Singapore and the Revolution in Military
Affairs
Singapore's military capability is, by most measures, the most
advanced in Southeast Asia. The build-up of Singapore's armed
forces and its national defense industry, as well as local defense
R&D, reflects the determination of the People's Action Party
(PAP) government to ensure the city-state's survival in a
potentially hostile regional environment. However, these
developments would not have been possible if Singapore had not
possessed such a highly-developed economy and well-educated
population.
These advantages, reinforced by increasingly intense interaction
with the armed forces and defense industries of advanced industrial
countries, have allowed Singapore to make substantial strides
toward participation in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
since the 1990s. Singapore has fielded increasingly sophisticated
defense systems, particularly in the RMA-critical areas of
precision weapons, command, control, communications and
computer-processing (C4), and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR).
Integrated logistic support (ILS) is also well-developed. Though
the doctrinal and organisational innovation required to implement
the RMA is so far rather less well advanced, Singapore seems to
have made substantial progress towards establishing a relatively
low cost 'system of systems' which will far outclass the military
capabilities of other Southeast Asian states for at least the next
decade. And although Singapore's government has become increasingly
concerned over asymmetric threats, it is clearly determined to
maintain its emphasis on developing high-technology conventional
military capabilities.
SINGAPORE'S DEFENSE POSTURE
Geopolitical circumstances have forced Singapore's government to
take defense extremely seriously since the city-state separated
from Malaysia in acrimonious circumstances in 1965. Though the
government sees security holistically and has implemented a
strategy known as Total Defence, which provides for the wholesale
mobilisation of the population and national resources in time of
crisis or conflict, the military component of defense has always
loomed large. Despite Singapore's small size and population, by the
late 1990s its armed forces were probably the best-equipped,
best-trained and potentially most effective in Southeast Asia. The
government routinely devotes 25-30% of its total annual spending
(roughly 5% of GDP) to the armed forces. In 2001/2, Singapore's
defense spending amounts to US$4.5bn, by far the largest
national
defense effort in Southeast Asia.
The development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has
traditionally been based on the need to deter and, if deterrence
fails, to defend against threats posed by its much larger
neighbours to north and south, Malaysia and Indonesia. Secondarily,
Singapore's military capability has provided a firm basis for
security cooperation with friendly powers from outside the region.
Pre-eminent amongst these extra-regional associates is the United
States, which developed into a quasi-ally during the 1990s. But
Singapore has always based its defense on the potential necessity
of defending itself without direct outside help.
In developing their armed forces, Singapore's leaders have
increasingly stressed the importance of exploiting technology to
compensate for the city-state's lack of strategic depth and
shortage of professional military manpower. Though the Singapore
Armed Forces (SAF) can mobilise 350,000 personnel if necessary,
only 20,000 of these are regulars: the remainder are conscripts and
reservists. The SAF prizes its 'technological edge', which has
almost certainly provided it with conventional military advantages
over any likely adversaries in its immediate region. In part, this
technological edge has derived from purchases of advanced military
equipment from overseas suppliers (for example, F-16C/
D fighter/strike aircraft from the US during the 1990s) but it is
also a product of Singapore's highly capable defense industry and
defense R&D efforts.
Singapore's defense establishment clearly recognises the RMA's
significance. According to Defending Singapore in the 21 st Century
(DS21), MINDEF's most recent comprehensive defence policy statement
(issued in February 2000):
The revolution in military affairs will change the nature of
warfare. Superior numbers in platforms
will become less of an
advantage unless all these platforms can be integrated into a
unified, flexible and effective fighting system using advanced
information technologies. At the same time, the ever-increasing
reliance on information technology means that protecting
one's
own information systems and disrupting the enemy's will become a
major aspect of warfare
Placing the SAF's future development firmly in this new context,
DS21 promised that the SAF would 'exploit developments in the RMA,
such as the integration of information technology into weapon
systems' to achieve battlefield superiority. As for Singapore's
defence industry, 'the digital battlefield of the future and the
need for commercial technology in IT and communications will
influence the approach we take to ensure that we sustain a
technological edge'.
ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL ADVANTAGES
In attempting to participate in the RMA, MINDEF and the SAF have
been able to exploit important national advantages. Despite
occasional setbacks, Singapore has achieved outstanding economic
success since the 1960s. Rapid and sustained growth, deriving
largely from the government's relentless efforts to direct the
economy into higher value-added, more highly technological and more
capital- and knowledge-intensive activities, gave Singapore Asia's
highest and the world's fourth highest per capita GDP by
1997.
Though Singapore was affected by the region-wide recession that
began in 1997, it was not so badly hit as its neighbours: growth
recovered from 1.5% in 1998 to 5.4% in 1999 and 10.1% in 2000. In
2001, the weakness of US economic growth, world semiconductor sales
and other regional economies caused a collapse in manufacturing
exports, causing an economic contraction of 2%. This was the worst
recession since independence.
However, by early 2002 the economy appeared to be reviving strongly
and growth of 3-4% was expected for the year. Over the coming
decade, Singapore government economists predict annual growth in
the 4-6% range. Economic prosperity has underpinned high levels of
defence spending, which have in turn allowed the SAF to benefit
increasingly from high-technology equipment, modern infrastructure
and high-quality training facilities.
Singapore's sophisticated economy is increasingly based on the
types of activity needed to support a local version of the RMA. By
1998, Singapore was ranked as 'the world's fourth most
information-driven economy' (after the US, Sweden and Finland). The
telecommunications, IT and media industries were by the late 1990s
the most important area for new investment in the economy's service
sector. The government is pushing the economy increasingly towards
R&D and in October 2000 unveiled its National Science and
Technology Plan for 2001-5, under which it will invest US$4bn in
high technology R&D with the aim of transforming Singapore into
a 'knowledge-based economy' (KBE).
A highly-developed information technology (IT) and communications
sector will be key to the KBE.
