be classified as jungle.
Significantly,
the rubber plantations had numerous side roads that connected with
the main
road and allowed parallel trafficability.
The Scropion AFVs family started design in the 50s where one of
the critera was that it should be able to maneuver in a rubber
plantation in MY(MY was still a colony then), that is why they are
light and small.
