Missile Market Overview 2003
Aviation Week & Space Technology
01/19/2004, page 173
Steven J. Zaloga
Teal Group Corp.
Precision-Guided Weapons Rule
The air campaign over Iraq in the spring of 2003 has again
highlighted the growing role of precision-guided munitions on the
contemporary battlefield. As a result, air-to-surface missiles
continue to be the most dynamic area of missile development.
THE STRIKE REVOLUTION
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition air forces delivered
29,199 munitions of which 31.6% were unguided "dumb" bombs and
68.3% were guided weapons. Guided bombs were the most numerous,
representing 57.6% of the total, and guided missiles, 10.6%. By way
of comparison, of the 23,614 munitions dropped during the NATO air
campaign in the Balkans in 1999, only 35% were guided, while during
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only 7.5% of the 227,000 munitions
employed were precision-guided. The predominant weapons in the
recent air campaign were laser guided bombs (29.5%) and Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs (22.4%). This suggests that the
scale of guided missile use has remained fairly constant in recent
air campaigns, but the importance of guided bombs has increased as
they continue to replace unguided "dumb" bombs. Guided bombs are a
significant combat multiplier since they reduce the number of
aircraft and aircraft sorties needed to destroy a target. For
example, during the 1991 air campaign, guided bombs constituted
only about 5% of the total bombs used, but they were credited with
about 50% of the targets hit.
The U.S. Air Force is attempting to continue this revolution with
the development of the GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB), a new
GPS/INS guided bomb (Global Positioning Satellite/Inertial
Navigation System). This is an evolution of the current JDAM, based
around a much smaller 250-lb. bomb, with greater standoff range due
to the use of pop-out wings. The idea behind the SDB is that it
allows a single aircraft to attack more targets since it can carry
many more of the SDB than other, heavier guided bombs. The SDB is
vital to the effectiveness of Stealth aircraft since their internal
bomb bays restrict their payload. This affects not only current
Stealth aircraft such as the B-2 bomber, but future designs such as
the F-35 JSF and strike derivatives of the F/A-22.
The conversion of unguided munitions into precision-attack weapons
is also affecting other traditional categories of weapons. The Army
is in the process of developing an inexpensive semi-active laser
guidance package for its widely used 70-mm. Hydra helicopter
rockets as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (Apkws).
Likewise, the widely used MLRS artillery rocket system is being
enhanced by a GPS/INS guided rocket, the Gmlrs. Army and Navy
artillery rounds are also mutating into smart munitions under the
Navy ERGM (extended-range guided munition) and Army Excalibur
programs.
An underlying reason for the proliferation of guided weapons has
been their steady drop in cost. JDAM and other GPS/INS guided
weapons have depended on the availability of low-cost civilian
technologies such as GPS receivers and small inertial measurement
units such as those used in automotive air-bag systems. Future
advances in precision bombs may also benefit from mass production
of advanced technologies in the civilian market. For example, the
development of low-cost, un-cooled imaging infrared night-vision
systems now being used on high-end automobiles could form the basis
for terminal guidance systems that could improve the accuracy of
future versions of the JDAM and SDB.
The development of GPS/INS weapons outside the U.S. has been
remarkably slow. France has finally funded their JDAM-analog, the
AASM (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire) which is due to enter service in
a few years. The slow pace of European development of these weapons
has led some of the more sophisticated air forces to turn to the
U.S. for technology. For example, the Royal Air Force has awarded
Raytheon a contract for Enhanced Paveway guided bombs, which are an
improved version of the existing laser-guided Paveway bombs, but
with an adjunct GPS/INS system. At the 2003 Moscow air show,
Russian companies suggested they had begun to develop GPS/INS
guided bombs, but they are not yet in service. At the Paris 2003
air show, Israeli firms also began to advertise guided weapons with
GPS/INS features.
Aside from low-cost guided bombs, there also has been a
considerable amount of activity in the area of high-cost
precision-attack missiles. The emphasis in these programs has been
to move away from older-generation weapons such as AGM-65 Maverick
where the strike aircraft had to be within visual range of the
target, to standoff missiles which allow the strike aircraft to
remain outside any air defense that may ring the target area. The
U.S. Air Force's key program, the AGM-158 JASSM, has run into
testing snags, which was not altogether surprising given its
unrealistically compressed development schedule. Should these
problems be ironed out, JASSM will emerge as a key ingredient in
U.S. strike weapons, since the air force also intends to deploy an
extended-range version as an alternative to the conventional air
launched cruise missile (Calcm). The Anglo-French Storm
Shadow/Scalp saw its combat debut over Iraq in 2003 with its use
from British Tornadoes. Germany recently has given the production
go-ahead to its analog missile, the Taurus.
