Motive behind misreading of book on SAF
by David Boey
BILATERAL ties between Singapore and Malaysia have gone through a
bad patch
lately, with verbal spats turning distinctly belligerent. Malaysian
Foreign
Minister Syed Hamid Albar said on Dec 31 last year: 'Singapore has
two choices:
If it refuses to compromise, go to war.'
Adding to the strain were reports in Malaysian newspapers that used
extracts
from a book by British academic Tim Huxley, titled Defending The
Lion City: The
Armed Forces Of Singapore, out of context.
Dr Huxley supervised my master's dissertation on Singapore's
defence policy
when I studied at the University of Hull in England several years
ago. The
preface of his contentious book cites a Singaporean journalist who
'contributed
substantially to my knowledge of the subject'.
I am the journalist mentioned. I will point out later how his book
has been
misread. But first, some comments on Singapore-Malaysia
political
brinkmanship.
A similarly tense period occurred in 1991 when Malaysia and
Indonesia staged
joint military manoeuvres, code-named Exercise Malindo Darsasa 3AB,
on
peninsular Malaysia from July to August. This was then the largest
military
exercise between Malaysia and Indonesia.
The highlight of the exercise involved dropping paratroops in
southern Johor,
just 18 km from Singapore's border. The airborne landing site was
just minutes
away by car from the Causeway.
From Singapore's perspective, the exercise was seen as a deliberate
ploy to
test how the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) would react to a
large-scale military
exercise on its doorstep.
And lest Singapore's defence planners missed the message, the
airdrop was
codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout'). It was also
executed with
unprecedented proximity to Singapore on Aug 9 - Singapore's
National Day.
MOBILISATION
SINGAPORE responded by launching an Open Mobilisation Exercise at
5.30 pm on
National Day eve. In those pre-Internet days, the exercise was
widely
publicised on Singapore's television and radio news on Aug 8 and
received Page
One treatment in local newspapers on Aug 9 - the day on which the
Pukul Habis
airdrop took place.
Fast forward to Sunday, Jan 26, 2003. The SAF conducts its second
Open Mobex
for 2003. This was barely a fortnight after the year's first Open
Mobex on Jan
11.
Since Singapore's first Open Mobex was held on July 8, 1985, there
have been
only two instances when Mindef held such exercises twice in the
same month - in
June 1987 and in May 1988.
The latest mobilisation was notable as it was held one day after
Foreign
Minister S. Jayakumar made his landmark parliamentary speech
on
Singapore-Malaysia relations.
The drill also coincided with Malaysia's apparent bid that same
weekend to hike
up military activity in Johor. After weeks of provocative talk, the
Malaysians
used a Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) career expo in Johor to display
some of the
MAF's firepower.
The SAF rarely mobilises troops on a Sunday. And when it accords
full media
coverage for the exercise, one can sense that Singapore's Ministry
of Defence
(Mindef) wants its deterrent message heard loud and clear.
The Open Mobex publicity, when augmented with moves to quietly
enhance the
SAF's defence readiness, represents a carefully-controlled,
measured approach
to warn outsiders of Singapore's readiness to deal with
military
contingencies.
Singapore cannot allow itself to be desensitised to bellicose talk
or hyped-up
military activity close to its border. If it chooses not to respond
to such
unneighbourly activity, Singapore risks sending a signal that
war-like remarks
will be tolerated - or worse, that the city-state has been cowed
into silence -
everytime the tone of language used breaches accepted behaviour
among erstwhile
friends.
Now back to Dr Huxley's contentious book.
The book is not new. It was published in early 2000 and has since
gone through
five print runs of 2,000 copies each. When it first hit the
bookshelves, it
attracted hardly any attention in the Malaysian media or academic
community.
Defence watchers should also note that the Johor scenario - that
the SAF would
invade Johor and defeat the MAF in a matter of hours - is not new
either. Dr
Huxley first published his thoughts on this scenario way back in
1991 in an
article in The Pacific Review titled 'Singapore and Malaysia: A
Precarious
Balance?'.
MISCHIEVOUS MOTIVE
IT'S fine to trawl up a two-year-old book to give a fresh spin to
articles on
Singapore-Malaysia defence relations. But when a critical point in
the analysis
is glossed over, one cannot help but start to doubt the motives of
the
writers.
That critical point concerns the SAF's strategy of
deterrence.
At no point in the book did Dr Huxley conclude that the SAF would
be used as an
occupation force in a war of conquest.
To suggest what the author has not intended, or to perceive
something that the
text clearly does not say, is mischievous and intellectually
dishonest.
If this is the way Malaysian commentators react to what I and
others think is
an impartial study on the SAF, then Singaporeans should brace
themselves for
more fiery, yet lop-sided diatribes when new additions like AH-64D
Apache
attack choppers, 155mm self-propelled heavy artillery and stealth
frigates are
added to the SAF's arsenal in due course.
In his book, Dr Huxley spells out the strategy of deterrence
clearly. He says:
'The key to understanding Singapore's strategy, though, is that the
SAF's clear
capability to inflict severe damage on Malaysia (by implication,
creating
serious political and economic repercussions for Singapore) is not
intended to
be used. The capability is a deterrent - a sort of regional
'doomsday machine'
intended to manipulate Singapore's regional threat environment by
forcing
neighbouring states to treat the city-state with a degree of
respect and
caution which might otherwise be absent.'
It is ironic that the kinship Singapore values with Malaysia, which
is perhaps
best underscored by the Malayan Tiger sharing pride of place with
the Singapore
Lion on Singapore's Coat of Arms, has been so taken for granted in
the frequent
games of political brinkmanship.
The writer is a Business Times correspondent. He contributed this
article to The
Straits Times