Economic progress has both facilitated and necessitated dramatic
advances in Singaporeans' educational achievement. The education
system is now explicitly geared towards educating Singaporeans for
the KBE. The government's 1997 education blueprint, Thinking
Schools, Learning Nation, encompasses a key initiative aimed at
'developing critical and creative thinking skills in the young' and
a master plan for IT education, the latter aimed at training
teachers 'to bring IT into schools to prepare future generations
for the digital economy'.To help meet the government's target of
increasing Singapore's trained workforce in the IT and
communications sector from 100,000 in 2001 to 250,000 by 2010, the
Institute of Systems Science aims to train 15,000 students annually
by 2005.
In the mean time, information and communications technology already
plays an prominent part in the lives of most Singaporeans. For
example, under the first phase of the 'E-government action plan',
130 key public services are delivered electronically, and are
widely used. The government has also established a broadband
infrastructure that can be accessed by all schools and more than
99% of homes. Given that the majority of working-age Singaporean
men, and many women, are involved in the SAF as regular, reservist
or conscript personnel, this trend towards a better-educated
population, increasingly familiar with information and
communications technology, facilitates the SAF's absorption of the
technologically-sophisticated systems intrinsic to the RMA.
DEFENSE R&D
Singapore's strong orientation towards advanced technology is
reflected in the vital role played by defence engineers and defence
scientists from government agencies and the state-controlled
defence industry, as well as 'warfighters', in the Integrated
Defence Development process which guides the development of the
SAF.Though the republic's technological capacity is limited
compared with that of larger industrial states, local development
and upgrading of defense systems has provided access to military
capabilities not available to Singapore through off-the-self
purchase in the international market. In recent years MINDEF has
increased its R&D budget substantially, from approximately 1%
of defence spending in 1990 to 4% in 2000. In real terms, this
implied an increase from US$20m to US$160m. Working on the
principle that 'we cannot do everything ourselves',the republic's
defense R&D establishment and industry have made strenuous
efforts to acquire relevant technology through collaboration with
both international and local partners. Crucially, Singapores
defense decision-makers realise that leads in military technology
are ephemeral, and that defense R&D is a constant race to stay
ahead of the game.
MINDEF claims that local R&D has provided the SAF with silver
bullets advanced systems that might prove militarily decisive in
extreme conditions. But the essence of Singapore's RMA-relevant
defense technology effort focuses on acquiring, developing and
integrating information and communications technologies for command
and control with ISR systems and precision-guided weapons. The aim
is to allow SAF combat units to locate, target and destroy targets
more effectively in the context of round-the-clock combined arms
and joint-service operations. Developing and refining such a
capability will be key to the SAFs continuing regional military
superiority in the early twenty-first century.
The three 'key pillars' underpinning Singapore's ability to harness
technology for defense purposes, according to Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Defence Tony Tan, are the SAF's highly-educated
personnel, a 'versatile' local defense industry, and the Defence
Science and Technology Agency (DSTA).DSTA, a statutory body with a
staff of 2400 was established in April 2000 as the outcome of a
major restructuring within MINDEF aimed principally at
strengthening 'technology acquisition and management'.The Agency is
responsible for procuring equipment and services for the armed
forces, for developing their infrastructure, and for managing
defence R&D. DSTA's directorates of Air, Land and Navy Materiel
manage major equipment procurement; its Defence Information Systems
directorate handles C4I programs.DSTA collaborates extensively with
local and foreign industry on :
systems engineering and systems integration for new
equipment;
upgrading the performance and capability of existing
systems;
providing engineering support for selected weapon systems;
and
keeping abreast of relevant technology and advising the SAF on
how to exploit it.
In addition, DSTA - through its CSO Development Laboratory - is the
design authority for all MINDEF and SAF C4I systems' hardware and
software, as well as for simulation systems, employing more than
400 engineers in divisions specialising in advanced technology,
mission planning and wargaming, air, land, naval, joint,
communications, and dual-use (civil-military) systems. DSTA
engineers' work on C4I uses 'battle lab' modelling and computer
simulations to produce 'customised solutions' for Singapore's
requirements. The extremely active 'dual-use solutions' branch has
spearheaded the application of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware and software within MINDEF and the SAF. DSTA takes
exploitation of dual-use technology seriously to the extent of
funding small 'start-up' companies conducting research relevant to
SAF requirements. For example, with a view to improving battle
simulation, DSTA might fund companies creating computer game
software.
Fundamental defense R&D are mainly the responsibility of the
Defence Science Organisation (DSO) which, with more than 600
engineers and scientists, is Singapores largest R&D
organisation. DSO was originally concerned particularly with
electronic warfare, but its capabilities expanded considerably
during the 1980s and 90s.
In 1997 DSO was corporatised, becoming DSO National Laboratories, a
non-profit company affiliated with DSTA. This move was intended to
improve DSO's efficiency by introducing more flexible, less
bureaucratic commercial best practice in project management,
sub-contracting, technological alliances, intellectual property
protection and commercial ventures. In the personnel sphere, the
intention was to equip DSO better to attract and retain the
scientists and engineers who constitute its life-blood.
In practical terms, limited resources dictate that while attempting
to stay close to the leading edge in the basic
ttechnologies,Singapores defense R&D must target highly
specific technological niches, chosen in close consultation with
the SAF. These niches must offer substantial potential payoffs in
terms of enhanced operational capability, lie within DSOs
capabilities and be assessed as worthwhile to investigate
in-house for reasons of secrecy or because of the lack of
alternative sources of the technology in question. DSO conducts
R&D through 13 centres of excellence that work on areas of
particular interest to MINDEF and the SAF. Those of particular
relevance to the RMA Include :
Advanced electronics and signal processing
Decision support
Information systems security
Advanced systems (meaning guided systems)
Communication systems
Electronic warfare systems
Radar systems
Systems engineering
Unmanned systems
DSOs work on systems integration and software development has
contributed importantly to supporting the SAFs RMA aspirations.
