Hi All,
Happy reading...
An extract written by Ralph Omholt.
Despite our rapid defeat of the Iraqi army last spring, one clear
lesson that has emerged from both
the combat and occupation phases of the war is that the entire
concept of helicopter operations in
battle is undermined by their extreme vulnerability to ground
fire.
Unlike our experience in the jungles and wooded mountains of
Vietnam, the helicopter is a prime and
easy target in desert and urban warfare environments such as we
have seen in Somalia, and are still
seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The combat record of the helicopter in Vietnam was different from
subsequent battlefields. That was
true by virtue of the limitations of the Viet Cong-NVA firing
accuracy, the limitations of their
weaponry - including quantity - and the visual limitations of the
jungle or forests which served to
protect the helicopters flying overhead.
It was also true that the UH-1 Huey was a simple and tough
helicopter, easily repaired. The
application of the helicopter was uniquely successful in a unique
environment. And, their relatively
low cost ensured that quantity was rarely a factor.
The harsh reality is that today the helicopter is a terrible choice
of troop transport or firepower
against any competent or well-equipped force - of any size.
Whether in Mogadishu 10 years ago or Iraq today, the helicopter
equation has changed for the worse.
Typically, the adversary's ground arms are more available. And
whether by luck or skill, the
effectiveness of enemy ordnance is far greater than that
experienced in Vietnam.
While the details remain unclear eight months after the fact, the
only major battle in the Iraq war
centered on U.S. attack helicopters ended in mission failure. The
raid involved 40 AH-64D Apache
Longbow helicopters that attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units
south of Baghdad on March 24. One was
shot down (the two crewmen taken prisoner) and 30 returned to base
having sustained severe damage.
The Washington Post subsequently reported:
"In attacking a formation of about 40 Apache Longbows on Monday,
the Iraqis staged a classic
helicopter ambush first perfected by the North Vietnamese in the
1960s. As the lethal, tank-killing
aircraft approached on a mission to destroy the Medina Division's
dispersed armor, troops dispersed
throughout a palm-lined residential area and opened fire with
antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled
grenades and a wall of fire from rifles and other small arms. ...
"The Iraqi fire was so intense that
the Apaches had to break off their mission and return to
base."
The results of that failed mission strongly suggest that the modern
helicopter is a battlefield
liability, versus such close air support aircraft as the
A-10.
The Iraqis in 2003 seemed to have adapted a lesson from the Afghani
resistance that fought the
Soviets more than 20 years ago and was repeated over Mogadishu in
1993: The art of downing a
helicopter is a well-known methodology - lure and destroy.
Of particular concern to the helicopter pilot today is the
time-tested Rocket Propelled Grenade
(RPG). They are cheap and effective weapons. "Close" counts with
RPGs, given their 4.2-second
time-fuse and associated 900-meter burst-range (lacking physical
contact), ensures that a volley of
RPG firings will be effective against the frailty of a helicopter's
main or tail rotor.
Second, the electronic frailty of the modern helicopter leaves an
exposed Achilles heel. Packed with
"black box" components, wire bundles and sensors, the modern
helicopter is at a terrible disadvantage
against a machine gun or even an ordinary rifleman's bullet. Beyond
the combat scene, the maintenance
factor for modern UH-60 or AH-64 helicopters is also a major
challenge, compared with the Huey or
CH-47 Chinook from the Vietnam era. Given the limited numbers of
helicopters, ground time is the
greatest expense and also a liability.
A third element of weakness involves the matter of budgetary limits
on basic airmanship and training
flights. Time and again, the events surrounding the helicopter
accidents and combat losses show a
distinct pattern of inadequate training in basic flying skills,
judgment and tactics. Whether a
high-altitude accident or a midair collision, certain truths stand
out. There should be no doubt that
part of this problem stems from unrealistic expectations by mission
planners.
The modern helicopter pilot finds more demand on his/her data
management skills than airmanship. The
dollar expense of "blade time" additionally detracts from the skill
of the pilots, through
non-currency and total experience in actual flight.
Unfortunately, in a combat zone, the smart pilot must deviate from
the "standardization" of the
infamous "classroom solution," even as it pertains to safety.
Landing into the wind is suicide if an
enemy gunner is awaiting just that arrival. Since there are
multiple forms of combat scenarios, a
simple set of tactics is impossible to devise.
Still, there are a number of tactics that can help protect
helicopters from enemy ground forces:
Alter any takeoff and landing directions from known or predictable
helipads.
Never fly a predictable or constant schedule, route, course,
altitude, "race-track" or other any
other identifiable or easily predictable flight path. That includes
constant hovering positions,
including "nap-of-the-earth" flight.
Never follow a predictable altitude or route, including rivers,
canyons, streets or roads, for any
length of time.
Evade any population centers, such as a town or village.
If these rules must be compromised, arrange for effective fighter
cover and rescue capability.
In multi-ship missions, allow at least 500 meters between aircraft,
so as to allow all aircraft room
to maneuver without risking collision or restriction of defensive
gunnery. That includes the basic
airmanship of always turning, so as to view a clear spot, whether
climbing, descending or staying
level.
Vary any insertion or extraction tactics as well as those of
support aircraft and their stand-off
defensive coverage.
Be aware that helicopters have no significant surprise element,
given their speed and noise. Thus,
pilots must be aware that going into an unprepared LZ is extremely
dangerous. This is especially true
if the LZ presents itself as a predictable insertion point,
particularly if a "pathfinder" is not
used. One landmine can destroy a helicopter and its mission.
Be certain during night operations that a minimum of light from the
ground - as simple as a
trash-fire barrel - will illuminate the rotor blades, marking the
helicopter as an easy target.
Never fly a mission without overwhelming firepower in immediate
reserve, whether artillery or air
cover. That includes rescue capability.
In light of the above helicopter limitations, the U.S. military is
proceeding to repeat the current
crisis by fielding the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Many news
reports over the past five years
have cited the aircraft as unsafe in any environment. The FAA won't
certify its use for civilians,
yet the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command are
preparing to entrust the fate of
America's finest combat troops to an aircraft that begs of
disaster.
A schedule of design changes and flight tests have supposedly
ironed out some of the MV-22's
problems. However, critics who study the flight history of the
Osprey cannot shake a deep suspicion
that its basic flight parameters will prove fatal on the modern
battlefield. Just one identified
limit, the Osprey's maximum descent rate, is so slow as to leave it
a sitting duck for any amount of
rifle fire alone.
Beyond the risk of life, the MV-22 also comes with an increasingly
exorbitant starting price tag -
$68 million apiece - independent of such factors as combat
maintenance and repair. Worse, its
marginal suitability compromises any mission effectiveness.
The final issue regarding helicopters on the battlefield comes down
to an unpleasant premise. The
United States may not always be conducting war with a third-world
country. It is clear that any
competent army armed with sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry or
aviation assets, will quickly drive
our fleet of attack and reconnaissance helicopters from the sky,
rendering them to a marginal role as
a vehicle used for air evacuation and mop-up operations.
It remains to be seen whether senior U.S. military leaders have the
awareness and moral courage to
recognize how endangered military helicopters have become.
Regards,