Some areas of air-to-surface missile development have atrophied
lately. Anti-radar missile development has been slow, in part due
to the lack of a serious radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM)
threat in recent conflicts, and in part due to the vulnerability of
fixed radars to the new precision-guided bombs. The U.S. is
continuing to fund AGM-88 HARM upgrades such as its recent AARGM
(Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided-Missile) program, and this could
evolve into a new missile if combined with a high-speed ramjet
powerplant. In Europe, the Armiger anti-radar program has been
stalled, with just enough money to keep it alive but not enough for
it to prosper and reach production.
Another area of technology development for strike weapons is
high-speed propulsion systems, especially ramjets and scram-jets.
Interest has blossomed since the advent of real-time targeting from
space and UAVs, coupled to advances in information processing and
networks which makes the intelligence timely and available. Such
weapons are especially attractive for attacking time-sensitive
targets which might move between the time they are first identified
and the time it takes to prepare a missile strike. Proponents of
such hypersonic cruise missiles even have proposed an
intercontinental version able to strike targets anywhere around the
globe within a few hours of launch. Nevertheless, some of these
proposals seem a bit contrived since there is already a class of
hypersonic missiles available, namely ballistic. Part of the
problem of employing ballistic missiles to satisfy novel
requirements has been the lingering mindset of Cold War thinking
which links ballistic missiles to nuclear weapons delivery. A
second problem is the impact of Cold War treaties such as the INF
Treaty which puts constraints on U.S. Army deployment of
intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES
In recent years, one of the big trends in air-to-air missiles (AAM)
has been the advent of highly maneuverable, short-range,
off-boresight missiles pioneered by the Russian R-73 and the
Israeli Python 4. Several new types are now entering service, such
as the American AIM-9X, British Asraam, and German IRIS-T. While
these weapons are intended to replace the ubiquitous Sidewinder and
its European analogs, it is unlikely that they will be built on the
same scale. This is due to both their much higher cost because of
their more expensive seekers, and the rise of beyond-visual-range
(BVR) missiles such as Amraam. The revolution in air combat brought
about by battle-management aircraft such as the E-3 AWACS permits
the engagement of enemy fighters at longer ranges which would not
have been attempted in decades past due to the fratricide risk.
Combined with the advent of active radar seekers which do not
require the long-range illumination of an enemy aircraft by an
opposing fighter's radar, BVR combat is likely to become the
dominant style of air combat among high-technology air forces.
Sales of the AIM-120 Amraam have reflected this, with more than
7,000 on order by export clients in addition to those being
acquired by the U.S. armed services. European firms hope to break
into this market with the Meteor missile, now being developed to
arm the Eurofighter Typhoon. However, delays in starting the
program will force the Typhoon operators to acquire Amraam for the
early batches of fighters.
ANTI-SHIP MISSILES
Anti-ship missile development has been dormant since the end of the
Cold War and a resuscitation does not appear likely in the
short-term. This is largely due to the shift in focus of the major
navies from Cold War fleet actions on the high seas to the current
focus on littoral operations where ship-versus-ship actions are
less prominent. Harpoon and Exocet, both long-in-the-tooth, remain
the dominant weapons in the export market and have seen some modest
improvements over the past few years. One of the few areas of
active development has been on the lightweight end of the scale,
such as the Norwegian NSM (Nytt Sjomals Missil) program. NSM is
intended to replace lightweight missiles such as Penguin, Sea Skua
and AS.15TT which are fired from naval helicopters and small
combatants. Such missiles are well-suited for littoral operations,
and if successful, NSM could become a significant player in the
European and Middle East naval markets.
ANTI-TANK MISSILES
While the end of the Cold War took much of the steam out of
anti-tank guided-missile (ATGM) programs, the impact has not been
as profound as has been the case with anti-ship missiles. This is
in part due to the fact that anti-tank missiles continue to be used
in regional conflicts such as the war in Iraq, and due to the trend
to expand the role of such missiles from purely anti-tank missions
to a broader range of close-combat missions such as precision
attack of bunkers and other hard targets.