Examples include the integration of radars, various types of
surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and fighter aircraft with command and
control elements into the air defence system during the 1980s, and
the integration and capability optimisation of new sensors and
weapons (such as Harpoon anti-ship missiles and Barak SAM) for
warships. R&D related to electronic warfare - which MINDEF has
specifically identified as a silver bullet - and to signals
intelligence systems and information warfare are also key to the
development of RMA capabilities. DSO has played a central role in
exploiting as well as generating dual-use technologies. In 1992,
it inaugurated a 'Technology Watch' programme with the aim of
identifying and monitoring key emerging technologies for
application in the SAF, including ideas from
technologically-advanced commercial sectors. DSO's corporatisation
in 1997 has facilitated cross-fertilisation of R&D with local
academic and research institutes, notably the National University
of Singapore (NUS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), the
Institutes of Systems Science, Information Technology and High
Performance Computing, as well as local companies,, helping to
expand further its exploitation of dual-use R&D.28 Dual-use
communications technology has been used in components and
subsystems for radar systems, and COTS components in the
DSO-developed Airborne Compute Engine, an ultra-fast military
computer. Dual-use technologies have also played a key part in
DSOs efforts to develop protection for the military communications
and computing infrastructure against information attack.
Though DSOs focus remains on defence-related R&D on behalf of
MINDEF and SAF, it can no longer be assumed that defence R&D
work will automatically be contracted to DSO.When DSO was
corporatised, MINDEF also established the Directorate of Research
and Development (now part of DSTA) as its R&D master planner
and buyer of R&D services for the ministry and the SAF - with
the option on drawing on sources outside DSO. A potentially
important new defence R&D source was established in September
2000 in the form of Temasek Laboratories, a collaborative research
venture between DSTA and NUS, specialising in electromagnetics and
aeronautics.
DSTA and DSO have drawn extensively on foreign technological
expertise in their R&D work, and are increasingly deeply
involved in collaborative projects in areas of mutual interest with
foreign counterparts, with the aim of maintaining the SAFs
technological lead. Much of this cooperation is highly-classified.
This applies particularly to Singapores defense R&D
cooperation with Israel, but it is known that this has included
work on electro-optics, training simulation, electronic warfare,
anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
During the 1990s, Singapore intensified its R&D collaboration
with national defense science establishments in several other
countries. Despite Washingtons concerns during the 1980s that
Singapore was a potentially untrustworthy end-user for
high-technology military and dual-use exports, US-Singapore
defence-technological cooperation has gathered pace in the new
context of an increasingly close overall bilateral security
relationship since the early 1990s. In 1999, Singapore joined the
'demonstration phase' of the US-UK Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
programme as a 'Level 3 participant, allowing access to
information regarding the programmes technological progress.Though
this status will not allow Singapore to influence the JSFs design,
and no decision has yet been made on continuing participation into
the development phase, it might lead to substantial industrial
cooperation and an order for the aircraft for Singapore's air
force.
Collaboration with Swedens Defence Research Establishment has also
been particularly close, and in 1997 Singapore and Sweden
established a Joint Technology Development Fund to finance joint
defense R&D projects.36 Singapore has also explored
possibilities for defense-technological collaboration with
Australia (a 1993 Agreement for Cooperation in Defence Science and
Technology led to joint projects in military communications),
France (leading to establishment in 1997 of a Joint Technology
Development Fund), South Africa, the United Kingdom and
Norway.
In 1999, MINDEF set up a Defence Technology Office in Paris to
coordinate Singapores defense technology cooperation with France
and other EU members.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
DSTA and DSO provide the crucial managerial and R&D
underpinnings for Singapore's procurement of RMA-linked defense
equipment. However, the role of the local defense industry, which
is dominated by government-linked companies belonging to the
Singapore Technologies (ST) group, has also been crucial.
Most of the ST companies were first established during the late
1960s and 1970s. Though the early focus was on producing
unsophisticated arms and on maintenance, by the 1990s the industry
had developed strengths in retrofitting and upgrading (particularly
of combat aircraft), and the design, development and production of
artillery, armoured vehicles and small and medium-sized naval
vessels. With DSTA as an intermediary, the industry has
collaborated widely with foreign defense companies, which have
facilitated its growing sophistication through Industrial
Cooperation Programs involving technology transfer, agreed in
connection with contracts for license production and
off-the-shelf purchases for the SAF. Singapores high-technology
industrial base, sophisticated and competent defense R&D
organisation, and well-educated workforce have enabled it to absorb
advanced defence-relevant technologies considerably more easily
than other Southeast Asian states. By the end of the 1980s,
Singapores defense industry had become the most substantial,
sophisticated and diverse in Southeast Asia.
In 1997, four core ST businesses - ST Aerospace, ST Automotive, ST
Shipbuilding & Engineering, and ST Electronic & Engineering
- were grouped under ST Engineering (ST Engg), a new
publicly-listed company. The aim was to create the critical mass
for a listed company which would be more attractive to investors
because of its size and smoother revenue stream, and which would
benefit from cross-fertilisation and rationalisation of R&D
operations. An additional subsidiary, ST Dynamics, was formed soon
afterwards to
specialise in the development, production and marketing of smart
and guided weapons, and unmanned systems, areas that all involve
close collaboration with Israeli industry.
In early 2000, ST Engg took control of ST's ammunition company,
Chartered Industries of Singapore, which was joined with ST
Automotive to form ST Kinetics, an integrated land systems arm. ST
Engg now deploys a 10,000-strong workforce and the groups sales
(60% of which were military) amounted to US$1.3bn in 2001. 39 The
government indirectly still holds more than 56% of the group's
shares. Although ST Engg has to compete against international
suppliers, in effect the group remains a favoured supplier to
MINDEF and the SAF because of the leeway given during the
procurement process to opt for local production or upgrading
programmes
Senior SAF officers frequently assume positions in ST Engg on
leaving active military service,helping to ensure that the local
defense industry remains closely attuned to the military's
requirements.
