Eurofighter Typhoon service entry looms at last
Aviation Week & Space Technology
06/16/2003, page 128
Douglas Barrie
Munich
The Tranche 1 buy comprises 148 aircraft. Two further tranches are
also covered by a 620-aircraft umbrella contract between the
partner nations and industry.
However, once more in keeping with the partner nations' apparent
inability to follow any path of least resistance, in parallel with
service introduction, the four also are trying to hammer out the
production contract on Tranche 2, recast its scope and possibly
draw in elements of Tranche 3. As if this were not challenging
enough, there are also indications the British government is being
forced to reconsider acquisition numbers, which now stand at 232
with an option for a further 60. Meanwhile, the RAF has torn up its
long-standing fielding plan in order to better reflect emerging
operational needs.
The critical nature of getting Tranche 2 right is reinforced by two
key issues: the changing concept of operations with regard to the
aircraft, and the emerging budgetary pressures on the projected
Tranche 3 production run.
The Typhoon--or the European Fighter Aircraft as originally
conceived in the mid-1980s--is at least conceptually a "legacy"
program. Driven by the need to find a successor to the partner air
forces' inventory of air-defense aircraft--the British Tornado F3,
German F-4, Spanish F-18, and Italian F-104--EFA was designed
primarily for the air-to-air role.
As the recent war with Iraq has clearly evinced, serried ranks of
threat fighters to be met in beyond-visual-range engagements no
longer constitutes the most likely operational scenario.
The Iraqi air force, perhaps motivated by self-preservation,
remained resolutely on the ground throughout the war. And while
there was a latent, if limited, air-to-air threat, it failed to
materialize. The likely majority of future conflicts Typhoon
partners are liable to become embroiled in will surely see a
preponderance of airpower in their favor. Such superiority,
however, does not negate the need for an aircraft fully capable in
air-to-air combat. Even given near-assured air dominance--part of
the benefit of involvement in any U.S.-led coalition--the
continuing export of third- and fourth-generation combat aircraft
suggests some potential adversaries could still pose an air
threat.
In limited conflicts, the ability to defeat a Western coalition
increasingly may not have to constitute denying air supremacy, but
rather inflicting only a publicly unacceptable level of loss. At
its most extreme, ponder how many B-2s (or eventually F-22s) the
U.S. public, or indeed the Pentagon, would consider as acceptable
losses in a conflict such as Iraq, or Kosovo.
In the case of Europe, this then pushes toward the acquisition of
platforms capable of being used to prosecute an air campaign
predicated on air-to-surface engagements, while sustaining more
than sufficient air-to-air capacity.
Reflecting this shift, the RAF is looking to transition its rollout
of the aircraft into squadron service from dedicated units to an
all-multirole force structure. This would see seven multirole
squadrons available by around 2011.
RAF Air Commodore Chris Harper, who is responsible for Typhoon,
argued in a recent presentation that this change "spread the
operational loading" while also offering "significantly enhanced
flexibility."
The initial RAF service-entry road map foresaw the creation of four
dedicated air defense squadrons, to be followed by an
air-to-surface squadron, and then two multirole units.
Rather fortuitously, Typhoon was conceived from the outset with a
latent secondary air-to-surface capability.
Within both Tranches 1 and 2 there's an increased emphasis on
developing, and expanding, this capability as rapidly as possible
to maximize the utility of what will be a key platform for the
customer nations.
All of this, however, is being carried out in the context of
budgetary pressures among all of the partners, with the inevitable
gap between desirability and affordability to be negotiated.
"In addition to the Typhoon's inherent air-to-air capability, we
have to offer in a more flexible way an increased air-to-surface
capability," Bagnato acknowledged.
"Tranche 1 is not only an air-to-air platform; there is already
within the full operational capability an initial air-to-ground
capacity. The Tranche 2 concept is to build on this capability, so
the aircraft is already prepared for the integration of new
weapons," he added.
The air-to-surface capability within Tranche 1, however, is
severely constrained by the paucity of air-to-surface weapons to be
integrated on the aircraft at this stage.
The first batch of Tranche 1 aircraft for the RAF, as initially
configured, are suitable only for air-defense training and
operational test and evaluation. The batch-two aircraft will have a
moderately improved capability with the inclusion of the
multifunction information distribution system (MIDS), the first
iteration of the defensive aids subsystem (DASS), and the ability
to utilize the Paveway II laser-guided bomb.
Tranche 2 is where a much broader range of air-to-surface weaponry
is now planned to be introduced, supported by the requisite sensor
fusion, and full DASS capabilities.
Harper outlined British priorities for Tranche 2 to include
Enhanced Paveway II and laser designator pod capability, to be
followed by the Storm Shadow cruise missile, and Meteor air-to-air
missile. The yet-to-be-selected winner of the British
Precision-Guided Bomb competition will also be integrated within
the Tranche 2 standard.
The integration of a reconnaissance pod, as part of enhanced
operational capability (EOC) 2, also is being considered. One of
the emerging lessons of the war with Iraq is the continuing need
for crewed tactical reconnaissance. These upgrades are to be
implemented in two stages: EOC 1, in 2007-08, and EOC 2,
2009-10.
Eurofighter officials have asked the respective partner nations to
come up with a priority list of air-to-surface weapons to be
integrated within the context of the Tranche 2 program; however,
industry sources say this continues to be very much a work in
progress.
The weapons "wish list" is increasingly facing the litmus test of
fiscal reality, and it's likely some will either be pushed back or
removed completely.
"On additional weapon integration, we don't always want to have to
go back to the beginning [in terms of clearances]," Bagnato said.
"The Tranche 2 avionics architecture is intended to allow us to
avoid this--for both air-to-surface and air-to-air weapons."
"We want to avoid what happened on the Tornado, where the three
partner nations ended up with 17 variants of the basic type. Once
you lose commonality, you lose much of the cost-effectiveness of a
joint program," noted Massimo Tarantola, the Eurofighter support
program director.
"The concept with the Typhoon is for 2-3-year regular updates,
while also accommodating any urgent operational requirements. But I
need to know [what these are] to be able to put them into the
baseline configuration for the aircraft. Every two years or so, I
will offer all the modifications, and the same will apply with new
developments," he added.
Central to this idea is the International Weapon System Support
Center recently established at Halbergmoos, near Munich. The IWSSC
has been set up "to maintain central control of the entire weapon
system support process and resources," according to
Eurofighter.
However, as Tarantola recognized, in making this work over the life
of the program, "the real problem [among the operators] is going to
be discipline."
Regardless of how good an idea the IWSSC is, it can only be as
effective as the customers will allow. If partner nations pursue a
path similar to that of the Tornado, with the rapid emergence of
discrete national variants, then the IWSSC will be sidelined, left
to watch costs spiral as commonality is squandered.
