OPENING REMARKS BY MINISTER FOR
DEFENCE, RADM (NS) TEO CHEE HEAN, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON
TRAINING DEATHS
Good morning. Thank you for coming to MINDEF. Last month, I made a
statement in Parliament about the deaths of three SAF servicemen
during 3 unrelated training incidents. I informed Parliament that
MINDEF had convened independent inquiries into these cases. These
inquiries have since been completed, and I would like to give you
an update on the findings of these inquiries. The SAF will also
give you an update on the steps they have taken.
First, the case of 2SG Rajagopal Thirukumaran. He was a regular
serviceman who collapsed on 3 September after completing a 5km run
in the Ranger course selection test. The Higher Board of Inquiry
submitted its report on 16 October. It found no evidence of foul
play or negligence that may have contributed to 2SG Thirukumarans
death.
Second, the case of Recruit Andrew Chew Heng Huat. Recruit Chew was
30 metres short of completing his 2.4km run in the IPPT
categorisation when he collapsed and died on 23 September. The
Commission of Inquiry submitted its findings on 10 November. The
COI found no indication of foul play, nor evidence of negligence or
non-compliance that could have contributed to Recruit Andrew Chews
death.
On the cause of death of 2SG Thirukumaran and Recruit Andrew Chew:
after thorough post-mortem examinations including toxicology
studies, the forensic pathologist of the Health Sciences Authority
(or HSA) found that there was no evidence of any traumatic cause or
any unnatural cause that could have resulted from heavy physical
exertion, such as heat stroke, that could have led to their deaths.
The pathologist has also ruled out infective causes, such as
myocarditis (which is a viral infection of the heart muscle).
The forensic pathologists opinion is that the most probable cause
of death for both 2SG Thirukumaran and Recruit Chew was the onset
of a sudden cardiac arrythmia. What this means is that the heart
began to beat irregularly and therefore could not effectively
sustain the supply of oxygen to vital organs such as the brain,
kidney and heart.
The HSA is now conducting further studies to conclusively determine
whether there were any underlying medical reasons for the sudden
cardiac arrythmia which resulted in the deaths of 2SG Thirukumaran
and Recruit Chew. The forensic pathologists final reports on the
cause of deaths will be submitted to the State Coroner who will
consider the reports and other relevant circumstances and facts.
The State Coroner will hold the Coroners Inquiry as soon as the
reports and investigations are completed. This is a matter now for
the State Coroner to decide.
The third case is that of 2SG Hu Enhuai. He died on 21 August
during a Combat Survival Training (CST) course. I had informed
Parliament on 16 October that an initial Higher Board of Inquiry
and Commission of Inquiry found that 2SG Hus death from asphyxia
and near drowning followed from non-compliance with the approved
lesson plans during the conduct of the water treatment phase of the
CST course. I told Parliament then that MINDEF would convene a
second Higher Board of Inquiry to ascertain when the unauthorised
water treatment started in the conduct of the CST course and how
such a practice was allowed to creep into the lesson. The HBOI
submitted its report on 6 November.
The HBOI found that water treatment, as
specified in the lesson plan, had been part of the CST since the
course was first conducted in 1993. Generally, from 1993 to 1997
the water treatment was carried out according to the lesson plan.
This involved dousing the trainees with cold water, with the intent
of showering them.
However, the HBOI found that, in some CST courses in 1998 and 1999
and regularly from 2000 onwards, the CST trainees had their heads
placed under a running tap and their faces submerged in a washing
bay which contained about 7 to 10 cm of water. From the 78th Course
in April 2003, the trainees heads were submerged in a tub which
held about half a metre to one metre of water. These practices are
not approved and not in accordance to the lesson
plans.
The HBOI found that individual instructors conducting this training
failed to refer to the approved lesson plan although they should
have done so. New instructors also did not refer to the CST lesson
plan. The preparation for the new instructors and those newly
appointed to supervise and conduct a CST course, consisted mainly
of observing the conduct of a previous course. Since new personnel
were trained to conduct the course by being shown how the CST was
conducted, these new personnel would subsequently use the methods
shown to them when they ran their courses. Since instructors did
not refer to the approved lesson plans, unauthorised methods of
water treatment that had been used in a prior course could be
perpetuated in subsequent courses.
The lesson plan was last reviewed in January 2001, by the School of
Commandos. However, this variance in practice from the approved
lesson plan was not detected.
Independent investigations by the CID and by the State Coroner into
the death of 2SG Hu are in progress. The law will have to take its
course. In the meantime, as I informed Parliament, we have
suspended all the instructors directly involved in using the
unauthorised method of training, and replaced those senior
commanders who allowed these unauthorised methods to continue to be
used so that the School of Commandos and the formation can conduct
its review.
The SAF has taken a number of measures to rectify the shortcomings
identified by the HBOI. I will now ask the Chief of Defence Force,
Major-General Ng Yat Chung, to speak to you about the approach the
SAF is taking to address these issues. After that, Colonel Hugh
Lim, the Armys Assistant Chief of General Staff for Operations,
will brief you on the ongoing efforts to improve training and
safety management in the Army.
So perhaps, I should wrap up. I would just like to say that weve
had these committees of inquiry, the higher boards of inquiry in
order to the bottom of these issues so that we can uncover what
went wrong that day. Once we uncover what has gone wrong, then we
are able to take the correct measures to put them right.
The SAF has briefed you on what measures they have already taken
and what measures will be taken within the next three to six months
to put these things right. The SAF is committed to ensuring that
what happened to 2SG Hu is not repeated.
I also like to add that the response from the members of Parliament
as well as the public has been a very mature and a very supportive
one. And I appreciate that and the SAF appreciates that. Both CDF
and I have been to visit the Commandos and I think they understand
and appreciate the support that the public has for them and that
gives them the strength to be resolved, to do what is necessary to
put things right and to carry on doing their duty for the
country.
And I would like to thank the public for their continued support
and encouragement for the SAF, Army and the Commandos.
SAF Reviews Training Safety System
http://www.mindef.com.sg/display.asp?number=1951