ST Engg activities which support the SAF fall into five main
categories. At the most basic level, ST Engg continues to provide
routine logistic support and depot-level maintenance. This support
role expanded during the 1990s as the SAF - motivated by personnel
shortages as well a desire for efficiency gains - commercialised
more of its service, support and logistic functions, to local
industry's benefit.
ST Engg also continues to supply an extensive range of munitions
for all branches of the SAF, and produces or assembles under
license a wide range of weapons systems and other equipment, from
Russian Igla manportable SAMs to French-designed frigates. In a
fourth category of activity, ST Engg companies have - in close
collaboration with DSTA and DSO - upgraded the operational
capabilities of many SAF weapon systems (such as A-4S strike
aircraft, AMX-13 light tanks, and Missile Gun Boats) since the
1980s.
Finally, in conjunction with DSTA and DSO, ST Engg companies have
developed and produced a range of new equipment for the SAF. It
would be erroneous to call most of these systems 'indigenous', as
they have often relied heavily on imported design expertise. Over
time, though, the systems produced have become increasingly
sophisticated, reflecting local industry's expanding confidence and
capabilities. As with the upgrade projects, close collaboration
with DSTA and DSO has characterised these programs, which have
included the SAR-21 rifle equipped with an integral laser-aiming
device and the Bionix infantry fighting vehicle.
Behind the scenes, ST Engg - and particularly ST Electronics - is
closely involved with DSTA and DSO in a range of highly-classified
C4 and ISR projects, usually only hinted at in official documents.
Other key areas of RMA-relevant research involve developing
computerised wargaming and simulation, information security
systems, and offensive information warfare capabilities.
ST Engg has recently been more open about some aspects of its
RMA-relevant R&D. For example, the company has revealed its
work on several UAV projects, including the Tailsitter ('smaller
than a golf bag') and the Sparrow, a 'palm-sized device'. At the
other end of the size range for UAVs, in conjunction with US
designer Burt Rutan, ST Engg and DSTA have drawn up plans since
1998 for a huge 'battle management' drone (approximately the size
of a Boeing 737 airliner), known as LALEE (Low-Altitude Long
Enduring Endurance).
At the tactical level, ST Electronics is working on the Futuristic
Soldier System (FSS), aimed at improving soldiers' situational
awareness, 'hitting power' and 'battlefield survivability', and
based on a suite of advanced sighting and aiming devices linked to
a backpack computer. In another project looking to the future land
battlefield, ST Engg is involved with a US company in developing a
system for the US Army's Future Combat System (FCS) requirement
using unmanned robotic land warfare systems. Together, these
projects promise to revolutionise the technology available to
Singapore's army.
THE SAF'S RMA-RELEVANT CAPABILITIES
Along with equipment procured in the international market, the
plethora of RMA-relevant projects undertaken by the local defense
R&D establishment and local industry have in many cases already
fed through into capabilities providing a technological basis for
Singapore's participation in the RMA.
Advanced weapons systems
Precision-guided weapon systems and their associated platforms have
become ever more prominent elements of the SAF's capabilities over
the last decade, increasingly providing the capability to hit
targets more accurately and at greater range. Key activities for
DSTA ST Engg have been - and continue to be - the integration of
guided weapons from diverse sources into the SAF's ships and
aircraft and the adaptation and improvement of these missiles'
performance. For this reason, access to software source codes is an
important consideration for MINDEF when it purchases defense
systems in the international market. US restrictions on the
transfer of such codes (for example, in connection with the
purchase of F-16C/Ds in 1993-4) has sometimes irked Singapore and
has undoubtedly stimulated research aimed at overcoming this
obstacle. Israel's willingness to supply Singapore with source
codes is one reason for its success in marketing defense systems to
the city-state.
The navy fields large numbers of US-supplied 90 km-range Harpoon
long-range anti-ship missiles on its corvettes and missile gun
boats in addition to the earlier, shorter-range Israeli-made
Gabriel weapons. By the end of the 1990s, the navy deployed a total
of 120 anti-ship missile launchers, the largest number of any
Southeast Asian navy. The new French-designed 'modified Lafayette'
class frigates, due to become operational from around 2005, will be
armed with the latest version of Harpoon missiles. Since 1993, the
navy has also armed most of its vessels with French Mistral/Simbad
air defence missile system. LSTs & Corvettes are equipped with
the Israeli-supplied Barak system, effective against anti-ship
missiles as well as aircraft. The Eurosam Aster15 air defence
system is likely to be ordered for the new frigates.
Since the late 1990s, Singapore's air force has dramatically
expanded its capabilities for air defence and for long-range
precision strike with the acquisition from the US of F-16C/D combat
aircraft By July 2001, no fewer than 62 of these aircraft had been
ordered, Eighteen are already in service in Singapore, while others
are based in the US for training on a long-term basis. Singapore's
Chief of Defence Force did not exaggerate when, in 1998, he claimed
that procurement of these aircraft marked a 'quantum leap' in the
Singapore's air capability.They are armed with AIM-7M air-to-air
missiles, providing a beyond-visual-range engagement capability
against hostile aircraft for the first time, and Israeli Python 4
missiles. Although the US government has allowed Singapore to
purchase the AIM-120C advanced medium-range air-to-air missile
(AMRAAM) for its F-16s, Washington requires - in order to help
prevent a regional arms race - that they are stored in the US and
will only be delivered to Singapore in a crisis.
In the strike role, the F-16C/Ds can - like earlier RSAF combat
aircraft - carry Maverick air-to-ground missiles (both the AGM-65E,
and the TV-guided AGM-65B for anti-ship strike), cluster bombs and
Paveway laser-guided bombs. However, the new F-16s were also
equipped with Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods, enabling
them to execute long-range precision strike missions and to
self-designate targets during day or night and in all weather
conditions. Singapore's F-16Ds are reported to have received
special modifications on the production line, involving the
installation of Israeli-supplied electronic countermeasures
equipment. This may indicate that these two-seat aircraft are
specially equipped for missions to suppress enemy air
defences.