Recent international competitions have focused on lightweight
missiles for infantry defense. The two contenders in several of the
European contests have been the U.S. Javelin versus the Israeli
Spike. The Spike has won contracts with some of the smaller armies
such as Finland, the Netherlands and Poland due to its lower cost,
but Javelin racked up an important victory with its selection by
Britain in 2003.
Even though the Cold War has reduced the need for anti-tank
missiles, most armies will face a significant decline in their
arsenals over the next decade as missiles procured during the Cold
War become time-expired. Some of these missiles, especially the
simpler wire-guided types, are not viable candidates for upgrade
since the cost of replacing their solid-rocket motors and warheads
would be nearly as expensive as buying a new missile. The options
will be to revive the production of older missiles such as TOW, HOT
and Milan, develop improved derivatives, or opt for entirely new
missiles using more sophisticated guidance approaches than the
typical wire-guided Saclos (semi-active command-to-line-of-sight)
in use since the 1960s.
The U.S. Army has a broad range of new anti-armor missile programs
underway including a Hellfire replacement, the Joint Common
Missile; an EFOG-M replacement called Netfires or NLOS-LS (Non
line-of-sight launch system), and a Losat replacement called CKEM
(Compact kinetic-energy missile). Underlying the current Army
programs is the notion that future U.S. forces need to be as light
as possible to make them easier to deploy around the globe. As a
result, such forces are likely to be less survivable in
close-combat and so there is a premium on standoff weapons such as
these new missiles. The future of these programs is uncertain, and
the Army's current priorities are odd.
It is debatable whether the U.S. Army has a short-term need for a
Hellfire replacement considering that the last Longbow Hellfire
will not be manufactured for a couple of more years. In contrast,
the last TOW anti-tank missiles were funded in the early 1990s, and
there will be a major collapse in Army anti-tank missile inventory
later in this decade as those missiles become time-expired. Yet the
Army has no program underway to remedy this impending problem, and
instead is intending to replace the newer and more robust Hellfire.
NLOS-LS is a contrived scheme to supplant the failed EFOG-M
program. Like the EFOG-M, NLOS-LS is technologically attractive but
suffers from a weak tactical rationale. Its deep-strike mission is
essentially that of conventional artillery, and can be performed in
a more robust and versatile manner by improving the terminal
accuracy of conventional artillery using targeting from UAVs. The
Army has been distracted from this obvious solution by its
remarkably prolonged failure in tactical UAV development dating
back to the Aquila program of the late 1970s. Once the current RQ-7
Shadow enters service in significant numbers, the potential synergy
between UAVs and artillery will become more apparent.
CKEM is yet another attempt to develop a very-high-speed anti-tank
missile which uses kinetic kill instead of a shaped-charge warhead,
ostensibly to avoid the risk of an opponent developing a novel
armor or active protection system beyond those currently in the
field. While this may be a worthwhile insurance policy in case of
unexpected technical revolutions in tank protection, the slow pace
of tank development since the early 1990s undermines the rationale
for fielding such an expensive and awkward missile.
Europe is in a somewhat different predicament than the U.S. Army.
Both a new medium- and long-range ATGM were ready for production in
the 1990s under the multinational TriGAT (Third-Generation
Anti-Tank Missile) program. Cost escalation and declining
requirements prevented the programs from reaching the mass
production stage, and the programs are now in limbo. Rejuvenating
TriGAT will be difficult, but its expected arrival in the 1990s led
the Europeans to minimize modernization of the Milan and HOT
compared to the extensive U.S. Army modernization of the TOW. So as
European ATGM inventories go stale over the next few years, the
European armies will face tough decisions about the most
cost-effective solution.
AIR DEFENSE MISSILES
The largest single segment of the missile market has traditionally
been surface-to-air missiles (SAM). This market has been in the
doldrums since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of heavy
U.S. spending on missile defense. The worldwide slump in SAM sales
was in part due to extensive modernization of SAM systems in the
1980s and the longevity of these systems if periodic modernization
is undertaken. It should be recalled that many armies still employ
the HAWK system nearly four decades after it was first deployed,
and there is no reason to expect Patriot batteries will soon be
retired.
The sales of man-portable air defense systems (Manpads) has tapered
off due to market saturation after a decade of intense activity in
the 1990s. There have been few new large sales of the French
Mistral, which had led the market in the 1990s. Stinger continues
to gain more export clients due to its compact size compared with
many European counterparts such as Mistral and RBS.70 which are
actually crew-served weapons rather than true man-portable designs.