The RSAF's older fast combat aircraft - the locally-upgraded F-5S
in the air defence role and the A-4SU for strike - are approaching
the end of their service life, and from 2006-7 will be replaced by
a new multi-role combat aircraft, of which up to 40-50 may be
purchased eventually. A competition is presently underway to choose
the new aircraft type, with the enhanced capability F-15N Super
Eagle, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the French-produced Rafale seen
as favorites. This procurement program, which will involve
substantial local industrial participation, is likely to lead to
further substantial enhancement of the Singapore air force's air
defense and long-range strike capabilities.
For example, BAE Systems - which is marketing the Eurofighter - is
offering Singapore an integrated package of systems virtually
identical to those which are being purchased by the UK's Royal Air
Force, including the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile,
ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-air missile), together with
Brimstone and Storm Shadow short-range attack and long-range cruise
missiles.
The army relies less than the SAF's other two branches on advanced
technology solutions. Nevertheless, MINDEF has focussed
considerable efforts on improving land forces' mobility and
firepower, particularly over the last decade. The most obvious
accretion of firepower has come from the expansion of the 155mm
artillery inventory, particularly with the locally-developed FH-88
and FH-2000 guns, more than 100 of which were in service by the
late 1990s. Future artillery equipment will include self-propelled
155mm guns and possibly also multiple rocket launch systems.
Anti-armour capabilities have benefited from the infantry's
adoption in 1990 of the two km-range Milan anti-tank missile, and
since the late 1990s the four km-range Israeli Rafael NT-S Spike, a
weapon described as a 'computer with a warhead' and which MINDEF
claims is effective even against explosive reactive armor.51 Since
the early 1990s, the air force has flown Fennec helicopters armed
with TOW-2A missiles in the anti-armor role. From mid-2002,
this helicopter anti-armor capability will be upgraded dramatically
with delivery of AH-64D Apaches equipped with highly sophisticated
Longbow fire control radars, allowing them to designate their own
targets for attack with the latest 'fire and forget' version of the
Hellfire laser-guided anti-tank missile.
C4 and ISR capabilities
Singapore's C4 and ISR capabilities are sophisticated and highly
integrated, and increasingly provide the means for the effective
operational coordination of the SAF's growing firepower. In 1991,
MINDEF requested proposals for a Singapore-wide command, control,
communications and intelligence network, based on microwave and
fibre-optic channels and including links to air and maritime
surveillance assets. During the early 1990s, a branch of DSTA
developed such a network, which is focussed on an underground Armed
Forces Command Post. According to MINDEF, a computerised command
and control system provides up-to-the-minute updates of the
battlefield situation, including the disposition of friendly and
hostile forces'.
The Air Force Systems Brigade provides a full picture of the air
situation, integrating data from ground-based radars and airborne
early warning and control aircraft, and is 'charged with the
'operational and tactical control of all airborne aircraft'.The
navys Coastal Command contributes a central sea surveillance
facility, using data from shore-based military and civilian radars,
ships at sea, maritime patrol aircraft and shore-based electronic
and signals intelligence.
MINDEF has invested heavily in cutting-edge IT for command and
control purposes. As early as 1990, Brigadier-General Lee Hsien
Loong, then second defence minister (services), claimed that IT
could potentially provide the SAF with a strategic edge over an
opponent. IT applications which he foresaw included computer-based
tools and staff aids to assist SAF commanders and staff officers in
operational planning and decision-making. COTS computer technology
has been widely exploited: for example, Minister for Defence Tony
Tan claimed in 1996 that Singapore was among the leaders in the
world in using [COTS] computers in real-time command and control
systems, notably in
integrating air defense sensors and weapons systems for the air
force's Air Defence Systems Division.
And, in the intelligence sphere, MINDEF's Joint Intelligence
Directorate collaborated closely during the 1990s with the Computer
Systems Organisation (now part of DSTA) to develop INSIGHT, a
system enabling 'efficient and effective means of information
gathering, processing, retrieval as well as timely dissemination'
in support of SAF operations.
New technology is also impacting on tactical command and control.
In the late 1990s the army introduced the battalion-level Artillery
Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) to compute and manage
firing data more accurately and rapidly. In May 2001, Chief of Navy
Rear-Admiral Lui Tuck Yew spoke of the 'quantum improvement of our
C4I networks', which combined with the use of muzzle velocity
radars for improving gun-firing accuracy had - he claimed - allowed
the navy 'to move into the new domain of network warfare relying on
precision strike and tactical force dominance'. Naval vessels have
incorporated increasingly sophisticated combat information centres,
with important elements developed by ST Electronics. The modified
Lafayette-class frigates, due to enter service from 2005, will be
equipped with a C4I suite integrating ship management, weapons
control and communications developed by ST Electronics and navy
under the Intelligent Naval Defence Platform 21 program.
One important dimension to Singapore's emerging C4 and ISR
capabilities is MINDEF's use of satellites for both communications
and surveillance purposes. The republics first communications
satellite was a joint project between Singapore Telecom (SingTel)
and Taiwans Chungwa Telecom, and was launched from French Guiana
in August 1998.
This satellite, ST-1, was built by the Anglo-French Matra-Marconi
company and is designed for both broadcasting and
telecommunications (including data, telephony and multimedia)
purposes, with its thirty transponders shared equally between
Singapore and Taiwan. Its footprint covers the whole of Asia.63
SingTel has been keen since the late 1990s to increase its
satellite access and in January 2001 announced that it would lease
15 transponders on Apstar V, a Chinese-owned but US-built satellite
due for launch in February 2003.
Another satellite program began in 1995 when NTU signed an
agreement with the UK's University of Surrey covering collaborative
research and training in satellite engineering, communications
satellites and low earth orbit technology. As a result, in April
1999 a jointly-designed 350-kg mini-satellite was launched from a
Russian space base in Kazakhstan and has subsequently passed over
Singapore every 90 minutes. It carries NTU-designed components in a
package referred to as the Merlion Communications Payload, which
has been used to research 'real-time mobile communications and
satellite linking of vehicles in GPS-based fleet
tracking/control'.
The next phase will involve X-SAT, a 100-kg micro-satellite
designed and built at NTU in partnership with DSO and scheduled for
launch by 2007. This will be the first of a planned equatorial
belt of Singaporean micro-satellites, ultimately providing
Singapore (and potentially other users located close to the
equator) with round-the-clock access to clearer and faster
satellite communications. DSO's involvement underlines the
project's military significance.
Satellites increasingly play an important role in intelligence
collection. Since 1995, the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and
Processing (CRISP) at NUS has routinely downloaded images from
European, French and Canadian satellites, including the French
Spot-4, launched in March 1998. CRISP's role in monitoring marine
pollution and forest fires in the region has received wide
publicity, but its defence intelligence role has not been
acknowledged officially. However, the 10-metre resolution of these
images is sufficient to generate militarily useful information on
the location of ships, armoured vehicles and aircraft.
Eventually, Singapore may rely to a large extent on its own
satellites for the collection of intelligence imagery. The
NTU-University of Surrey mini-satellite carries 10-metre resolution
cameras, which were reportedly returning spectacular imagery
within weeks of launch, and X-SAT will have a remote-sensing as
well as a communications role. However, a joint project with Israel
(which has reportedly already provided satellite imagery on a
commercial basis) may eventually provide Singapore with a
greatly-enhanced space-based surveillance capability. Under an
agreement signed in June 2000, Singapore will reportedly fund
further development of Israel's Ofeq series of satellites, advanced
versions of which will eventually be operated by MINDEF.
A key aspect of Singapore's effective information dominance over
its region is its ability to collect signals intelligence (SIGINT)
through systems land-based systems operated by army signals
battalions, as well as other systems are deployed on aircraft and
naval vessels. SingTel's radio receiving station at Yio Chu Kang
probably also contributes data to the overall SIGINT picture.70
According to Australian defense analyst Desmond Ball:
Some of Singapores SIGINT capabilities, especially the systems
acquired from Israel over the last decade but increasingly also
some designed and developed indigenously by [DTG] and Singapore
Technologies, are among the most advanced in the world. Overall, it
amounts to a sophisticated capability which provides Singapore with
strategic COMINT concerning its
neighbours (Malaysia and Indonesia); HF DF/ocean surveillance
information, including a very detailed picture of the maritime
traffic in the Straits and waters surrounding Singapore; a
comprehensive picture of the electronic order of battle (EOB) of
its neighbours; and the most advanced electronic Warfare (EW)
capability in Southeast Asia.
The air force's E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW) and
control aircraft also contribute significantly to Singapore's
intelligence picture and ability to manage the air and sea battle,
and provide over-the-horizon targeting for the navy's Harpoon
long-range anti-ship missiles. Though the E-2Cs have been upgraded
locally with a new mission control system,72 MINDEF is considering
how to maintain and enhance its airborne battle management
capability in the future. While the most obvious solution would be
to procure a radar-equipped small airliner or regional jet (such as
the Boeing 737 with Northrop Grumman's MESA radar, as purchased by
Australia), some in DSTA and ST Engg have proposed adopting a
distributed network employing the LALEE UAV as a
platform performing a range of C4 and ISR functions.73 Though
evidently still at an early developmental stage, LALEE might
ultimately carry not only AEW radar, but also sensors akin to those
used for battlefield monitoring and stand-off radar reconnaissance
by the US Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.
Integrated logistic support and maintenance
One of Singapore's great advantages in developing RMA-type
capabilities is the SAF'saccess to integrated logistic support and
maintenance, which are largely missing elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
Crucially, the philosophy of Life Cycle Maintenance (LCM) guides
the procurement process, with the intention of ensuring the
reliability and maintainability of the SAF's equipment, reducing
logistic support requirements and facilitating more effective use
of the procurement budget.74 DSTA's target is that LCM costs should
be no more than 60% of the initial purchase costs of any particular
procurement program.
The central role of local industry (essentially ST companies) in
providing logistic support for the SAF has increased substantially
over last decade, particularly as a result of the commercialisation
of non-combat support services, such as the army's General Supply
Base and Ordnance Supply Base, depot-level air force maintenance,
and parts of Naval Logistics Command. Comprehensive logistic and
maintenance support from the state-controlled local industry is
integral to the SAF's potential for sustained RMA-type operations
and provides a key strategic advantage over other regional
states.
ORGANISATIONAL AND DOCTRINAL ISSUES
It is clear that, in purely technological terms, Singapore is
acquiring many of the necessary prerequisites for participation in
the RMA. However, the extent to which MINDEF and the SAF are
implementing the doctrinal and organisational innovations necessary
to absorb these technologies into an effective 'system of systems'
remains open to question.
Even before discussion of the RMA became voguish, SAF 2000, a
planning blueprint adopted in 1988 as the result of a major force
structure review, brought significant changes to organisation and
doctrine, particularly in the army. Under Army 2000, a
single-service derivative of SAF 2000, army doctrine stressed
offensive combined arms operations and the conduct of a '24-hour
battle'. In organisational terms, the most important change under
Army 2000 was the introduction of genuine (as opposed to nominal)
combined arms divisions, each including an armored brigade as well
as two infantry brigades, even in peacetime.
Another innovation was the establishment of a light rapid
deployment division trained for air-mobile and amphibious
operations. In the mid-1990s, the organisational evolution went a
step further with the integration of reservist and active units
within the three combined arms divisions.SAF 2000 also brought much
greater emphasis on joint-service cooperation, and
established the Integrated Warfare concept as the basis for a
doctrinal framework which attempted to integrate and exploit
synergies in the three services' capabilities. Because of the SAF's
relative youth, small regular cadre and the lack of strong
single-service traditions, institutional obstacles to joint
operations are considerably less than in the case of
longer-established national armed forces. As a result of this new
emphasis on joint-service operations, in 1989 the air force
established a Tactical Support Wing, which became Tactical Air
Support Command (TASC) in 1991 with responsibility for planning,
coordinating and providing air support for the army and navy. One
key TASC activity is
operating UAVs in support of the army. The increasing emphasis on
joint-service cooperation was also clear in the establishment in
1995 of a tri-service officer training academy, the SAFTI Military
Institute. In addition, the Tri-Service Staff Course, which is
conducted six times a year for a total of up to 240 officers, is
aimed specifically at furthering the SAF's Integrated Warfare
capability.76 Joint-service exercises have been held routinely
since the 1990s.