Manpads are one market where Russia continues to play a major role.
The latest Russian design is the upgraded Igla-S which was unveiled
at the Moscow air show in August 2003. By lightening the seeker
electronics, the warhead size has been doubled.
Many armies are beginning to look for replacements for the
medium-SAM systems such as the Rapier, Crotale and Roland. The most
common approach has been to look for higher performance at reduced
cost. A good example is Sweden's RBS-23 BAMSE which aims to provide
the protection of a high-altitude air defense system like HAWK at a
cost more similar to that of past medium-SAM systems. It
accomplishes this by using a new two-stage missile configuration
which provides better range than the more typical one-stage designs
of the 1980s. Russia is offering a very similar approach with its
Pantsir SAM, and Germany has begun to explore such a design with
its HFK demonstrator. Britain is beginning to explore its options
under its new GBAD program (Ground-Based Air Defense). The U.S.
Army has had a string of failures in this area from Mauler, through
U.S. Roland to U.S. ADATS. Now the Army is looking at adapting the
Amraam missile to the SAM role, mounted on a wheeled vehicle. It is
unclear how strong the commitment to this program will prove to be
considering that the U.S. Army has not faced a serious air threat
in half a century.
Naval SAM systems have continued to languish due to the slow pace
of ship construction. One of the bright spots has been the Enhanced
Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) which recently entered production and
which has a significant backlog of orders with the U.S. and several
European navies.
By far the largest amount of funding in the air defense field has
been the U.S. program for ballistic missile defense. The Bush
administration decision to abandon the ABM Treaty and to field a
limited national missile defense (NMD) will change the balance of
this effort due to the high funding demands of the new Alaskan
missile sites. The Missile Defense Agency had been funding a very
broad range of efforts including PAC-3, Meads, Thaad, and GBI to
cover the full spectrum of ballistic- and cruise-missile threats.
Some consolidation is likely since the funding for missile defense
is unlikely to expand enough to maintain the same level of heavy
research funding concurrent with a major procurement and deployment
effort. At some point, a more sober assessment may be made about
the ramshackle North Korean missile threat that could lead to
significant cuts in this very expensive program.
Meads continues to stagger along, based on the notion that Germany
and Italy will actually be able to scare up their share of the
funding from their increasingly emaciated defense budgets. In the
past year, the U.S. has moved to absorb Meads into the Patriot
program, suggesting that Meads may simply become PAC-3 packaged
with a lighter and more deployable fire control and launcher
complex.
Europe's SAM programs have been starved for funds and are badly
behind schedule. The Franco-Italian Aster medium-SAM program has
finally reached production in its naval form, equipping the new
French aircraft carrier Charles DeGaulle, and a few warships. This
missile system will probably have long legs as it has been selected
for the British Type 45 Daring destroyer program which could
eventually total a dozen ships. The fate of the land-based SAMP/T
for French and Italian armies is less clear, though France at the
moment is attempting to expand its role to include defense against
tactical ballistic missiles. Curiously enough, EADS showed a model
of a notional ground-based interceptor for a future European
missile defense system at the Paris 2003 air show. Given the puny
funding for missile defense in Europe to date, this seems like
wishful thinking.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
Strategic missile programs continue to sputter along around the
world. The U.S. Air Force is completing its extensive Minuteman
upgrade program, and the Navy's Trident D-5 continues in production
at a modest rate. France's M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) is continuing in development and in contrast to a number of
other French programs, appears to be close to schedule. Russia's
programs have suffered from very thin funding, with the Topol-M
being deployed at a glacial pace and the naval Bulava SLBM nowhere
to be seen.
In spite of considerable gnashing of teeth several years ago,
proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) has been very
slow. North Korea's ballistic missile development effort appears to
be moribund, even though it continues to try to export its cut-rate
Scud-copies. Iran has declared its Shahab-3 missile to be
operational, though without North Korean engines, the program would
be difficult or impossible. In the Asian subcontinent region, both
Pakistan and India have continued to test their own TBM.
WORLD FIVE-YEAR MISSILE FORECAST
VALUE OF UNITS
UNITS TO BE TO BE PRODUCEDÝ
YEAR PRODUCED (billions of 2004 U.S. dollars)
2004 20,076 6.30
2005 19,951 7.15
2006 18,241 7.80
2007 19,112 9.01
2008 20,054 9.17
ÝPertains to missiles only and does not include associated launch
hardware, radars, etc.
Source: Teal Group Corp.