MINDEF's commitment to exploiting new information and
communications technologies to give the SAF a 'strategic edge' in
the area of C4I was clear even in the late 1980s and early 1990s.77
In 1992, it was reported that the SAF planned operations based on a
'radio electronic combat' doctrine that integrated electronic
warfare with reconnaissance, physical disruption and deception.78
However, this doctrinal emphasis increased greatly under Army 21,
the planning blueprint which has guided the development of the
SAF's land component since April 1999. Army 21 was written in the
context of the RMA and emphasises the development of information
capabilities, deriving from the 'integration of command, control,
communications and sensor systems', sufficient to achieve 'dominant
battle-field awareness'.79
Senior MINDEF officials (from the defense minister downwards) and
ranking SAF commanders speak the language of the RMA with a high
degree of fluency, and evidently recognise the military component
of a broader problem with which Singapores leaders have been
grappling since the 1990s: how to encourage Singaporeans to be more
creative in order to retain and enhance the city-states
competitive advantages. A key problem in relation to the RMA is
that Singapore's military command and control have in the past
tended to be rigid and strictly hierarchical, with effective
authority concentrated at the higher levels of MINDEF and the SAF.
A reluctance to delegate authority to middle-level and junior
commanders has been characteristic. For example, air force squadron
commanders have hitherto been able to exercise little operational
initiative compared with their Australian or British counterparts.
The SAF's lack of organisational flexibility has been reinforced by
not only the political and administrative system, which has tended
not to reward individualism or creativity, but also by the local
cultural milieu in which respect for elders and seniors, and
considerations of 'face', have traditionally been central
features.
As in other areas of competition it is evident that, in the field
of defense, technological superiority alone is not sufficient for
Singapore to come out on top. New information and communications
technology has evidently stimulated much thinking within the SAF
about the need for new command and control doctrines and new forms
of military organisation. In 1999 the Singapore air force's Chief
of Staff, Brigadier-General Rocky Lim, pointed out that, by
providing rapid access to more information, the latest IT
applications increase the pressure for decision-making at lower
levels in the chain of command. According to Lim, this could
change your entire doctrine of air warfare.80
The influence of intensified interaction with Western armed forces,
which already practice more decentralised command and control, may
also push MINDEF and the SAF to delegate operational authority to
lower levels of command more effectively. This applies most
obviously in case of the air force's long-term training programmes
in the United States, Australia and France), but all three services
benefit from extensive interaction with Western forces that are
themselves going through fundamental doctrinal and organisational
change.
However, glimpses of internal debates within the armed forces which
are revealed in sources such as Pointer (the official SAF journal
aimed at commissioned officers) suggest some impatience amongst
younger middle-ranking officers for doctrinal and organisational
change which would lend greater substance to Singapore's incipient
RMA.
As early as 1992, one young army officer (the commander of a
semi-elite army Guards battalion) argued that the SAF could gain an
edge over opponents by adopting the German military philosophy of
Auftragstaktik, involving considerable decentralisation of command
and control, and greater expectations of initiative on the part of
lower-level commanders and even individual soldiers:
Our Asian heritage has unfortunately...put too much premium on the
value of face. We are exceedingly hierarchy-conscious to the
extent that constructive criticism is extremely rare from
bottom-up. It will take much time and deliberate effort to dispel
the fear of ... subordinates to speak up if they think their
superiors are in the wrong, and for the latter to accept
constructive criticism. Writing almost a decade later, a more
senior SAF staff officer returned to this theme, pointing to both
the German army's Auftragstaktik and the Israeli army's similarly
decentralised command system, both based heavily on the initiative
of commanders and soldiers, as examples to be followed in
implementing Army 21.
More recently, several Pointer articles have argued for major
organisational change within the SAF in response to technological
developments. The essence of these arguments is that the SAF should
adopt what one officer termed a 'flatter and more network-based
system'.83 More specifically, another officer has indicated that
Army 21 may just 'put new wine into old bottles', and argues in
favour of 'streamlined and flattened military organizations' which
will 'allow the SAF to compress the time needed for
battle-procedure and decision-making' while at the same time
reducing the vulnerability of the army to a pre-emptive enemy
attack. Following the examples of the US Army's Force XXI and the
French brigade-based army, he proposes that the Singapore army's
basic combined arms units should be organized around brigades
rather than divisions.
SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: HOW RELEVANT IS THE
RMA?
The great challenge for MINDEF and the SAF in the future will be to
exploit advanced technologies in ways which are relevant to their
requirements in light of the city-state's changing strategic
circumstances, while simultaneously developing appropriate and
effective military doctrines and organisational forms. Singapores
regional security environment has deteriorated significantly since
the economic recession of 1997-98 and there are few signs that the
city-state's strategic circumstances will improve in the
foreseeable future. Relations with Malaysia remain unstable and
unpredictable, being driven in large part by economic, social and
political developments there that are outside Singapore's control.
War between Singapore and Malaysia still remains a remote
possibility, but its prospect has entered the politicians' and
media commentators' discourse on bilateral relations during early
2002.
Malaysian defence procurement plans mimic the SAFs efforts to
develop RMA-style capabilities. The Malaysian armed forces
potential acquisition over the next decade of advanced weapons such
as multiple-launch rocket systems, long-range anti-tank missiles,
airborne laser target designators, and medium-range air defence
missiles, on top of the new air force and naval equipment already
purchased since the late 1990s, suggest that maintaining the SAFs
precious technological edge may become an increasingly expensive
business. However, taking into account Malaysias educational and
technological shortcomings, the lack of coherence in its
procurement strategy, and Singapores far superior
defense-industrial and R&D capabilities, there seems little
doubt that the SAF will be able to retain the upper hand for the
foreseeable future.
In these uncertain circumstances, Singapore's leaders - while never
pointing at any specific threats - have repeatedly emphasised the
continuing importance of the republic's military instrument as a
deterrent. The ability of Singapore's defense establishment to
continue developing and integrating the advanced information and
communications technologies extensively employed for command and
control with satellite and other surveillance systems (including
airborne early warning, maritime patrol and tactical reconnaissance
aircraft, UAVs, and ground-based radars), and with precision-guided
weapons, will be key to the SAFs continuing regional military
superiority. The aim will be to allow the SAF (particularly the air
force, navy and artillery) to locate, target and destroy targets
more effectively in the context of round-the-clock combined arms
and joint-service operations. At the same time, greater emphasis on
criteria of range and endurance in selecting major platforms
(principally ships, submarines and aircraft) will provide Singapore
with an artificial form of strategic depth by allowing the SAF to
fight at greater distance from home.
However, like their counterparts in other states attempting to
engage in the RMA, Singapores security planners have needed to
consider possible asymmetric counters to their probable
conventional military superiority. Social and political
developments in Indonesia pose a new type of security concern for
Singapore. Continuing social, economic and political instability,
together with intensifying secessionist and inter-communal conflict
around Indonesia's periphery, have raised the possibility of a
'complex emergency on Singapores doorstep involving a breakdown
in law and order, warlordism, communal conflict, piracy,
hostage-taking, unregulated population movements, famine, rampant
disease and environmental catastrophe. Though unlikely, it is
conceivable that the SAF could be drawn into diffuse, low-intensity
operations around the periphery of Indonesia (in the Riau Islands
to Singapore's south, for example) if the situation there
deteriorated significantly.
Other new challenges - from either governments or non-governmental
groups might include various combinations of bombings, the use of
weapons of mass destruction (particularly chemical or biological
agents) or information attacks, aimed primarily at Singapores
civilian population and national infrastructure as well as military
targets. Chemical contamination of Singapores water supply, for
example, could be a particular effective asymmetric weapon. Though
countering such asymmetric threats would largely be the
responsibility of 'Home Team' non-military agencies under the
Ministry of Home Affairs (principally the police and civil defense
force), MINDEF claims that the SAF has a range of capabilities
relevant to such contingencies (for example, the army's Special
Operations Force in the anti-terrorist role). According to Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Tony Tan, during 2000-01
MINDEF and the SAF, working with the 'Home Team', 'made good
progress' in developing 'concepts, frameworks and operational
plans' in relation to potential low-intensity conflict.85 The
September 11 attacks in the US and the Singapore authorities'
arrest in December 2001 of 15 members of a terrorist group
allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda in connection with a plot to attack
local targets have accentuated the city-state's concerns over
potential asymmetric threats. The main impact on Singapore's
security and defence planning was to reinforce the validity of the
long-established idea of Total Defence, which involves non-military
agencies as well as MINDEF and the SAF in ensuring Singapore's
security.86 In November 2001, the government announced that it
would implement a 'homeland security' strategy involving closer
cooperation between MINDEF and the home affairs ministry, and the
SAF and police.
By January 2002, a National Security Secretariat had been set up to
oversee this cooperation against 'non-conventional threats and new
security challenges', and the government emphasised that it would
need to allocate greater resources to the SAF, police and civil
defense force to help them counter new threats.88
Particularly in light of recent events, it is clear that
Singapore's developing RMA-type capabilities do not provide a
panacea for its security needs. However, they are not necessarily
irrelevant to low-intensity concerns. For example, the
greatly-improved ISR capabilities likely to be generated by
Singapore's investment in UAVs and satellites will be highly
relevant to the monitoring of population and shipping movements to
the south.
Moreover, technological improvements in the capability of ordinary
infantry soldiers, ranging from the SAR-21 rifle to the Future
Soldier System, have a wider utility than simply on a
high-intensity battlefield against a conventional enemy.
Information security systems may be as useful in protecting
'critical national infrastructure' (such as public utilities and
air traffic control) against 'cyber-terrorism' as they are in
defending military C4I systems against attacks by opposing armed
forces.
CONCLUSION
Singapore's resources for defense R&D and even for military
procurement are slim compared with those available to the major
Western military powers. To put Singapore's defense budget in
perspective: in 2001/2, in approximate terms it amounts to less
than 2% of the United States', 10% of Japan's, or 25% of Taiwan's
military spending. Moreover, even the United States' close military
allies in Europe, such as the United Kingdom (which spends more
than seven times as much as Singapore on defense) face considerable
difficulties in keeping up with US technological advances and
ensuring inter-operability. Realistically, in relation to the major
RMA players, Singapore's incipient advanced
technology military capabilities might best be described as 'RMA
lite'.However, Singapore is not expanding the SAF's technological
capacity primarily with a view to participating in US-led coalition
warfare. Interconnectivity with US forces may be a welcome
spin-off, but MINDEF's principal aim is to develop forces that in
the last resort can defend Singapore against regional threats
autonomously.
For less than US$5bn annually, MINDEF and the SAF provide Singapore
with a remarkable range of military capabilities. In Singapore's
immediate regional context, these capabilities presently far
outclass those of any potential opponent in conventional military
terms. Singapore possesses highly educated and IT-literate
military, research and industrial personnel, and its
defence-industrial and R&D establishment has set up an
extensive network of international links. For these reasons, it can
almost certainly sustain its conventional military advantage for at
least the next decade. Indeed, if Singapore develops military
doctrine and organisation which allow the SAF to exploit its C4,
ISR and firepower to the full, it may be able to assure continued
military superiority in Southeast Asia even if potential regional
adversaries (notably Malaysia) are eventually able to catch up in
technological terms.
